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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Aim 
 
During the 1980s, Latin American economies experienced low rates of economic growth 
(lower than population growth), high external debt, restricted internal consumption and 
savings, high inflation, devaluation of local currencies, and expansion of the informal labour 
market. In response, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Peru, like other countries in the 
region, implemented an accelerated process of structural reform, in accordance with the 
Washington Consensus.1 Some of the most dramatic reforms were carried out in the labour 
markets. The reforms in the Peruvian labour market legislation modified significantly the 
way employees are hired and dismissed (social security and employment protection 
conditions). In addition, external shocks such as financial crises (in Asia, Russia and Brazil) 
and natural disasters (such as the El Niño Phenomenon) impacted the functioning of the 
labour markets and influenced the effects of the reforms. 
 
It was expected that market-oriented reforms would reduce labour market inefficiencies and 
non-wage labour costs, increase labour productivity and thereby reduce inflation and boost 
economic growth. The reforms were successful at decreasing inflation and increasing 
growth; however, labour market performance was modest. The non-wage labour costs 
resulting from regulations remain high in the formal sector. As a consequence, firms without 
the financial means to comply with the regulations resorted to informality or reduced 
personnel.2 
 
In a post-structural–reform scenario, Latin American countries faced serious barriers to 
improving employment prospects for younger workers, particularly those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. The opportunities of younger workers in the labour market are 
limited under the described circumstances. Even in low-skilled jobs, individuals with larger 
human capital (in terms of work experience) displace youths seeking a first job. As a 
consequence, seven out of ten youths work in the informal sector, with no social security 
coverage, and under precarious conditions. The growing number of young people in 
intermittent, insecure and low-paid jobs is putting pressure on decision-makers to 
implement reforms. 
 
                                                          
1 Washington Consensus describes a set of specific economic policy prescriptions that constitute the 
"standard" reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries by Washington, D.C.-
based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the U.S. 
Treasury Department in the 1980s. 
2 See: Tokman and Martínez (1999); Egger and García (2000); IADB (2001); and Saavedra (2003). 
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A policy measure targeted at economically disadvantaged youths in Latin America has been 
the introduction of youth job-training programmes (YJTP). The objective of these 
programmes is to improve the labour market prospects of economically disadvantaged 
youths by providing them with basic job readiness skills as well as some trade-specific 
abilities. Since the early 1990s, such training programmes have been carried out throughout 
Latin America. YJTPs were implemented in countries including Venezuela (1993), Argentina 
(1994), Paraguay (1994), Peru (1996), the Dominican Republic (1999), Colombia (2000), 
Panama (2002) and Haiti (2005). The International Labour Office provided these countries 
with technical assistance in the design of the programmes, and most of them were funded 
with loans from the Inter-American Development Bank. YJTPs are based on the dual system 
of classroom instruction and on-the-job internship. They follow a market-oriented approach, 
in which governments consign the training activities to private parties. Latin American 
governments fund training providers to train youths on their own premises and to 
subsequently place them in internships. The government confines its role to the selection of 
the best bids from private organisations, through public tenders, and control of the quality of 
the training offered. 
 
Latin American YJTPs have been extensively evaluated and the general conclusion is that 
training programmes are effective policy interventions. It has been suggested that these 
programmes increase youths’ chances of being employed and their potential earnings, 
particularly for young women. Nevertheless, the presence of trainees who do not complete 
the programme, either because they are not placed in internships or because they drop out 
voluntarily from the programme, has been ignored in most evaluations. This is crucial 
because the presence of an important proportion of trainees who do not complete the 
training (partial treatment) is a characteristic of virtually all training programmes. Taking 
into account the low completion phenomenon, its causes and implications could challenge 
the current view of YJTPs’ effectiveness. Additionally, it could provide information about 
how to enhance the effectiveness of these programmes. For instance, apparent positive 
training outcomes, reported by earlier evaluations which do not consider the presence of 
trainees with partial treatment, could hide the fact that the training may be effective only if 
completed. Ignoring this could prevent the programme from concentrating its efforts on 
finding out the motives and consequences of the low completion phenomenon. 
 
Low completion rates in YJTPs provide evidence that i) training providers do not place all 
trainees in internships; ii) internships are carried out under precarious conditions3; or iii) the 
programme works better for some types of individuals than for others. Consequently, in 
order to estimate and understand the programme’s effectiveness, it is important to 
distinguish the effects of the different phases of the programme, to take into account the 
institutional arrangements of the training (regulations, incentives and enforcement 
mechanisms) and individual heterogeneity. Some individual characteristics, like work 
experience, gender or poverty status, could influence the programme’s effects, discouraging 
some of the trainees from completing the training. In addition, if internships are carried out 
                                                          
3 In this study, “not having a written contract” is used as an indicator of precarious working 
conditions. 
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under precarious conditions, trainees may drop out for better opportunities. These aspects 
have been neglected in previous evaluations. Therefore, the relationships between training 
completion, trainees’ heterogeneity and the institutional arrangements of YJTPs on the one 
hand, and trainees’ labour market outcomes on the other hand, remain ambiguous. This 
thesis aims at filling this gap in the treatment effects literature. 
 
Specifically, this thesis evaluates the effectiveness of the Peruvian YJTP Projoven in terms of 
both overall and formal employment and in terms of monthly wages. The case chosen for 
this study is representative of similar training measures in Latin America and has an average 
dropout rate. Projoven is an ongoing training programme initiated in 1996 and is conducted 
at least once a year in successive waves or ‘public calls’. In thirteen years of operation it has 
trained around 60,000 individuals. The programme is run by the Peruvian Ministry of 
Labour. Projoven finances training courses for youths, but the services are provided by 
training institutions which compete to obtain funding for their course offering. The official 
goal of the programme is to facilitate the insertion of economically disadvantaged youths 
(16–24 years old) into the formal labour market by funding basic training in low-skilled 
occupations. Projoven training is based on two sequential phases: i) three months of 
classroom instruction which almost all trainees complete, followed by ii) three months of on-
the-job training internship which is offered to a majority but not to all trainees. 
 
By integrating the analysis of the institutional framework, individual heterogeneity and the 
participants’ dropout behaviour into the evaluation of Projoven’s effectiveness, this thesis 
will shed light on the following questions:  
 
1. To what extent do the institutional arrangements affect the programme outcomes and 
hence should be considered in its impact evaluation? 
2. How is the estimation of Projoven’s effectiveness affected when taking into account 
simultaneously the presence of trainees with partial treatment, unobservables, and 
selection into work? 
3. Does the programme affect youth differently depending on their work experience, 
gender or poverty condition? 
4. Is training more effective conditionally on completion? 
5. What are the factors influencing trainees’ dropout behaviour? 
 
This dissertation follows a three-step approach to answer these five research questions. First, 
a discussion of the institutional framework of Projoven is presented. This discussion 
proposes a number of elements which should be taken into account in a training programme 
evaluation, such as: how the programme works and how its regulations generate the 
incentives for disadvantaged youths to enrol or drop out of training; for training providers to 
offer high-quality training or internship placements for all trainees; and for training firms to 
provide internships under proper conditions. Therefore, a deeper analysis of the institutional 
arrangements and the context under which a programme is conducted is crucial in order to 
disentangle the reasons of the programme’s success (or failure). 
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Second, the effects of the programme, in terms of both overall and formal employment and 
in terms of monthly wages, are estimated. These estimations take into account the non-
experimental nature of the data, the heterogeneity of individuals, selection into work and the 
presence of trainees with partial treatment. Neglecting the non-experimental nature of the 
data could bias the estimations of treatment effects because of potential systematic 
differences between control group individuals and trainees. Taking into account individual 
heterogeneity is crucial, as the training may affect individuals differently depending on 
certain characteristics such as poverty status, gender or work experience. In addition, 
estimating treatment effects which account for partial treatment could yield a different 
perspective on the YJTP’s effectiveness. Amalgamating completers and non-completers may 
confound different effects. For instance, dropping out implies not obtaining a certificate, 
which could cast the trainee in a negative light to potential employers. 
 
Finally, the factors affecting trainees’ dropout behaviour are analyzed. This study tests 
whether individual characteristics, regional features or training characteristics influence 
trainees’ decisions to drop out. Individuals with certain characteristics who find that they do 
not benefit sufficiently from the training to compensate for their opportunity costs will not 
make the necessary effort to complete the programme. Regional features influence trainees’ 
opportunity costs associated with pursuing training and the availability of internship 
opportunities. The characteristics of classroom instruction and of internships, revealed to the 
trainee during the training, modify individual expectations about the returns of the training. 
Youths may drop out during the training if they realise that the programme is not going to 
yield the returns they had hoped for.  
 
 
1.2 Outline of the study 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters in which the evaluation of Projoven is conducted, 
following the three-step approach described earlier. First, Chapter 2 provides background 
information about the programme and describes its institutional framework. Second, 
Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to Projoven’s treatment effect evaluation. Chapter 3 describes 
and discusses the Projoven dataset, and the sixth public call for which detailed data are 
available. In Chapter 4 a methodology to evaluate Projoven is proposed and applied. The 
evaluation is conducted in terms of both overall and formal employment and in terms of 
monthly wages. Third, Chapter 5 identifies and discusses the factors affecting trainees’ 
dropout behaviour. Finally, in Chapter 6 some general conclusions are drawn and potential 
future research opportunities are suggested. 
 
Chapter 2 studies the extent to which the institutional arrangements should be taken into 
account in the evaluation of the programme’s effectiveness given the context in which the 
programme is carried out. By presenting how Projoven is designed to work compared to 
how it actually does work, this chapter suggests three elements which should be accounted 
for when evaluating the effectiveness of a training programme such as Projoven. First, it 
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should be considered that not all the trainees are placed in internships after the classroom 
instruction phase. Therefore, Projoven’s impact evaluation should distinguish between the 
effects of the two phases of the programme. Second, as 30% of the trainees placed in 
internships drop out, Projoven’s impact evaluation should account for the presence of 
trainees with partial treatment. Third, it should be taken into account that both trainees and 
their employment prospects are heterogeneous. The fact that half of the trainees are working 
prior to the programme, most likely in the informal sector, has implications for the treatment 
effect estimations in terms of employment indicators and individual heterogeneity. 
Evaluating the effect on overall employment may overlook the real potential of the 
programme, because disadvantaged youths are frequently employed in precarious jobs with 
low pay and no social rights. Especially in a developing country with a dual labour market, 
the quality of the employment matters. Labour markets in Latin America are often 
fragmented into a formal segment, with higher productivity and where all regulations are 
met; and an informal one, with lower productivity and no regulations. Taking this dualism 
into account, assessing trainees’ employment status in the formal labour market could 
provide additional evidence of Projoven’s effects in terms of employment. In addition, the 
programme may affect trainees differently depending on their work experience. For instance, 
training returns could be relatively lower for youths with work experience as they already 
posses some skills. 
 
Chapter 3 describes Projoven’s sixth public call dataset. This dataset combines not only 
demographic information about trainees and an official control group, but also 
administrative records on level of training completion. It comprises a baseline survey and 
three follow-up interviews: at six, twelve and eighteen months after the end of the training. 
This chapter explains how a new control group was created using propensity score matching 
with replacement. The objective is to tackle the pre-programme earnings dip in the trainee 
group which is not observed in the official control group and which may be evidence of 
systematic differences between the groups, undermining their comparability. The new 
control group is a subsample of the individuals in the official control group. The tests 
performed on this new control group suggest that in terms of employment, treatment effects 
estimations are free of bias; whereas in terms of monthly wages, treatment effects estimations 
could be upward biased. 
 
In Chapter 4, Projoven’s effectiveness is evaluated. It begins with an overview of the 
literature on the treatment effect evaluation of YJTPs, in particular for Latin America. It 
includes a discussion of the importance of the low completion phenomenon for treatment 
effects estimation. The literature review suggests that not accounting for the partial treatment 
of some trainees could bias the results and the interpretations of the programme’s effects. 
Basically, individuals who complete the training (or are exposed longer to the training) 
experience higher employment and income gains in comparison with individuals who do 
not. This chapter estimates the effectiveness of Projoven’s sixth public call, in terms of both 
overall and formal employment and in terms of monthly wage. It accounts for the presence 
of trainees with partial treatment using fixed effects methods with sample selection 
correction. Four groups are compared pair-wise: the control group, the dropout group with 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
6 
 
only classroom training, the dropout group with classroom training and internship 
placement, and the group completing the full programme. The estimations also account for 
the potential endogeneity of training completion. Using pooled two stages least squares 
methods with sample selection correction, it is found that in terms of overall and formal 
employment, the returns of the programme are only short-term effects and are based on 
internship completion. The programme seems to increase trainees’ wages, but these effects 
diminish over time. When differentiating the effects by types of individuals, it is found that 
Projoven yields additional returns, in terms of overall employment and wages, for 
individuals with no work experience prior to enrolment, and these additional returns are 
constant over time. It should be noted that general equilibrium effects of Projoven on the 
Peruvian labour market are negligible given the limited coverage of the programme. 
 
The extent of the dropout phenomenon in Projoven and the circumstances under which 
dropouts are more likely are analyzed in Chapter 5. Using a probit model which controls for 
a potential selection into internship, the estimations suggest that regional differences and 
internship conditions (in particular, having a written contract) affect trainees’ decisions to 
drop out. Two different exit-routes are identified and compared to training completion: i) 
dropping out of training to take another job, and ii) dropping out of training into 
unemployment or inactivity. Using a multinomial probit model, the estimates suggest that 
trainees who are male and have prior work experience are less likely to drop out into 
unemployment, but are more likely to drop out for another job. 
 
Both empirical structures i) Projoven’s effectiveness evaluation and ii) the analysis of the 
factors affecting trainees’ dropout behaviour, complement each other in order to shed more 
light in studying the dropout phenomenon in training programmes. Whereas the first one 
evaluates the consequences of dropping out, in terms of employment condition and wage 
gains, the second one provides a profile of trainees who are most likely to drop out. The 
analysis of the factors affecting trainees’ dropout behaviour complements Projoven’s 
effectiveness evaluation by going beyond the consequences of dropping out. It gives some 
explanation about why trainees drop out even when is not worthy doing so.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 draws conclusions from the study. The main findings of the thesis are 
reviewed in this chapter as well as their policy implications and the scope for future 
research. This thesis contributes to the YJTP treatment effects literature in two ways. First, its 
contribution lies in examining the impact of the presence of trainees with partial instruction 
in YJTPs, while appropriately accounting simultaneously for unobservables, potential 
endogeneity of training completion, trainees’ heterogeneity and the institutional 
arrangements of YJTPs. This approach consists of comparing pair-wise four groups of youths 
(the control group, the dropout group with only classroom training, the dropout group with 
classroom training and internship placement, and the group completing the full programme) 
to avoid potential bias generated by completion levels. In addition, the use of fixed effects 
accounts for the presence of unobservables; and complemented with random effects allow 
the effects of the programme to vary, not only over time, but across individual characteristics 
(gender, poverty status and work experience). Second, this thesis contributes to the existing 
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literature by focusing on the determinants of trainees’ dropout behaviour accounting for 
potential selection into internships and allowing the effects of the determinants to vary 
depending on the exit route (to another job or to unemployment). The few empirical studies 
that evaluated training programmes accounting for partial treatment did not develop further 
on why trainees drop out, even though they concluded it is not worthwhile to do so (e.g., 
Mealli et al., 1996; Heckman et al., 1998; Heckman et al., 2000; Lee and Lee, 2003; Flores-
Lagunes et al., 2007). This thesis seeks to disentangle the reasons behind trainees’ dropout 
behaviour taking into account that trainees who drop out for another job can have a different 
profile than those who drop out into unemployment. By accounting for potential selection 
into internship and different exit routes, this study suggests that individual characteristics, 
regional features and characteristics of the training affect trainees’ dropout behaviour. 
Additionally, it argues that trainees who are male and have prior work experience are less 
likely to drop out into unemployment, but more likely to drop out for another job. This 
understanding is crucial as it allows policy makers to enhance the benefits of training by 
taking into account these factors. 
 
This thesis’ findings imply that the programme must be complemented with a better 
selection of training providers, stricter monitoring mechanisms and focused targeting 
strategies. To enhance its effectiveness, Projoven should take into account that i) not all 
trainees receive the same doses of treatment; ii) the effectiveness of the training varies 
individually based on several socioeconomic factors; and iii) precarious treatment conditions 
can lead trainees to drop out of the programme.  
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Chapter 2  
Projoven’s Institutional Framework 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes Projoven’s institutional framework. Understanding the institutional 
framework governing a youth job training programme (YJTP) such as Projoven and the 
context under which it operates is critical to assessing and interpreting under which 
circumstances the programme could be more (or less) beneficial. By comparing how the 
programme is supposed to function and how it performs in practice, this chapter suggests 
three elements that should be taken into account when evaluating the effectiveness of 
Projoven. 
 
First, since a quarter of trainees are not placed in internships (the second phase of the 
programme) after finishing the classroom instruction phase, Projoven’s impact evaluation 
should estimate separately the effects of the two training phases of the programme. Labour 
market outcomes may differ depending on whether the trainee is placed or not in an 
internship, as the internship phase plays an important role in providing disadvantaged 
youths with job readiness skills and trade-specific abilities. Some features of Projoven’s 
institutional framework may influence training providers not to place all trainees in 
internships. For instance, the most valued criteria in Projoven’s course selection are (1) 
maintaining the least unit cost per trainee, and (2) the commitment of the training provider 
to place at least 60% of trainees in internships. Competition to offer low-cost courses could 
incentivise training providers to supply low quality training or not to offer internship 
placements to all trainees. Providing high-quality training and finding internships for all 
trainees would increase cost estimates in course proposals, reducing the chances of selection 
for those training providers. 
 
Second, since 30% of trainees placed in internships drop out, Projoven’s impact evaluation 
should account for the presence of trainees with only partial treatment. Projoven’s effects 
may differ by trainee level of completion. Trainee dropout behaviour, when not considered, 
could yield biased estimates of the effects of the programme, particularly when dropouts are 
systematically different from completers. Disadvantaged youths enrol in the training with 
the expectation of improving their labour market prospects. Their opportunity cost, working 
in the informal labour market in precarious conditions, is evidently lower than the minimum 
wage they are supposed to earn during the internship. However, not all training firms offer 
proper internship conditions. In this study, “not having a written contract” is used as an 
indicator of precarious working conditions. Precarious internship conditions may discourage 
trainees from carrying on with the training. The fact that not all training firms comply with 
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Projoven’s internship regulations may be explained by the lack of an effective monitoring 
process during the internship and the transaction costs involved in hiring trainees. 
 
Finally, because Projoven is carried out in a developing country with a dual labour market, 
its treatment effect evaluation should consider the impact of both formal and informal 
employment. In Peru, the lack of appropriate welfare programmes forces individuals at the 
bottom of the income distribution to find precarious jobs in the informal labour market. 
Around half of Projoven participants are working when they enrol in the programme. By 
observing only overall employment, without distinguishing between formal and informal 
jobs, the policymaker might overlook the effects of the programme on the quality component 
of employment. In this respect, an indicator of the quality of employment, formal labour 
employment condition, could be more indicative of the effects of the programme on trainee 
employment prospects. In addition, the presence of individuals employed prior to enrolment 
in the programme could introduce new sources of individual heterogeneity. The programme 
may affect individuals differently depending on their prior work experience. Therefore, 
Projoven treatment effects evaluation should also take into account individual heterogeneity 
(in terms of work experience and poverty status). For instance, training returns could be 
lower for youths with work experience if the training merely teaches skills they have already 
acquired. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the general context in 
which Projoven is carried out. Section 2.3 describes the vocational education and training 
market in Peru. A detailed description of Projoven’s institutional framework is provided in 
Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
 
2.2 The General Context 
 
Projoven has trained more than 60,000 disadvantaged youths from thirteen Peruvian cities. 
The programme started in Lima (the capital) and has progressively expanded to more cities. 
Projoven is conducted in successive waves, or public calls. From 1996 to 2007, the 
programme has conducted fifteen public calls. This period was characterized by vigorous 
economic recovery after the implementation of an aggressive structural reform agenda in the 
early 1990s. After completion of the structural reforms, improvements were obvious in terms 
of Peru’s monetary and fiscal position. Macroeconomic equilibrium was restored and 
inflation rates were reduced, making Peru one of the fastest growing economies of the 
region. Unfortunately, these developments were not accompanied by improvements in the 
labour market, mainly in terms of quality. During the reference period, yearly employment 
growth was approximately 3.5%, slightly above labour supply growth (3.3%); however, the 
quality of the jobs created was quite poor. The proportion of jobs in the informal labour 
market increased from 45% to 52% and employment in firms with more than 100 workers 
decreased in absolute terms. In addition, an increase in the turnover rate and a decrease in 
average worker tenure may have contributed to the actual reduction in the levels of firm-
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provided training (from 19% to 14% during the reference period). This situation impacted the 
opportunities available to low-skilled workers, particularly for youths of disadvantaged 
background. 
 
A total of 3.6 million youths within the age bracket of 15–24 years (22% of the Peruvian 
population) entered the workforce in the period 1997–2007. Despite some improvement in 
educational attainment, young cohorts typically exhibit higher unemployment rates than 
adults. During the reference period, the youth unemployment rate was stable at 
approximately 14%, almost triple the corresponding rate for adults. The youth participation 
rate was stable at around 55%, a 20% lower participation rate compared to adults. It is not 
surprising that youths have lower participation rates than adults since many are still in the 
process of acquiring basic human capital (through schooling). However, the proportion of 
youths neither working nor studying increased over the period, from 19% to 23%, whereas 
the proportion of youths engaged exclusively in study slowly declined, from 32% to 29%. 
 
Perhaps the poor performance of public basic education is limiting the ability of this cohort 
to pursue tertiary education. The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) indicates that student scores in Peruvian public schools are alarmingly low in 
language, mathematics and science. In reading, for instance, 80% of Peruvian students are 
below minimum level one. This means that these students have serious reading deficiencies. 
As a matter of comparison, Argentina has 44% of its students below this level, Uruguay 40%, 
Brazil 50%, Mexico 52% and Chile 48%.1 The results in mathematics and science literacy are 
also low. Peru performed worst in the region in these areas. The outcomes from poor quality 
education are expressed in the precarious labour market conditions under which Peruvian 
youths work. Whereas the number of hours worked per week held close to 41 on average 
during the period 1997–2007, the average real youth wage declined steeply (down 26% over 
the period). Additionally, seven out of ten youths worked in the informal labour market, 
with no social security coverage. 
 
The growing number of young people in intermittent, insecure, and low-paid jobs is putting 
pressure on decision makers to search for new and more effective policy interventions. The 
poor quality of public education forces young workers into the informal labour market and 
reduces their ability to pursue further study. The lack of skills is thought to be one of the key 
determinants of major social problems for youth. Thus, education programmes have been at 
the heart of development policies. However, these interventions take a long time to translate 
into poverty reduction and require further investment in quality improvement. Education 
programmes may reach youths too late, especially those who are entering or are close to 
entering the labour market. Given conditions for young people in the labour market, 
vocational education and training appears to be a suitable option. 
 
                                                          
1 The average in OECD countries of students below level one is 19%. 
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2.3 The Vocational Education and Training Market 
 
The Peruvian regular education system consists of three levels of instruction: primary 
education, secondary education, and tertiary education. Primary education is carried out in 
six grades (years); it is mandatory and begins at age six. Secondary education is carried out 
in five grades (years); its objective is to strengthen the outcomes achieved in primary 
education and to orient the students toward vocational fields according to their aptitudes. 
After secondary school, youths may opt for tertiary education (university and non-university 
technical schools). University studies last at least five years and technical school studies last 
from three to five years. 
 
Vocational education and training grew as a system separated from regular education. Both 
systems (vocational education and regular education) show, in practice, a disparity of 
objectives, little coordination, and very often differing sets of social values (Chacaltana and 
Sulmont, 2004). Vocational education and training services are defined as courses lasting less 
than a year designed to prepare individuals for low-skill jobs and to provide them with 
trade-specific abilities. As a consequence, vocational education and training is seen as an 
alternative for those who cannot access (or cannot afford financially) tertiary education or for 
those who drop out of secondary education. 
 
In Peru, the provision of vocational education and training expanded significantly in the 
1990s and consists of a heterogeneous supply of private and public institutions. Vocational 
education and training is provided by Institutes for Tertiary Technical Education (IST) and 
Vocational Training Centres sponsored by Economic-Sector Associations of firms - VTCESA 
(SENATI, the industry-related firms training centre; CENFOTUR, the tourism-related firms 
training centre; SENCICO, the construction-related firms training centre; etc.). Additionally, 
there are institutions targeting individuals who do not complete secondary education, such 
as the centres for vocational training (CEO), which are publicly funded, and programmes 
organized by NGOs. 
 
In contrast to the rapid expansion of institutions providing vocational education and 
training, the market is still poorly regulated and efforts to introduce quality standards 
through certification have been extremely slow (Diaz and Jaramillo, 2006). As a consequence, 
the supply of vocational education and training is heterogeneous. It is composed of diverse 
types of institutions with dissimilar levels of quality, prices, services and links with the 
productive sector. On the one hand, this heterogeneity could be beneficial to satisfy the 
demands of firms that require specific skills and the demands of individuals who have 
different preferences. On the other hand, this heterogeneity could be detrimental if the 
differences in quality among institutions imply inequality in accessing job opportunities. 
According to Saavedra and Chacaltana (2001), disadvantaged youths are more likely to 
attend vocational education and training institutions of low quality, as they imply low 
investments in terms of both time and financial resources. 
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Vocational education and training could serve as a fundamental tool to improving youth 
employability. However, the low quality of vocational training services and their limited 
links with the productive sector may limit the ability of disadvantaged youths to succeed in 
the labour market. By implementing the YJTP Projoven, the Peruvian government attempts 
to make available vocational education and training for youths from disadvantaged 
backgrounds and to stimulate links between the productive sector and the vocational 
education and training system. 
 
 
2.4 Projoven 
 
Projoven began its operations in 1996 under the umbrella of the labour market policies of the 
Peruvian Ministry of Labour. The International Labour Organization (ILO) provided 
technical assistance for the implementation of these measures. Originally the programme 
was intended to be implemented nationwide. When the ILO proposed the idea and design of 
Projoven to the Peruvian Ministry of Labour, it had already obtained funding to train 150,000 
youths per year over four years. This funding was obtained through a loan from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB). Unfortunately, the Ministry of Labour did not obtain 
the counterpart public funding (approximately 30%) necessary to secure the IADB loan. 
Consequently, the funding was reduced to the extent that during the first four years of the 
programme only 8,220 youths were trained in three cities, with an expenditure of 4.4 million 
U.S. dollars. 
 
The official goal of the programme is to facilitate the entry of economically disadvantaged 
youths (16–24 years old) into the formal labour market by funding basic training in low-skill 
occupations. Additionally, by inviting tenders for training courses depending on, among 
other factors, internship placement, Projoven attempts to enhance the links between 
vocational education and training providers and the productive sector. The programme 
rationale is to provide youths with the hope that by increasing their human capital, they 
avoid involvement in drugs or criminal activities. In fact, the original design of the 
programme included modules and workshops related to this issue. This objective was lost as 
Projoven progressively evolved into a training programme à la Europe or the U.S. 
 
Projoven’s training activities are organized into three preparatory phases and two phases of 
actual instruction. The first two preparatory phases are: (1) selection of courses to be offered, 
and (2) selection of eligible participants by the programme management unit. The third 
preparatory phase, referred to as (3) ‘ECAP selection process’, is selection of trainees by the 
training providers when there are fewer vacancies than candidates. Following these 
preparatory phases, the two phases of actual instruction are: (1) classroom instruction and (2) 
on-the-job training. These phases are discussed in the following subsections. 
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2.4.1 Course Selection 
 
The course selection process begins when Projoven launches a call for training providers (the 
so-called ECAP – Entidades de Capacitación). Institutions interested in participating in the 
programme must register in the database of training providers called RECAP (Registro de 
Entidades de Capacitación). To be registered in RECAP, potential ECAPs must have a valid 
licence from the Ministry of Education, possess proper facilities for teaching, and have a 
track record in vocational training. 
 
The ECAPs registered at RECAP are invited to present course proposals. The courses must 
be aimed at a low skill level, terminal (training should be sufficient to get a job – no need to 
be complemented by another type of training/education) and, most importantly, labour-
demand oriented (there should be firms requiring workers with this training). Courses 
include training for: office assistants, call centre operators, pharmacy assistants, hairdressing 
and cosmetology assistants, inventory assistants, archival assistants, payroll assistants, cloth 
finisher, counting clerk and clerical assistant, assistants for computer installation and 
maintenance, textile operators, woodcutting machine operators, sales clerks, housekeepers, 
house cleaners, carpentry assistants, plumbers’ assistants and electricians’ assistants, among 
others. 
 
The courses should be designed for 15 to 25 students per classroom, last between 200 and 300 
hours, with four to five contact hours per day spread over four or five days per week, over 
three months. Proposals are selected based on a grading system that follows an algorithm 
that chooses the best quality courses at the best competing prices. In practice, the most 
valued criteria for course selection are: lowest unit cost per student, and the commitment of 
the ECAP to place at least 60% of the trainees in internships. The ECAPs must provide 
Projoven with a document signed by a firm representative that confirms internship 
vacancies. On average, per public call, between 40% and 50% of course proposals are rejected 
on the basis of these criteria. ECAPs receive a financial compensation based on the costs of 
the courses per youth trained at their premises. Compensation is reduced for trainees who 
either are not placed in an internship or do not complete it. 
 
Projoven has supplied 2,164 courses in its first thirteen public calls. The supply of courses per 
public call, as mentioned above, is driven mainly by budgetary considerations. Over time, 
the programme has grown, in terms of the number of class groups2, as shown in Figure 2.1, 
until the ninth public call. Afterwards, the programme experienced some difficulties in 
obtaining funding. As a consequence, a sudden decline is observed in the supply of courses 
in the tenth public call. Fortunately, the programme obtained new sources of funding and 
was able to increase the supply of courses almost to the level of the 2000–2001 public calls. 
 
Probably because of the budget constraints and the course selection mechanism, the costs of 
the programme are relatively low. Training a youth for six months costs the programme US 
                                                          
2 The term “class groups” is used to refer to the number of groups in which a class is taught.  
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$530, meaning the monthly cost of the training is less than US $100 (Saavedra and 
Chacaltana, 2001). As is evident in Figure 2.2, the evolution of unit costs per course per 
trainee seems to follow a slightly decreasing trend. Providing a trainee with a course 
becomes somewhat cheaper over time. In principle, this could represent evidence of a 
learning effect. ECAPs may progressively reduce some of their costs by participating 
continuously. However, of the 333 ECAPs that have provided courses in Projoven, 68% 
participated in only one public call, 18% in two public calls, 7% in three public calls, and 7% 
in four or more public calls. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Number of class groups per public call. Projoven (1996–2005) 
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Source: Projoven and further elaboration by the author. 
* PCi: ith public call. 
 
Figure 2.2. 
Average ECAP unitary cost per course per trainee per public call. Projoven (1996–2001) 
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Source: Projoven and further elaboration by the author. 
* PCi: ith public call. 
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The high proportion of one-time ECAP participants suggests that they are not exploiting 
learning effects. Perhaps in order to appear as a cost-efficient institution, ECAPs are 
compromising the quality of training and not making the necessary effort to place all trainees 
in appropriate internships. Whereas almost all trainees complete the classroom phase and 
are entitled to pursue an internship, one-quarter of trainees are not placed in internships. 
Although internship placement is above the 60% threshold, ideally all trainees should 
experience the internship phase. This phase plays an important role in providing 
disadvantaged youths with job readiness skills and trade-specific abilities. 
 
The high proportion of trainees not placed in internships may be explained by institutional 
arrangements with respect to the selection of courses and ECAP compensation mechanisms. 
It is possible that the additional compensation for completing two phases does not suffice to 
cover the marginal costs of placing more trainees in internships. This feature of the course 
selection mechanism could force training providers to save money by supplying low quality 
training or by not offering internship placements to all trainees. Providing high-quality 
training and finding internships for all trainees would increase the cost of the course, 
reducing the chances of proposal selection. 
 
Distinguishing the treatment effects by training phase is critical in Projoven treatment effect 
estimations. It will be shown in Chapter 4 that classroom instruction alone yields no returns 
on trainee labour market outcomes (see also Chacaltana et al., 2003). Although the internship 
placement performance of ECAPs is above the threshold required by the programme, the 
fact that not all trainees are placed in internships undermines the programme’s effectiveness; 
this should be taken into account in any evaluation. 
 
2.4.2 Selection of eligible participants 
 
Selection of eligible participants follows after course selection. Potential enrolees are targeted 
based on a poverty map. Projoven’s branch offices in the selected cities conduct campaigns to 
recruit the targeted youth. The target group consists of youths between the ages of 16 and 24, 
in poverty status, and with low educational attainment (a maximum of secondary education 
completion). The programme usually places newspaper ads and distributes flyers in 
strategically selected locations, and invites potential participants and their parents to 
informational meetings. 
 
Projoven’s targeted demographic group was composed of 0.97 million people in 1997, 1.4 
million people in 2001, 1.4 million people in 2004, and 0.89 million people in 2007 (See Table 
2.1). Consequently, the overall effect of Projoven on the labour market and in the market for 
vocational training is quite limited. Since 1996, Projoven has benefited only 60,000 youths, 
less than 7% of its targeted population regardless of year of reference. The programme is too 
small to generate a change in the youth labour market and/or in the market for vocational 
education and training. 
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Table 2.1. 
Poverty level, in thousands. Urban Peru (1997–2007) 
 1997 2001 2004 2007 
     
Total population  16,064.1 17,560.9 18,240.0 19,001.4 
Below poverty line 4,706.8 7,305.3 6,675.8 4,845.4 
(%) 29.3 41.6 36.6 25.5 
     
Total youths  3,442.8 3,533.4 3,870.2 3,672.9 
Below poverty line 970.9 1,424.0 1,385.5 899.9 
(%) 28.2 40.3 35.8 24.5 
Source: ENAHO (1997-2005) and further elaboration by the author. 
Note: Poverty measures are absolute and are calculated at the household level. Households are referred to as poor if their 
expenditure per capita does not allow them to afford a basket of goods, which is adjusted by city (defined by the Peruvian 
National Institute of Statistics – INEI). 
 
 
Applicants who fulfil the requirements of age, poverty status, and low educational 
attainment are called back for a detailed evaluation of their eligibility. Potential trainees must 
fill in a socio-economic evaluation form (FSEE), which collects information about educational 
attainment, job training experience, labour status, family composition, and living space. 
Based on this information, Projoven calculates a poverty score. Only participants above a 
particular poverty threshold are deemed eligible to enrol in the programme.3 
 
Table 2.2. 
Targeting errors. Projoven (2001–2005) 
Public 
call 
Year Eligible 
youths 
Undercoverage 
(%) 
Leakage 
(%) 
8th 2001   9,837 0.16 0.15 
9th 2002 10,851 0.02 0.10 
11th 2003   3,977 0.60 5.98 
12th 2004   5,818 1.58 4.78 
13th 2005 11,091 0.66 5.15 
Source: Projoven and further elaboration by the author. 
 
 
To check for possible targeting errors, the programme interviews a random sample of 
accredited individuals in their homes. The interview contains the same questions as the 
FSEE, but the facts can be observed in situ. The rationale here is to uncover problems of 
leakage and undercoverage. Leakage consists of all those cases that were classified as eligible 
in the first screening that turned out not to be actually eligible. Undercoverage consists of all 
those cases that were classified as non-eligible in the first screening that turned out to be 
eligible. In Table 2.2, it is notable that undercoverage and leakage indicators are below 2% 
and 6%, respectively. These figures are rather small in comparison with those of other 
                                                          
3 In order to be eligible, participants should have a poverty score greater than 11 points. The poverty 
score is based on certain proxies of poverty status without considering income. Table A2.1 of the 
appendix explains the detailed composition of the poverty score index. 
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Peruvian social programmes. Alcazar et al. (2003) argue that food programmes and day care 
programmes targeting children present leakage and undercoverage levels above 40% and 
50%, respectively. Therefore, Projoven seems to be effective in terms of targeting. 
 
The profile of Projoven trainees indicates that the programme attracts the poorest among the 
poor and that more than 50% of trainees are employed prior to training. In Table 2.3, it is 
observed (for public calls of the programme that have been evaluated) that the control 
groups and trainees are similar in observables such as gender, age, education and 
employment. These characteristics make both groups eligible at baseline (two to three 
months prior to training). However, according to the table, trainees seem to be poorer and 
earn less than their peers in the control groups.4 The averages of monthly wages displayed in 
Table 2.3 are in nominal terms. These wages are also lower than the national averages for 
youths (around S/. 539 in Lima and S/. 357 in urban Peru). 
 
Table 2.3. 
Characteristics of treated individuals and control groups. Projoven (1997–2001) 
 First public call 
(1997) 
Fourth public call 
(1999) 
Sixth public call 
(2000) 
Eighth public call 
(2001) 
 Trainees Control 
group 
Trainees Control 
group 
Trainees Control 
group 
Trainees Control 
group 
         
Male (%) 43.4 43.4 44.1 43.6 48.1 49.9 46.3 45.4 
Av. Age 19.5 20.2 20.3 20.0 19.6 19.8 19.0 19.0 
Secondary 
education (%) 
85.5 83.6 82.5 80.36 79.8 79.7 49.5 45.6 
Employment 
(%) 
54.0 51.8 56.7 56.0 62.8 60.9 54.7 54.8 
Av. monthly 
wages (S/.) 
209.7 300.5 179.4 211.0 238.3 315.9 166.4 239.0 
Source: Diaz and Jaramillo (2006). 
S/.: Peruvian Nuevos Soles. 
 
 
As is evident in Table 2.3, between 54% and 63% of trainees are employed prior to enrolment 
in the programme. A similar range (between 52% and 61%) is observed in the control group. 
Urgent household needs and the absence of proper welfare programmes force 
disadvantaged youths to leave school and enter the labour market early. They often end up 
working in the informal sector under precarious conditions. Trainee employment conditions 
prior to enrolment in the programme may hold implications for the evaluation of training 
effectiveness. If trainees were working prior to enrolment in the programme, no (or low) 
effect would be observed in terms of overall employment. The presence of trainees working 
prior to enrolment in the programme does not imply that they do not need the programme. 
Since they work in the informal labour market, the programme should aim at improving the 
quality of their employment conditions, via the provision of skills. Consequently, 
                                                          
4
 Individuals in the control group are selected among eligible youths in the neighbourhood of the 
trainees. Individuals in the control group are matched one-to-one with the trainees based on the 
following criteria: sex, age (+/- one year), education level, and poverty score (+/- five points). 
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employment in the formal labour market could be more indicative of Projoven’s 
effectiveness. 
 
The fact that half of trainees work prior to enrolment in the programme could hold 
additional implications for Projoven’s treatment effects estimations. Training could yield 
lower returns to individuals with work experience as these individuals have a higher 
marginal productivity. This makes sense when additional training efforts yield decreasing 
returns and merely teach skills that youths with work experience already have.  
 
In summary, overall employment alone is not sufficient to measure Projoven’s performance. 
Another qualitative measure of employment, such as formal employment, could provide 
more evidence as to the effectiveness of the programme. In addition, since the effect of the 
programme may depend on trainee employment condition prior to training, treatment effect 
evaluation should take this heterogeneity into account. 
 
2.4.3 ECAP selection process 
 
After the selection of eligible participants by the programme, the ECAP selection process of 
eligible trainees takes place. Eligible youths attend a meeting where they are informed about 
the available courses. The advantage of matching the courses closely with their skills is 
pointed out. Next, the potential participants take a vocational test and choose three course 
options. The test assesses the capacity of the applicant to execute simple arithmetic 
operations. The rationale for the test is to ascertain that potential trainees match the 
prerequisites of particular courses. For the most requested courses, Projoven sends up to 
three potential trainees for every vacancy available in each ECAP, based on trainee 
preferences and the results of the vocational test. Afterwards, the ECAP selects applicants 
based on interviews. No additional tests are allowed. Trainees not given their first option are 
reallocated according to their preferences in less sought-after courses. 
 
According to Projoven (2002), for the ninth public call only 23% of the participants who 
started with the programme had enrolled in the course they chose initially. The rest were re-
distributed among their second or third alternatives. The most desired courses are computer 
operator, textile operator, cloth finisher, counting clerk and clerical assistant, whereas the 
less desired courses are sales clerk, housekeeper and house cleaner. The main reasons 
eligible youths argue for not taking these courses are the fact that the payment for these jobs 
depends on commissions or that they are carried out in precarious conditions (Projoven, 
2002). 
 
The ECAP selection procedure may affect some interim outcomes of the programme. If 
trainees follow courses they are not interested in, they are more prone to drop out. In fact, 
the take-up ratio of the programme is quite low. As observed in Figure 2.3, the proportion of 
eligible individuals actually taking the courses ranges between 42% and 60% across public 
calls. This outcome could be signalling that the information sessions fail to sufficiently guide 
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youths with respect to matching courses and capabilities. The low take-up rate diminishes 
ECAP capacity to cream (select trainees), as sometimes vacancies are difficult to fill. This 
generally causes delays in the starting dates of the courses. 
 
Figure 2.3. 
Take-up rate. Projoven (1996–2005) 
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Source: Projoven and further elaboration by the author. 
* PCi: ith public call. 
 
2.4.4 Classroom instruction phase 
 
Actual training begins after these preparatory phases. The first training phase, the three-
month classroom instruction, consists of training courses in standard settings in the form of 
classes and workshops. Projoven assumes tuition costs and pays the trainees’ stipends to 
cover transportation and food expenses. This amount can be marginally higher for women 
with children, in order to encourage their participation. Participants are also covered by 
basic health insurance financed by Projoven during the instruction period. Practically all 
trainees complete the classroom phase of the programme; on average, only 3% of trainees 
drop out of this phase, for reasons related mainly to health. Classroom phase completion is 
not conditional on further examinations. Attendance is the only requirement. 
 
The courses must follow the job competence approach stated by Projoven in its manual. A 
job competence involves skills and aptitudes to solve problems and fabricate products (or 
perform services) within a particular occupation. Course design must be based on the 
training needed for a specific trade. To elaborate the design, the programme states that 
ECAPs should use interviews with firms and workers performing that trade in their 
geographical area. Overly specific training could jeopardise employment opportunities for 
trainees after the programme since it would not be transferable to another firm. 
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An extensive analysis of the Projoven courses is carried out by Chacaltana et al. (2003). That 
study concluded that, in some cases, it is not possible to develop the required vocational 
competences given a time frame of three months. Chacaltana et al. (2003) present the 
example of the curriculum of a Projoven course of operator for textile machines, which they 
compared with what is needed for the same course in a well-known technical school. These 
authors conclude that the classroom instruction necessary for training in operating textile 
machines takes longer than three months. Technical schools even provide additional 
preparatory courses before embarking on the use of textile machines – without them it may 
not be possible to grasp the knowledge necessary to operate a textile machine. 
 
2.4.5 On-the-job training phase 
 
The final phase of the programme is a three-month on-the-job training internship. All 
participants who complete the classroom instruction, with attendance being the only 
requirement, are entitled in principle to start the on-the-job training phase. During the 
internship, the trainees should be under the supervision of a tutor. The assigned internship 
must consist of activities that complement the training received during the classroom phase. 
The ECAPs are responsible for the compatibility of course content with the internship. 
 
Projoven establishes that training firms must hire trainees under a youth training contract 
(convenios de capacitación laboral juvenil – CCLJ). The CCLJ is designed for young low-
skilled workers between ages 16 and 24 (Projoven’s target group). The contract establishes 
that a working day cannot last more than eight hours and the trainee should not work more 
than 48 hours per week. The term of the contract should not last more than six months. With 
respect to pay, the wage should not be lower than the minimum wage.5 The contract may be 
extended for an additional six months after documenting proof of the need for the extension 
in terms of the trainee’s education. CCLJ contracts are exempted from the usual social 
security contributions. Firms can also deduct from taxes their expenditures on wages paid 
under this modality. All trainees hired under the CCLJ must be covered with an insurance 
policy against diseases and accidents. 
 
Projoven’s requirement of the use of CCLJ contracts may increase training firms’ transaction 
costs and thereby diminish trainee’s opportunities to be placed in internships. The official 
minimum wage, required by Projoven during the internship, is higher than what an 
unskilled worker is willing to work for as an unregistered worker (black payroll). In the 
labour market, there are individuals available and able to work for less than the minimum 
wage for the same types of jobs that trainees would be performing. This is especially true 
outside Lima. In addition, CCLJ agreements are meant to last a maximum of only six 
months. They may be extended for an additional six months after a bureaucratic procedure. 
If training is not seen as an investment in human capital, it is very unlikely that firms will 
retain trainees longer than six months. If trainees stay longer, the firm should hire them on a 
regular basis, and this, in terms of non-wage labour costs, is relatively more expensive. Non-
                                                          
5 In the case of part-timers, the payment will be prorated. 
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wage labour costs account for 30% of gross wages. Increments in transaction costs cause the 
effective post-training period to be shortened (Arulampalam et al., 1997). In fact, less than 7% 
of trainees remain at their training firm more than six months after the end of the internship. 
 
Although Projoven states that trainees must be hired under a CCLJ contract, there are 
indications that not all training firms comply with this regulation. In Table 2.4, it is evident 
that in the sixth public call, in Lima and Chiclayo, 19% and 27%, respectively, of the trainees 
worked without a written contract during the internship phase. Working without a written 
contract implies no insurance coverage and is also synonymous with long working hours, no 
wage payment guarantee, and an unsafe work environment (Velazco, 2004). 
 
Table 2.4. 
Trainees by type of contract. Projoven (2000) 
 Lima  Chiclayo 
   
Total (%) 100 100 
With a written contract   
Finished internship 52.4 16.4 
Did not finish internship 10.0 15.5 
Without a written contract   
Finished internship 1.9 5.5 
Did not finish internship 17.5 21.8 
No internship 18.3 40.9 
Source: Follow-up survey Projoven sixth public call and further elaboration by the author. 
 
Projoven lacks an effective enforcement system to supervise the development of the 
internship phase. Training firms are not accountable to Projoven directly. It is the ECAP that 
is responsible for proper development of the internship. The programme penalizes ECAPs 
with a lower payment if trainees do not complete the two phases of the programme. The 
programme interviews a sample of trainees and training firm managers. However, no 
penalty is stipulated if a trainee is performing a task not related to the classroom phase, the 
trainee is not adequately supervised during the internship, or (s)he is not hired under a 
written contract. 
 
A possible consequence of internships carried out under precarious conditions (without a 
contract) can be observed in Projoven’s dropout rates. Approximately 30% of trainees placed 
in internships drop out. This is critically important, as Chacaltana et al. (2003) and Chapter 4 
of this dissertation argue that the training must be completed in order to yield returns. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the absence of a written contract is one of the predominant factors 
affecting the individual likelihood to drop out of Projoven internships. This voluntary 
dropout phenomenon could imply a source of bias in the programme’s treatment effects 
estimation, and therefore should be accounted for in the Projoven treatment effect 
evaluation. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
 
Understanding Projoven’s institutional framework is important, as this framework describes 
the systemic relationships between training interventions and the circumstances under 
which they are more (or less) beneficial. This chapter reaches three general conclusions about 
critical elements of the institutional framework of Projoven. These conclusions should be 
taken into account in programme evaluation because they may explain some of the findings 
about the effectiveness of the programme. 
 
First, Projoven’s impact evaluation should account for the fact that not all trainees are placed 
in internships. Prioritising training providers with low unit costs per course might be 
beneficial in terms of programme efficiency, but not in terms of, for instance, programme 
effectiveness, among other considerations. Low-cost courses not only compromise training 
quality, but may reduce the chances that trainees will be placed in internships. The financial 
compensation mechanisms and the relatively low official threshold may fail to motivate 
ECAPs to make the necessary effort to place all trainees in proper internships. Distinguishing 
training effects by phase could shed new light on the effectiveness of the training. 
 
Second, in addition to evaluating the various programme phases, it is important to consider 
the level of completion of those training phases. In Projoven, 30% of trainees placed in 
internships drop out. The fact that trainees voluntarily receive different ‘doses’ of training 
(and drop out) should be accounted for in the evaluation of Projoven’s impact.  
 
Third, in a developing-country context with a dual labour market, a training programme 
evaluation should consider alternative indicators of performance. Overall employment may 
not suffice as an indicator to evaluate the impact of the programme if, say, half of the trainees 
were employed prior to enrolment in the programme (mainly in the informal sector). In such 
case, the observed effects in terms of employment would be attenuated. A better indicator of 
the programme’s performance with respect to employment would be formal employment. In 
addition, the presence of trainees employed prior to the programme indicates that different 
sources of individual heterogeneity should be considered. The effects of the programme may 
depend on trainees’ prior work experience. Projoven’s treatment effect evaluation should 
account for this level of individual heterogeneity. 
 
This study warns training practitioners and researchers that institutional and 
implementation characteristics may be systematically associated with training outcomes. In 
the case of Projoven, its impact evaluation could be affected by the fact that not all trainees 
are placed in an internship, that a fraction of trainees drop out of the programme, that an 
alternative definition of employment should be considered, and that the programme may 
yield differing returns depending on the trainee’s work experience. This chapter also shows 
the need for a better monitoring system for Projoven. Economically disadvantaged youth 
need to be provided not only with training but with hope that the accumulation of skills will 
pay off. This is not observed because training firms seldom retain trainees, and in 25% of 
cases do not even offer them a contract during the internship. Enforcement mechanisms 
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should ensure the fulfilment of training and internship agreements. The goal is to offer 
higher quality internships in order to improve trainee labour market outcomes. 
 
Appendix 
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Appendix 
 
Table A2.1. 
Poverty score index composition. 
Item Category 1  Score Category 2 Score Category 3 Score Category 4 Score 
         
Household 
Floor 
Dirt 4 Wood 3 Cement 2 Vinyl 0 
Household 
ceiling 
Residuals 4 Cardboard 3 Plastic, wood 2 Cement, 
concrete 
0 
Household 
walls 
Cardboard 4 Wood 3 Brick 
uncompleted 
2 Brick 
completed 
0 
Source of 
Potable water 
River or 
tanker 
4 Well 3 Outdoor 
public 
network 
1 Indoor 
public 
network 
0 
Toilet No toilet 4 latrine 3 Outdoor 
public 
network 
2 Indoor 
public 
network 
0 
Overcrowdinga >= 5 4 >= 4 and < 5 3 >= 3 and < 4 2 < 3 0 
Household 
head education 
level 
No 
education or 
uncompleted 
primary 
4 Secondary 
education 
2 Uncompleted 
tertiary 
education 
1 Completed 
tertiary 
education 
0 
Dependency 
ratiob 
>= 3 4 >= 2 and < 3 2 < 2 0   
Source: Burga (2003). 
Notes: a Ratio household size / number of rooms. 
             b Ratio non-working household members / number working household members. 
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Chapter 3  
Projoven Evaluation Data  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the characteristics of the dataset used to evaluate the Projoven training 
programme are reviewed. Because the data reveal the existence of a pre-programme earnings 
dip which can bias the treatment effects estimations, a way to deal with this phenomenon is 
presented. Basically, a new control group that is a subsample of the individuals in the official 
control group is created using propensity score matching with replacement. The rationale is 
to create a more comparable control group to identify Projoven’s treatment effects. In 
addition, this chapter checks how sensitive the estimates are under the presence of 
unobservables, calculating the Rosenbaum (1995) bounds.  
 
The Projoven sixth public call data set is used for this study’s estimations since is the most 
complete one available. This unique data set combines not only demographic information 
about trainees and the control group, but also administrative records on the level of training 
completed. It allows matching individual trainees with their specific training provider. 
Moreover, this was the only data set with the characteristics required for this study. 
Although the programme possesses data for other public calls (for the first, second, fourth 
and eighth) its availability is limited. The author attempted to acquire the other data sets by 
all means available. Unfortunately, whether the transparency of information has been 
blocked for political motives or simply due to staff negligence, acquiring the data was not 
possible. Díaz and Jaramillo (2006) argue that the Programme’s evaluation data has not been 
well kept. These authors sustain that important portions of information are missing. In 
particular, in the first and second public calls employment histories were collected during 
baseline data field work, but never put in magnetic format. A similar problem occurs in the 
third follow-up survey of the eighth public call, whereby data were gathered in the field 
work, but delays in processing the questionnaires into magnetic format meant that 
programme officers put them into storage but they were ultimately lost during office 
relocation. Given these circumstances, most of the existing studies evaluating Projoven’s 
impact have been conducted or sponsored by the programme or by former employees of the 
institution.  
 
This chapter has four sections. After the introduction, Section 3.2 provides a general 
description of the sixth public call, describing the different levels of participation, how the 
control group was built, and the presence of a pre-treatment earnings dip among trainees. 
Section 3.3 presents a potential way of dealing with the pre-treatment earnings dip of 
Projoven participants. Finally, Section 3.4 gives some concluding remarks. 
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3.2 Projoven Sixth Public Call  
 
The Projoven sixth public call data set consists of a baseline survey, conducted in November 
1999 (two to three months prior to programme commencement), and three follow-up 
comparison surveys at intervals of six months (May 2001); twelve months (November 2001); 
and eighteen months (May 2002) after the end of the internships. Consequently, it is possible 
to observe individuals at four points in time.1 
 
In the sixth public call, Projoven trained 3,651 youths in the urban areas of five Peruvian 
cities: Lima, Trujillo, Chiclayo, Arequipa and Cusco. To assess its impact Projoven selects 
randomly 1,014 trainees from all trained youths. Thus, the Projoven sixth public call data set 
includes 1,014 participants and an equal number of control group individuals. Only 2.2% of 
sampled trainees failed to complete classroom training. Some 19.1% of trainees completed 
the classroom phase but were not placed in training firms by the ECAPs. Some 21.7% of 
trainees completed the classroom training phase, but not the on-the-job training phase. The 
remaining 57% of trainees completed both phases of Projoven.  
 
Participants who dropped out within the first three months of the programme are excluded 
from the estimation sample (2.2%) since it is unlikely that the programme yields measurable 
returns to trainees after such a short period and their number is too small to draw specific 
inferences. Thus, in the estimation sample any participation in the programme implies 
completion of at least the classroom phase. This study will, however, allow the training effect 
to vary by completion level of the internship. 
 
To construct its official control group, Projoven selects three comparable individuals per 
trainee, all required to be eligible and to satisfy enrolment requirements of age, poverty 
status and educational attainment. The selection of control group individuals begins two 
months after training begins. The programme searches for potential controls in the same 
neighbourhoods as the actual trainees, or in the closest possible neighbourhoods within the 
same district. The rationale for this is that neighbourhood characteristics control for 
unobservable factors such as geographic segregation, transportation costs, firm location, and 
so on, which may affect the likelihood of finding employment, and the potential outcomes of 
the training programme (Chong and Galdo, 2006). According to Friedlander and Robins 
(1995), the selection of control group individuals from the same geographic areas as the 
actual trainees produces treatment effect estimators that are close to the experimental ones. 
Projoven matches individuals in the control group with the trainees based on sex, age, labour 
status, poverty score and education level. To be an adequate control for a participant trainee, 
an individual must: 
 
                                                          
1 Although the classroom training courses start at the same time, some delays occur before on-the-job 
training begins. Consequently, not all internships conclude at the same time. This affects the time at 
which follow-up surveys are carried out. 
3.2 Projoven Sixth Public Call 
29 
 
- be of the same sex as the participant, 
- be within a two-year age range around that of the participant, 
- be within a five-point range with regard to the poverty score, and 
- have the same education level as the trainee. 
 
All criteria must be satisfied simultaneously. Next, among the three controls selected per 
beneficiary, Projoven cleans and matches them one-to-one using a Mahalanobis metric 
approach.2 The group selected with this one-to-one matching is the one which is called 
“official control group” in this study. Unfortunately, the information about the other 
potential control group individuals was not available for similar reasons as those explained 
at the beginning of the chapter. 
 
Projoven’s control matching is based on individual information at baseline (November 1999, 
two to three months prior to programme start). In the first two columns, [A] and [B], of Table 
3.1, it is observed that Projoven’s official control group and treatment group are almost 
exactly matched in terms of cities of origin, education level, poverty score, labour status and 
age. However, there are notable differences in labour income and working hours along with 
other variables. For instance, the difference in household income per capita suggests that the 
treated group is poorer than the control group. Paradoxically, the poverty score suggests the 
opposite. The poverty score is composed of poverty indicators other than income (Chapter 
2). Additionally, being a non-wage family-business worker, not being married, not having 
children, and parents’ higher education level seem to encourage enrolment in training. 
Another substantial difference between groups A and B relates to monthly wages prior to 
training. The average monthly wage for the control group is nearly 50% more than the 
equivalent measure for the treated group. Such differences cast doubt on the validity of 
comparing the treatment and control groups for the evaluation of the training programme’s 
impact. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as evidence of Ashenfelter’s dip.3 In a 
famous article, published in 1978, Orley Ashenfelter evaluated the impact on earnings of the 
Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA). He observed that trainee earnings tend 
to fall (absolutely and relatively), compared to the control group, the year immediately prior 
to treatment. Heckman and Smith (1999) argue that this represents evidence of sample 
selection and is a characteristic of virtually all training programmes, which occurs despite 
the substantial variation in eligibility rules among training programmes. 
 
The occurrence of such a pre-programme dip suggests that part of the observed increase in 
earnings that seems to follow a training programme may be explained as a return to a 
permanent path of earnings, temporarily interrupted by a transitory downward shock. 
Trainees may self-select into the programme because they have, precisely, lower earnings. 
                                                          
2 Under this method, every trainee i  is matched with the control individual j  whose Mahalanobis 
distance is minimum. Mahalanobis distance: ( ) ( )ji
t
ji SSSS −∑−
−1 , where iS  is a vector 
containing the variables subject to matching for individual i , in this case sex, age, poverty score and 
education, and ∑  is an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the variables in iS  and jS . 
3 See Ñopo and Saavedra (2003), Ñopo et al. (2002), Projoven (2004), and Projoven (2005). 
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Consequently, before and after comparisons of trainee earnings might be seriously 
misleading evidence on the effect of training on earnings.  
 
Table 3.1. 
Baseline summary statistics [2–3 months before training]. Projoven sixth public call. 
 
Official control 
group [A] 
Treated group 
 [B] 
New control 
group [C] 
p-value [mean 
differences]c 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
dev. 
Mean 
 
Std. 
dev. 
Mean 
 
Std. 
dev. 
[A] vs. 
[B] 
[B] vs. 
[C] 
         
Total 1,014 992 992   
City         
Arequipa 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.804 1.000 
Chiclayo 0.12 (0.33) 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.509 1.000 
Cusco 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.858 1.000 
Lima 0.36 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.963 1.000 
Trujillo 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.938 1.000 
Age (years) 19.76 (2.35) 19.60 (2.44) 19.72 (2.41) 0.133 0.301 
Female 0.51 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 0.790 0.163 
Poverty score 18.95 (2.95) 16.71 (4.13) 18.78 (2.97) 0.000 0.000 
Household income per capita (S/.) 150.27 (85.28) 127.40 (91.31) 129.79 (77.95) 0.000 0.476 
Child  0.24 (0.43) 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36) 0.000 0.487 
Married 0.22 (0.41) 0.10 (0.30) 0.12 (0.32) 0.000 0.253 
Years schooling 10.45 (1.30) 10.45 (1.34) 10.42 (1.34) 1.000 0.558 
Father tertiary education 0.08 (0.27) 0.12 (0.33) 0.10 (0.30) 0.001 0.085 
Mother tertiary education 0.03 (0.17) 0.06 (0.25) 0.04 (0.18) 0.000 0.005 
Labour market status         
Employed 0.60 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.964 1.000 
     Formally employeda 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.23) 0.690 0.879 
Unemployed 0.29 (0.46) 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.183 0.839 
Inactive 0.10 (0.30) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.052 0.790 
Transitions (%) (from October 1999 
to November 1999)         
Unemployed/OLF -> employed 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.28) 0.10 (0.29) 0.872 0.269 
Employed -> Unemployed/OLF 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.17) 0.911 0.230 
Unemployed/OLF -> 
Unemployed/OLF 0.41 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49) 0.025 0.161 
Employed -> employed 0.47 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50) 0.018 0.222 
No work experience 0.28 (0.45) 0.37 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.000 0.242 
Non-wage family-business worker 0.07 (0.25) 0.13 (0.34) 0.17 (0.37) 0.000 0.039 
Wagesb (S/. 2001)         
Monthly 238.71 (148.21) 158.93 (134.78) 173.65 (135.14) 0.000 0.053 
Hourly 1.49 (1.05) 1.12 (0.92) 1.23 (1.07) 0.000 0.049 
Working hoursb (week) 55.21 (139.06) 46.76 (114.75) 42.30 (83.67) 0.249 0.444 
a The operative definition of formal employment used in this study considers jobs which satisfy at least one of the following 
conditions: having a written contract or with access to social security, or with access to accident/health insurance. 
b Only considering individuals working in the reference period. 
c Ho: Means differences = 0. 
Source: Projoven. 
 
 
This phenomenon of a pre-programme earnings dip amongst the trainees is also notable in 
the fourth, eighth, and tenth public call surveys of Projoven. There are no clear reasons as to 
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the origin of this earnings dip; however, Jaramillo and Diaz (2006) suggest that the presence 
of the pre-programme earnings dip could be related to the time when baseline data are 
collected. Trainees and control group individuals are both interviewed during the initial 
weeks of the classroom instruction phase. This timing of the baseline survey may induce 
systematic but mechanical differences in earnings between trainees and controls. The 
baseline survey collects information about individual characteristics and their labour market 
outcomes during the two to three months before treatment. However, given that in most 
cases trainees already know that they have been selected as such one month before they 
begin their training courses, their employment status and earnings may be observationally 
different just because they begin to leave their jobs once they realize they have been admitted 
into the programme. Thus, it is possible that differences in terms of wages are in part a 
mechanical result of the timing of the baseline survey fieldwork. 
 
 
3.3 Dealing with Projoven Pre-Treatment Earnings Dip 
 
To the extent that the pre-programme earnings dip constitutes evidence of systematic 
differences between the treatment and control groups prior to training, it undermines their 
comparability. Ashenfelter (1978) suggests using an (even) earlier period as the baseline to 
circumvent possible biases caused by the pre-programme earnings dip.4 Unfortunately, in 
the Projoven dataset, there is no earlier period available. To deal with the pre-treatment 
wage difference in Projoven data, Ñopo and Saavedra (2003); Ñopo et al. (2002); Projoven 
(2004); and Projoven (2005) suggest carrying out an additional individual matching process. 
This additional matching procedure is adopted in this study to create a more comparable 
control group. 
 
The matching technique aims to produce a control group of modest size that is similar to the 
treated group in terms of the distribution of observed characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1985). The drawback of this method is that there may be exact matches for only a fraction of 
trainees (matching one-to-one without replacement). Discarding treated individuals is not an 
option, especially as the unmatched treated individuals may differ systematically from the 
matched treated individuals.5 In addition, the methodology used in this study to evaluate the 
effects of Projoven implies reducing sample size in order to compare different groups by 
level of training completion, which also includes trainees groups. Having smaller groups of 
trainees by level of completion implies less variation and could affect the reliability of 
Projoven’s treatment effects estimate. 
 
                                                          
4
 According to Ashenfelter (1978), in presence of a decline of earnings before the training period, let’s 
say t , the choice of the “base period” is critical. If the decline in earnings occurs in the period 
preceding the training ( 1−t ), and it is transitory, it does not introduce any bias using as a base period 
the period before the one when the decline takes place, for instance 2−t . Whereas, if the decline is 
permanent, the training effect will be understated by the amount of the decline regardless of the base 
period chosen. 
5 Leuven and Oosterbeek (2006) discuss the problems inherent in small control groups. 
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In this study, a new control group using propensity-score matching with replacement is 
formed to avoid losing some individuals in the treatment group. This new control group is a 
sub-sample of the official control group. Although matching with replacement leads to 
higher variance estimators, it produces higher match quality (Abadie and Imbens, 2002). 
Propensity score matching with replacement also implies that a control unit could be 
matched with one or more treated individuals.  
 
Propensity score matching synthesises all the observables ( iX ) into a single score, the so-
called propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Similar treated and non-treated 
individuals are matched based on observables ( iX ) which include labour force status 
transitions, as suggested by Heckman and Smith (1999). To ensure a better match on wages, 
20 subsamples (by city, employment status and wages) are created, for which matching 
based on propensity score is applied. In Table 3.2, the distribution of the groups is shown to 
confirm the common support property. Basically, there are enough controls per treated 
individuals in every subsample. The propensity score function is estimated using the 
complete sample.  
 
Table 3.2. 
Common support groups matching methods to conform control group. Projoven sixth public call. 
Group Characteristics Control Participants Total 
Group 1 Arequipa, not employed 56 59 115 
Group 2 Chiclayo, not employed 60 48 108 
Group 3 Cusco, not employed 40 43 83 
Group 4 Lima, not employed 177 170 347 
Group 5 Trujillo, not employed 69 74 143 
Group 6 Arequipa, monthly wage <= 100 47 100 147 
Group 7 Chiclayo, monthly wage <= 100 16 31 47 
Group 8 Cusco, monthly wage <= 100 20 26 46 
Group 9 Lima, monthly wage <= 100 29 69 98 
Group 10 Trujillo, monthly wage <= 100 16 39 55 
Group 11 Arequipa, 100 < monthly wage <= 300 68 39 107 
Group 12 Chiclayo, 100 < monthly wage <= 300 40 27 67 
Group 13 Cusco, 100 < monthly wage <= 300 38 32 70 
Group 14 Lima, 100 < monthly wage <= 300 86 85 171 
Group 15 Trujillo, 100 < monthly wage <= 300 75 46 121 
Group 16 Arequipa, monthly wage > 300 34 7 41 
Group 17 Chiclayo, monthly wage > 300 6 4 10 
Group 18 Cusco, monthly wage > 300 19 16 35 
Group 19 Lima, monthly wage > 300 76 37 113 
Group 20 Trujillo, monthly wage > 300 42 40 82 
Total  1,014 992 2,006 
 
 
Propensity score matching assumes that Projoven selection into treatment (undertaking 
Projoven training) is based on observables. Additionally, it requires the overlap condition, 
which states that for each value of iX  observed for a treated case i, there are nontreated 
cases with the same values. The overlap condition is represented as: 
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[Eq. 3.1]   [ ] 11ProjovenPr0 <=< ii X . 
 
Another assumption required is the conditional mean independence assumption 
 
[Eq. 3.2]  [ ] [ ] [ ]iiiiiiii XYEXYEXYE 000 ,0Projoven,1Projoven ==== , 
 
which implies that the potential outcome of the individual iwhen (s)he has not undertaken 
Projoven training ( 0iY ) does not determine participation. The propensity score is a 
conditional probability measure of training participation given iX  and is denoted ( )iXp , 
where 
 
[Eq. 3.3]   ( ) [ ]iii XXp 1ProjovenPr == . 
 
Table 3.3. 
Propensity score estimation. Probit model. Dependent variable: participating in Projoven at 
baseline [Projoven = 1]. Conditioned on being eligible for the training. 
 Marginal 
effects 
Std. err. 
   
Ln hh income per capita -0.050* (0.027) 
Lowest quartile hh income per capita  0.063* (0.038) 
Age  0.014*** (0.005) 
Household size -0.004 (0.005) 
Female  0.000 (0.024) 
Married -0.171*** (0.039) 
Child -0.060 (0.043) 
Years schooling -0.013 (0.009) 
Father tertiary education  0.071* (0.040) 
Mother tertiary education  0.165*** (0.060) 
Additional training course  0.098*** (0.027) 
Unemployed/OLF -> employed  0.008 (0.043) 
Employed -> unemployed/OLF  0.023 (0.058) 
Unemployed/OLF -> 
unemployed/OLF 
-0.074** (0.036) 
No work experience (%)  0.175*** (0.037) 
Non-wage family business worker  0.203*** (0.038) 
   
Num observations 2006 
Wald X2(16) 151.97 
Log likelihood -1307.72 
Pseudo R2 0.0594 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Marginal effects are estimated at the median. 
 
 
The propensity score is predicted using a probit model. Table 3.3 reports the probit 
regression for participation in Projoven conditionally on eligibility. The regression results 
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suggest that poverty condition (lower household income and lowest quartile), not being 
married, parents’ higher education level, following other training courses, not being 
chronically unemployed, not having work experience, and being a non-wage family-business 
worker seem to encourage enrolment in training. Propensity score matching ensures a better 
comparability of treatment groups by selecting similar control groups. The variables monthly 
wages, employment status and cities were excluded from the propensity score estimation. By 
splitting the sample based on wages, employment status and city, the variation of the 
propensity score given these variables has been already accounted for.  
 
A fourth important assumption playing a role in propensity score matching is the balancing 
condition 
 
[Eq. 3.4]   ( )iii XpX⊥Projoven . 
 
The balancing condition expresses that for individuals with the same propensity score, or in 
the neighbourhood, the assignment to treatment is random and should look identical in 
terms of iX  (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
 
Based on the previous assumptions, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that conditional on 
the propensity score, the outcome of the treatment is independent of the participation, as if 
participation was randomized. In other words, the matching process, by creating a new 
control group, makes the participation in the programme independent of the outcome. The 
latter is a crucial condition to evaluate the effect of the treatment as it circumvents the non-
random assignment into the treatment (self-selection into treatment). Figure 3.1 displays the 
distribution of the estimated propensity scores. 
 
Figure 3.1.  
Kernel densities propensity score (predicted probability of participating in the training). Control 
group and participants in Projoven sixth public call. 
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Column [C] of Table 3.1 gives data for the new control group resulting from the one-to-one 
matching with replacement based on the propensity score. In Table 3.1, 992 individuals are 
counted in the control group, but there are actually only 488 individuals—some are repeated. 
It is observed that the differences in wages between the treatment and control groups 
decline. Furthermore, the groups are more similar with respect to household income per 
capita, having a child, being married and having an employment history prior to training. 
Henceforth, “control group” refers to the newly created control group. 
 
The newly generated control group is similar in observables to the treated individuals. 
Propensity-score matching assumes that because the distribution of observables is similar, it 
is likely that the distribution of unobservables is also similar. However, the presence of 
unobservables, which affects both the outcome and selection into training, cannot be easily 
disregarded. Systematic differences not explained by the nature of the quasi-experiment 
constitute evidence that the non-experimental design failed to produce quasi-randomization. 
 
A test for systematic differences prior to training between the newly created control group 
and the treated individuals is applied. The test consists of a regression of employment 
condition and monthly wages on individual characteristics and training participation. The 
rationale of both regressions is to observe in the coefficient of the Projoven variable if the 
difference between trainees and control group are significant. Both regressions predict 
unconditional outcomes. For a matter of comparisons, and simplicity, no adjustment for 
sample selection was considered when modelling monthly wages. However, if a correction 
for sample selection is applied, the Projoven coefficient remains significant but its magnitude 
is reduced by 30%. 
 
Table 3.4 shows the results of these regressions. Whereas in the case of employment no 
systematic differences prior to training are found (Projoven coefficient not statistically 
different from zero), in the case of monthly wages significant differences between treatment 
and control groups are observed (Projoven coefficient statistically different from zero). In 
addition, based on the sign of the corresponding variables’ coefficients it could be inferred 
that the youths with higher wages are those with more years of schooling, have more work 
experience, are male and do not work in microenterprises (synonymous for informal work).  
 
The results of the test of systematic differences prior to training suggest that if the labour 
market outcome to evaluate is employment, fixed-effects estimators would yield consistent 
results; but if one evaluates monthly wages, the results may be biased. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible to test how sensitive these estimates are given the potential presence of 
unobservables. 
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Table 3.4. 
Baseline OLS estimates. Test of systematic differences prior to training [new control group and 
treatment individuals sample]. 
 
Dep. var. overall employment Dep. var. ln monthly wages 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
         
Projoven 0.000 (0.032) -0.004 (0.030) -0.242*** (0.077) -0.211*** (0.068) 
Years schooling   0.027** (0.013)   0.042* (0.025) 
Potential experience   0.039*** (0.006)   0.065*** (0.014) 
Female   -0.201*** (0.035)   -0.256*** (0.069) 
Child   0.255*** (0.065)     
Child*Female   -0.135* (0.075)     
Married   -0.153*** (0.058)     
Ln hh income per capita   0.037** (0.017)     
Previous job-training 
course   0.011 (0.034)   -0.016 (0.070) 
Tenure       0.001 (0.001) 
Commerce sector       -0.08 (0.080) 
Manufacturing sector       -0.042 (0.086) 
Micro enterprise       -0.561*** (0.066) 
Arequipa   0.206*** (0.041)   -0.536*** (0.094) 
Chiclayo   0.031 (0.053)   -0.161 (0.110) 
Cusco   0.047 (0.046)   -0.063 (0.131) 
Trujillo   0.059 (0.043)   0.027 (0.087) 
Constant 0.603*** (0.028) 0.076 (0.163) 4.932*** (0.066) 4.867*** (0.298) 
Number of observations 2006 2006 1182 1126 
Wald test F(1, 1501) = 0.00 F(13, 1501) = 14.10 F(1, 894) = 9.89 F(13, 846) = 26.65 
R-squared 0.000 0.1191 0.017 0.2921 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Robust standard errors adjusted. 
Base category for city dummies: Lima. 
 
 
The treatment effect literature (Rosenbaum, 1995; and Lee, 2005, Chapter 5) suggests several 
techniques to assess the impact of unobservables in treatment effect estimations. In this 
study, the Rosenbaum approach is used to measure how biases of various magnitudes might 
alter results. This approach does not indicate whether biases are present or what magnitude 
of bias is acceptable. Rather, it indicates how large the bias caused by unobservables (hidden 
bias) must be in order to alter our conclusions. 
 
Rosenbaum’s sensitivity analysis starts with the premise that hidden bias is present if two 
individuals j  and k  (one receiving treatment and the other not) with the same observed 
covariates x  ( kj xx = ) have different probability π  of receiving the treatment ( kj ππ ≠ ). 
Now, let j  and k  be paired together. The odds that individuals j  and k  receive the 
treatment are, respectively, ( )jj ππ −1  and ( )kk ππ −1 , and the odds ratio is the ratio of 
these odds. Following Rosenbaum (1995), if we know that this odds ratio for individuals 
with the same covariates is at most some number 1≥Γ , then 
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[Eq. 3.5]  
( )
( )
Γ≤
−
−
≤
Γ jk
kj
ππ
ππ
1
11
   for all j , k  with kj xx = . 
 
If 1=Γ , the results are free of hidden bias. If 2=Γ , two individuals with similar covariates 
could differ in their odds of receiving the treatment, so one could be twice as likely as the 
other to receive the treatment. A sensitivity analysis would consider several possible values 
of Γ  and show how the inferences might change accordingly (Rosenbaum, 1995). 
 
Table 3.5 gives the sensitivity analysis for Projoven sixth public call data. For five values of 
Γ , the table gives the upper and lower bounds on the significance level. If 2=Γ , one person 
in a pair may be two times as likely to undertake training as the other because they have 
different values of the unobserved covariate r . In the case 2=Γ , the significance level 
might be less than 0.0001 or it might be as high as 0.0078, but for all Rr∈ , the null 
hypothesis of no effect of training on employment is not plausible. The null hypothesis of no 
effect begins to become plausible for at least some Rr∈  with 3=Γ . To attribute the higher 
employment rate to an unobservable covariate rather than to an effect of training, that 
unobserved covariate would need to produce a threefold increase in the odds of undertaking 
training, and it would need to be a near-perfect predictor of employment. Consequently, the 
association between training and employment cannot be attributed to small hidden biases, 
but is somewhat more sensitive to bias than examples provided in Rosenbaum (1995).6 
 
Table 3.5. 
Rosenbaum (1995) sensitivity analysis for Projoven sixth Public call effect on employment [6 
months after training]. Range of significance levels for hidden biases of various magnitudes. 
Γ  Minimum Maximum 
   
1 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
2 < 0.0001 0.0078 
3 < 0.0001 0.6848 
4 < 0.0001 0.9924 
5 < 0.0001 0.9999 
 
The results presented in Table 3.5 suggest that the effects of Projoven are not especially 
sensitive to the presence of hidden bias. Values of Γ  close to 1 could lead to inferences that 
differ significantly from those obtained assuming the study is free of hidden bias. A study is 
insensitive if extreme values of Γ  are required to alter the inference. Rosenbaum’s analysis 
assumes matching without replacement. The availability of panel data for the Projoven sixth 
public call allows us to circumvent the possible distorted effect of time-constant 
unobservables in the estimation of Projoven treatment effects. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Rosenbaum (1995) considers a high degree of insensitivity to hidden bias when the null hypothesis of 
no effect begins to become plausible for at least 5=Γ . 
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3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Projoven’s sixth public call data set is the most complete data set available for the study of 
the estimation of the programme treatment effects. This data follows a non-experimental 
design and control group individuals are chosen based on similarities in terms of gender, 
education and poverty with respect to the trainees. The official match seemed to be effective 
in terms of these observables. Nevertheless, significant differences are detected between the 
trainee group and control group, mainly in terms of wages. This pre-treatment earnings dip 
is often referred to as Ashenfelter’s dip and it is a characteristic of virtually all training 
programmes. 
 
The presence of a pre-treatment earnings dip could be evidence of systematic differences 
between treated and non-treated individuals and it undermines the reliability of treatment 
effects estimates. To ensure a better comparability of trainees with respect to the official 
control group in Projoven, a new control group has been generated.  
 
This study proposes propensity score matching with replacement to create a new control 
group. After this procedure, systematic differences have been significantly reduced. In 
addition, a Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis suggests that the effects of Projoven are not 
especially sensitive to the presence of hidden bias. Nevertheless, in the case of wages some 
differences still persist. Consequently, estimations of Projoven effects on trainees’ wages 
must be taken cautiously. 
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Chapter 4 
Evaluation of Projoven Effectiveness  
 
 
4.1 Introduction1 
 
While training programmes are regarded as effective in Latin America, they suffer from 
substantial dropout rates. In Peru, the dropout rate is around 40%. This rate ranges from 51% 
in Uruguay to 74% in Chile, 77% in Panama and 60% in the Dominican Republic. The 
dropout phenomenon has been neglected in most YJTP evaluation. Estimating treatment 
effects which account for trainees with partial instruction could yield a different perspective 
on YJTP effectiveness. Amalgamating completers and non-completers may confound 
differing effects. On the one hand, dropping out might imply not obtaining a certificate, 
which could cast the trainee in a negative light to potential employers. In such a case, 
training participation cannot be regarded as beneficial. On the other hand, there are cases 
where dropping out is justified by the sudden emergence of appropriate job opportunities. 
Thus, there is the potential to erroneously attribute some outcomes to the programme. The 
theoretical relationship between non-completion of YJTPs and trainee labour market 
outcomes remains ambiguous and its relevance is therefore an empirical question. 
 
By evaluating the impact of Projoven, this chapter aims to shed light on the effectiveness of 
YJTPs in the presence of dropouts with partial treatment. It takes into account the 
institutional framework discussion in Chapter 2 and the non-experimental nature of the data 
treated in Chapter 3. Thus, this chapter’s evaluation accounts for unobservables, sample 
selection, individual heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of training completion. 
Projoven’s impact is evaluated in terms of trainees’ overall and formal employment, and in 
terms of monthly wages. 
 
A four-step approach is followed to evaluate Projoven’s impact on trainees’ labour market 
outcomes. First, prior findings of the impact evaluation literature are reviewed, particularly 
for Latin American programmes. The objective is to observe which common characteristics of 
the programmes have been taken into account in impact evaluation and how the potential 
bias generated by the non-experimental design of the data sets and the low completion of the 
programmes has been dealt with. This review suggests that Latin American YJTPs yield 
positive returns in terms of overall and formal employment and high returns (above 12%) in 
terms of wages. Nevertheless, the presence of trainees with partial instruction has been 
ignored.  
                                                   
1 This chapter is based on de Crombrugghe, D., H. Espinoza and H. Heijke (2010) “Job-training 
programmes with low completion rates: The case of Projoven-Peru”. Working Paper ROA-RM-
2010/4, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA), Maastricht.  
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Second, this chapter provides an overview of other studies evaluating Projoven. Using 
differences-in-differences methods with propensity score matching techniques, prior studies 
found that Projoven yields employment and income gains on trainees. Nevertheless, 
Projoven effectiveness is open to question as no specification tests were provided regarding 
the presence of unobservables, and only in two studies the low completion phenomenon was 
taken into account. 
 
Third, a literature review of the low completion phenomenon as a source of bias in treatment 
effects estimations is presented. Not accounting for the presence of trainees with partial 
treatment could yield biased estimations of the programme’s effects. Therefore, the literature 
on YJTP evaluation approaches the low completion phenomenon from three angles: i) 
assuming dropout is a random event; ii) evaluating the effect of the time of exposure to 
training; and iii) using traditional non-experimental methods. Regardless of the method the 
general conclusion is that YJTPs are more effective conditionally on completion or the longer 
the trainee is exposed to training. 
 
Fourth, a method to estimate Projoven’s treatment effects accounting for low compliance, 
unobservables and individual heterogeneity is presented and applied. Four groups are 
compared pairwise: the control group, the dropout group with only classroom training, the 
dropout group with classroom training and internship placement, and the group completing 
the full programme. It is found that in terms of overall and formal employment, the 
programme yields returns only in the short term and conditionally on internship completion. 
The programme seems to increase trainees’ wages, but these effects diminish over time. In 
addition, Projoven is relatively more effective for individuals with no work experience prior 
to enrolment. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides a general background of YJTPs 
effectiveness, in particular for Latin America. Section 4.3 reviews previous findings 
regarding Projoven’s effectiveness. Section 4.4 presents an overview of different sources of 
bias for not accounting for low completion and how the treatment evaluation literature has 
dealt with this issue. Section 4.5 introduces the empirical framework to evaluate Projoven. 
The results are reported in Section 4.6. Finally, Section 4.7 draws some conclusions. 
 
 
4.2 Youth Job-Training Programmes Effectiveness 
 
The objective of impact evaluation is to determine whether a social programme yields the 
expected outcomes on the treated population, and whether these outcomes are attributable 
to the programme (Heckman and Smith, 1997). Of particular interest is whether programme 
participants are better off than they would have been in the absence of the programme. There 
emerges the fundamental evaluation problem that no individual can be observed 
simultaneously in two mutually exclusive states, factual and counterfactual. One way to 
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circumvent this problem is to create a control group to function as a substitute for the 
counterfactual. A control group can be created using either an experimental or a non-
experimental design. 
 
A purely experimental design is based on the random assignment of the eligible 
population—in practice, a sample thereof—into beneficiaries of the programme (the 
treatment group) and non-beneficiaries of the programme (the control group). Thus, the 
treatment effect is the average difference in the outcomes of the two groups, as treatment 
assignment is statistically independent of the outcomes. In a non-experimental design, the 
treatment is assigned in a non-random way. Individuals as similar as possible in observable 
covariates to the treated individuals are selected and function as control units. Often in 
practice, this control group is constructed only after the policy intervention.  
 
The consistency of estimators based on non-experimental designs, in comparison with 
experimental ones, has been widely discussed. On the one hand, LaLonde (1986) points out 
that only experimental evaluations yield consistent average treatment effect (ATE) 
estimators, and demonstrates that estimators using a non-experimental control group differ 
from those using experimental data. On the other hand, Heckman and Hotz (1989) and 
Dehejia and Wahba (1999) show how this LaLonde argument can break down if there are 
systematic differences between the treatment and control groups in observed as well as 
unobserved characteristics. Once Dehejia and Wahba (1999) control for systematic 
differences between non-experimental treatment and control groups (using LaLonde’s 
approach to select the same controls), the ATE estimators are close to those obtained with 
experimental data. 
 
One major concern is that differences between treatment and control groups in non-
experimental designs remain unobserved or are due to self-selection into treatment. 
Individual decisions to comply with treatment could be related to its benefits. The literature 
on policy evaluation offers diverse methods to circumvent the limitations of non-
experimental design.2 Despite the development of sophisticated evaluation methods in a 
large number of studies, uncertainty persists about which kind of training works best, the 
appropriate doses of training, the individual characteristics which are most important for 
training effectiveness and aggregate (general equilibrium) programme effects (Friedlander et 
al., 1997). 
 
Friedlander et al. (1997) review prior evidence on the effects of YJTPs. These authors 
conclude that job-training programmes generally yield modest positive effects on 
employment and earnings for adult men and women, but fail to produce positive effects for 
youth. Heckman et al. (1999) compare YJTPs in the U.S. and in Europe; they find that in the 
U.S., YJTPs have no effect on earnings of economically disadvantaged youth and only a 
modest effect on employment rates. In Europe, results are similar with respect to earnings 
                                                   
2 For a review on methodologies used to evaluate policy interventions with non-experimental data, see 
Heckman and Robb (1989); Friedlander and Robins (1995); Heckman and Smith (1997); and Heckman 
and Hotz (1989). 
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but more positive regarding employment levels. American studies use experimental designs 
more frequently than European studies. Political constraints and universal entitlement to 
social programmes make non-experimental designs the rule in Europe. 
 
YJTPs in Latin America are found to combine positive and statistically significant effects on 
earnings with small but significant effects on employment, particularly for young women 
(Betcherman et al., 2004; Ibarrarán and Rosas, 2008). As in Europe and the U.S., YJTPs in 
Latin America share the dual-system of classroom instruction and on-the-job internship, but 
with the phases occurring sequentially (first classroom instruction and then on-the-job 
internship) instead of simultaneously. In Europe and the U.S., YJTPs combine two to three 
days of classroom instruction with two to three days of on-the-job internship. In addition, in 
Latin America the training phases have a shorter duration (max. four months by training 
phase).  
 
Table 4.1 summarises the findings regarding the effectiveness of some Latin American YJTPs 
in terms of overall and formal employment, and in terms of wages. Four of these evaluations 
follow a non-experimental design and the remaining two follow an experimental design. In 
Chile and Panama, the comparison control groups were chosen ex-post among eligible non-
participants. In Argentina, the control group units were youths registered in the programme 
but who did not participate. In Mexico the control group was generated with information 
from a national survey. The studies applying experimental methods, Colombia and 
Dominican Republic, select randomly their comparison group individuals among those 
youths who applied to the programme.  
 
Table 4.1.  
Summary of Findings. YJTPs effectiveness in Latin America 
Programme Period Beneficiaries Ev. Method Effects on Employment Effects on 
wages 
Overall Formal 
Proyecto Joven 
(Argentina) 
1994-1998 280,000 Non 
Experimental 
0% - 11% 0% - 3% n.s. 
Chile Joven (Chile) 1992-1997 100,000 Non 
Experimental 
18% - 22% 15% - 23%  22% - 25% 
Jóvenes en Acción 
(Colombia) 
2000-2005 100,000 Experimental 5% women, 
none men 
6% - 7%  
women; 5% - 
9%  men 
22% women, 
10%  men 
Juventud y Empleo 
(Dominican Republic) 
From 1999 30,000 up to 2006 Experimental n.s. 17% 
PROBECAT (Mexico) 
  
From 1984 ~ 5 million 
(1984-2000) 
Non 
Experimental 
12% - 30% 10% - 20% 
since 2002 
n.s. 
PROCAJOVEN 
(Panama) 
From 2002 11,400 Nat. Experiment 13% (20% 
women, n.s. 
men) 
11% (14% 
women, 5% 
men.) 
12% - 30% 
n.s.: not significant. 
Source: Ibarrarán and Rosas (2008). For Dominican Republic: Card et al. (2007); for Colombia, Atanasio et al. (2008); for Panama, 
Ibarraran and Rosas (2007); for Chile, Aedo and Pizarro (2004); for Argentina, Alzua and Brassolio (2006); for Mexico, Delajara 
et al. (2006). 
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Methods used in these evaluations differ depending on the nature of the design. In the case 
of experimental evaluations, ordinary least squares regressions (with data reweighting by 
the likelihood to be selected as treatment) were applied. For the Colombian case, training 
providers fixed effects (with dummies) were also considered. None of these studies practised 
a special treatment to deal with the presence of trainees with partial instruction. 
 
For the studies using non-experimental designs, propensity score matching techniques, in 
both cross-sectional differences and in difference-in-difference settings, were applied. 
Whereas the cross-sectional differences technique assumes the absence of unobservable bias, 
the difference-in-difference technique attempts to control for time-invariant unobservables. 
In the case of Panama, reweighting and ordinary least squares regressions were also applied. 
As in the case of the experimental evaluations, none of these studies practised a special 
treatment to deal with the presence of trainees with partial instruction. 
 
In Latin America, YJTPs programmes seemed to be effective in increasing trainees overall 
employment prospects. The returns range from 0% (Argentina) to 30% (Mexico). 
Furthermore, the programmes are definitely more effective for women. In all the cases which 
distinguish treatment by gender, women are better off than men. The same pattern is 
observed in the case of formal employment, although with lower returns, and wages. Except 
for Argentina and Mexico, the returns in terms of wages are positive and by far significantly 
larger than any observed in developed countries.  
 
The literature in treatment evaluation gives a threefold explanation of the dissimilar 
effectiveness of YJTPs in developed and developing countries. Firstly, YJTPs in low-income 
labour markets training have more potential because skilled workers are not available 
(Betcherman et al., 2004). Trained individuals as scarce human resource are highly 
appreciated by firms in developing countries. Second, the availability of social assistance, 
unemployment insurances and other varieties of vocational training programmes in 
developed countries affects the outcomes of the comparison groups in a different way than 
in developing countries which have no social protection mechanisms. Should substitutes for 
the training programme be available (social assistance, counselling, etc.), then the 
experimental effect of the programme can be zero or negative, even if the effect of training 
relative to no training at all is large and positive (Heckman et al., 2000). Finally, the presence 
of an informal labour market in developing countries could explain these outcomes. Sources 
of employment are always available (Calderón-Madrid, 2006).  
 
 
4.3 Projoven Effectiveness 
 
Since its initiation, Projoven has used a non-experimental impact evaluation component. This 
evaluation component has used a selection of trainees and control groups in six out of fifteen 
public calls of the programme. Numerous studies have evaluated Projoven effectiveness in 
terms of employment and earnings. These studies have applied diverse evaluation methods, 
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such as: before-and-after comparisons, differences-in-differences, cross-section–based 
estimators, and propensity score matching techniques. A summary of outcomes is given in 
Table 4.2. These studies report small improvements in employment prospects of up to 8%, 
but these are mostly insignificant, along with more substantial income gains—in one case 
exceeding 100%. The results, in terms of magnitude, are similar to those observed for other 
YJTPs in Latin America. 
 
Table 4.2. 
Estimated effects of Projoven on overall employment and wages. 
Study Public 
call 
Effect on employment Effect on monthly wages Technique 
6 M 12 M 18 M 6 M 12 M 18 M 
Galdo (1998) 1    60%***   B&A 
Burga (2003)a 2 8.2%* 25.9%*** 11.8%*** 28.7%* 41.8%*** 28.6%* PSMK 
Chacaltana and Sulmont 
(2004) 
2    44.8%* 29.4% 40.2%** OLS 
4    38%** 54.5%*** 50.6%***  
Ñopo et al. (2002) b 6 6.0%***   18%**   PSMNN 
Ñopo and Saavedra 
(2003)c 
6 -1.7% -1.9% 3.2% 43.4% 30.3% 37.8% PSMK 
Chacaltana et al. (2003)b 6    12%* n. r. 13%* OLS 
Projoven (2004) c 8 2.7% 2.6%  46.0% 40.3%  D-D 
Projoven (2005) c 10 2.0%   -3.0%   PSMK 
Díaz and Jaramillo (2006) 1 -2.0% 1.0% 8.0% 88.2%*** 88.0%*** 81.0%*** PSMK 
2 4.0% 8.0% 1.0% 74.9%*** 111.8%*** 53.2%**  
4 3.0% 4.0% 3.0% 44.5%*** 45.1%*** 64.0%***  
6 3.0% -2.0% 2.0% 33.0%*** 33.0%*** 44.4%***  
8 5.0% 6.0%  57.3%*** 65.5%***   
Chong and Galdo (2006) 1    70%* 24% 58%* LLME 
2    52%* 73%** 61%**  
4    40%* 11% 34%  
6    33%* -5% 20%  
8    67%*** 89%***   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Notes: 
6 M: 6 months after the programme; 12 M: 12 months after the programme; 18 M: 18 months after the programme 
n. r.: Not reported. 
B&A: Before-and-after comparison. 
D-D: Diff-in-Diff (simple version). 
PSMK: Diff-in-Diff with propensity score matching kernel estimator. 
PSMNN: Diff-in-Diff with propensity score matching nearest neighbour. 
LLME: Diff-in-Diff with local linear matching estimator. 
a The effect on employment refers to the effect on hours worked. 
b The effect on wages refers to the effect on hourly wages. 
c These studies do not report standard errors. 
 
 
The results of the evaluation studies presented in Table 4.2 are not strictly comparable across 
the different public calls (Díaz and Jaramillo, 2006). The economic circumstances were 
different in each public call and may have also influenced the outcomes observed. Yet, some 
patterns could be identified. For instance, the differences observed among the estimates in 
the aforementioned studies illustrate and confirm the sensitivity of treatment-effect estimates 
to specification assumptions. Heckman and Smith (1997) explain that treatment effect 
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estimators are highly dependent on model specifications. This is more evident when 
analyzing studies which utilised the same dataset. Studies using the same data set 
(Chacaltana and Sulmont, 2004 and Burga, 2003 for the second Public call; or Díaz and 
Jaramillo, 2006 and Chong and Galdo, 2006 for multiple public calls) found very different 
estimates of Projoven’s treatment effects.  
 
All the studies identify the presence of a pre-treatment earnings dip; however, only some of 
these studies control for selection into treatment and a pre-treatment earnings dip. None of 
these studies consider methods that allow for the presence of unobservables, such as 
instrumental variables or fixed-effects estimators. Only some studies, such as Burga (2003), 
Chong and Galdo (2006), and Diaz and Jaramillo (2006) use differences-in-differences 
estimators in a propensity-score matching context to deal with time-invariant unobservables. 
Actually matching is the method most commonly used to deal with the Ashenfelter’s dip and 
selection into training. Implicitly, they assume based on observables (main assumption of 
propensity score matching techniques), that time-invariant unobservables are balanced 
between the treated group and the control group. 
 
Regarding individual heterogeneity, almost all studies consider different sources of 
heterogeneity of treatment, such as gender or hometown. However, they ignore if the 
programme is more effective for those youths with no work experience or for the poorest 
trainees. The presence of an informal labour market makes relevant the consideration of 
heterogeneity by poverty status and work experience (see Chapter 2). The low completion 
rates of Projoven are also neglected in most of the studies. Only Chacaltana et al. (2003) and 
Chong and Galdo (2006) present estimations that, to some extent, do consider the impact of 
Projoven’s low completion rate.  
 
Using data from the sixth public call, Chacaltana et al. (2003) run cross-sectional OLS 
regressions of relative changes in hourly wages controlling for demographic variables, 
labour-related variables and participation in Projoven. These regressions estimate Projoven’s 
effects six, twelve and eighteen months post-programme. The low completion factor is taken 
into account via dummy variables that split Projoven’s effect into two parts. The first dummy 
is activated for individuals who completed the first phase of Projoven but not the second. 
The second dummy is activated once the trainee has fully completed the training sequence. 
Chacaltana et al. (2003) find that the programme leads to increases in participants’ monthly 
wages of about 18% to the extent that they completed the entire training sequence, but only 
in the short-run (six months post-programme). These authors find no effects on trainee 
earnings after twelve months of either classroom instruction or on-the-job training 
internship. One must note that Chacaltana et al. (2003) do not control for any pre-programme 
earnings dip, for selection into work or for possible endogeneity of training completion. 
 
Chong and Galdo (2006), using data from the first, second, fourth, sixth and eighth public 
calls of Projoven, apply a differences-in-differences approach with local linear propensity 
score matching. They find positive and statistically significant returns in terms of monthly 
wages, which are larger for trainees who completed both phases of the programme in 
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comparison with trainees who completed only the first phase. These authors take into 
account a pre-programme earnings dip in their matching process, but training completion is 
considered as if randomly assigned. 
 
Evidence from Projoven evaluations suggests that the programme yields positive returns 
with respect to trainee employment conditions and earnings. Nevertheless, the non-
experimental design of these evaluations and the low completion phenomenon threaten the 
validity of these results. Questions remain about whether programme effects remain positive 
once simultaneous corrections for sample selection and completion are considered. 
 
 
4.4 Low Completion as a Source of Bias 
 
Observational studies face not only the risk of potential hidden bias (unobservables), but 
differing individual levels of completion could bring about new sources of bias. 
Amalgamating completers and non-completers may confound differing effects. On the one 
hand, dropping out might imply not obtaining a certificate, which could cast the trainee in a 
negative light to potential employers. In such case, training participation cannot be regarded 
as beneficial. On the other hand, there are cases where dropping out is justified by the 
sudden emergence of appropriate job opportunities. Thus, there is the potential to 
erroneously attribute some outcomes to the programme. Due to the presence of dropouts 
with partial treatment, regressions based on a Roy-model-type equation will not estimate an 
effective average treatment effect (ATE) but rather an “average intention to treat” (AIT) effect 
(Heckman et al., 1998).  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the difference between treatment effects for full and partial compliers. 
The effect of full treatment, denoted πγ + , compares to the effect of partial treatment, 
denoted γ . By ignoring the existence of two doses of treatment (corresponding to completers 
and dropouts), one would find an average difference between the outcomes of treated 
individuals (completers and dropouts) and the control group of ρπγ +=AIT , where ρ  
represents the proportion of completers (full compliers) and π  represents the additional 
treatment effect experienced by full compliers. One could underestimate the effects of the 
programme if the effects of the programme materialize only conditionally on completion  
( 0≤γ , 0>π ). If the programme is not effective, we could attribute to the programme the 
wrong effect if the dropouts are better off ( 0≤π , 0>γ ). Moreover, other cases such as 
when both dropouts and completers are worse off ( 0<π , 0<γ ), or when both groups are 
better off ( 0>π , 0>γ ) could overestimate negatively or positively the effects of the 
programme, respectively. Failing to account for the low completion rate may bias the 
estimated effect of the programme. 
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Figure 4.1.  
Programme treatment effects by completion level 
 
 
 
 
The literature on YJTP evaluation approaches the low completion phenomenon in three 
ways: i) assuming dropout as a random event; ii) evaluating the effect of the time of 
exposure to training; and iii) using traditional non-experimental methods. First, some studies 
implicitly take dropout as a random phenomenon. By ignoring dropouts with partial 
treatment, some studies assume that dropout is independent from the programme’s 
outcome. As such, its exclusion from the treatment effects estimations would not yield any 
bias on the rest of the parameters of interest. However, this could be a strong assumption. 
Some of the trainees drop out when a job offer appears. In that case, the dropout decision 
would not be independent of the programme’s outcome. Therefore, some tests would be 
needed to confirm the randomness assumption of training completion. 
 
Second, some studies do not consider the treatment as a binary variable equal to one if 
participation in training occurs, and equal to zero if no participation occurs. These studies 
instead evaluate the effect of the length of exposure to training. For instance, using duration 
models with the competing risk framework it is possible to evaluate alternative transitions 
from the duration of training to employment, unemployment or inactivity. This approach is 
used by Mealli et al. (1996) to evaluate the effects of the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) in the 
U.K. These authors found that early termination is associated with a lower probability of 
transition into employment. There is an important distinction between youths who stay in 
the YTS and those who leave the programme early. The completers have much better 
employment prospects. This also has implications regarding the training providers. The 
authors suggest that completers are usually matched with better training providers. 
 
Another approach which evaluates the effects of time spent in training is based on Hirano 
and Imbens (2004). This procedure, called generalized propensity score, consists in four 
steps. In the first step, it estimates by ordinary least squares (OLS) the conditional lognormal 
distribution of the treatment 
i
T (time exposed to training) given the covariates 
i
X : that is, the 
estimated model is ( ) ( )210 ,~ln σϕϕ ii XT + .  
 
In the second step, a generalized propensity score function (
i
R ) is estimated from the 
coefficients of the first regression: 
 
Treated Individuals Control Group
Policy Intervention
Completers Dropouts
Outcomes 0Yγ+0Yπγ ++0Y
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In the third step, the conditional expectation of the outcome (
i
Y ) given the observed 
treatment (time exposed to training) and the estimated 
i
R  is modelled with OLS 
 
[Eq. 4.2] [ ]
iiiiiiiii
RTRRTTRTYE ˆ.ˆˆˆ, 5
2
43
2
210 ωωωωωω +++++= . 
 
In the fourth and last step, this approach estimates the dose response function at treatment 
level t  by averaging the regression function [Eq. 4.2] over the distribution of the generalized 
propensity score (holding t  constant): 
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Different values of the dose response function corresponding to different values of the 
treatment can be estimated. Thus, the dose response function provides an insight into the 
causal effects of receiving different levels of exposure to the training. 
 
Using this methodology, Flores-Lagunes et al. (2007) found that, relative to the non-
participant baseline, the estimated marginal effects of an additional week of training in the 
YJTP Job Corps in the U.S. are positive and increase with the length of exposure; however, 
the marginal effect declines after approximately 52 weeks of enrolment in the programme 
(although still positive effects are observed). Using the same method, Kluve et al. (2007) 
found similar results for training programmes in Germany. Additionally, this method allows 
consideration for some levels of individual heterogeneity. Flores-Lagunes et al. (2007) 
estimated that the impact of the programme on Hispanics is larger and persistent over time 
in comparison with whites and black American youths.  
 
The approaches based on time exposed to training demonstrated that the length of training 
matters in terms of employment prospects and earnings. However, there are still some 
limitations to be accounted for. Kluve et al. (2007) and Flores-Lagunes (2007) assumed that 
the length of enrolment is randomly assigned conditional on observable characteristics. If the 
decision to take up training is based on unobservables, results may be biased. In addition, 
Mealli et al. (1996) exclude the control group from their estimations. Thus, it is not possible 
to assess the effect of the programme in the absence of it. 
 
Next to models including random drop-outs and models analysing the duration of the 
training, there is a third approach to deal with partial treatment or low completion in YJTPs.  
Heckman et al. (1998) and Heckman et al. (2000) advocate the use of non-experimental 
techniques to estimate training programmes’ treatment effects in the presence of dropouts, 
even when experimental data are available. Based on the analysis of the training 
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programmes funded under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in the U.S., Heckman et 
al. (2000) conclude that unadjusted (by dropout) treatment effects estimates understate the 
effect of the training. These authors question the reported poor performance of this 
programme (JTPA classroom instruction) because previous evaluations did not account for 
substitution and dropout. These authors report estimates of the full treatment effects of the 
JTPA classroom instruction on the fully treated in terms of earnings using cross-section 
estimates, instrumental variables, propensity score matching and Rosenbaum’s bounds. 
They use data from the trainees and control group before, during and after the training. 
Heckman et al. (2000) found that the training yields large and positive returns on trainees’ 
earnings conditioned on completion relative to no training. Although the methods presented 
by these authors are based on different identification assumptions, the main conclusion 
holds. However, it should be recalled that the dropout problem analysed in Heckman et al. 
(2000) occurs before the treatment. In other words, trainees drop out before starting the 
programme. If dropouts receive partial instruction, the methods discussed in Heckman et al. 
(1998) and Heckman et al. (2000) produce inconsistent estimates of the impact of full 
treatment on the fully treated. 
 
In terms of using non-experimental methods, Lee and Lee (2003) propose the use of 
propensity score matching techniques but accounting for partial compliance. These authors 
evaluate the effects of a Korean job-training programme for adult women. They compare 
three groups on a pairwise basis: the control group, the dropouts with partial treatment and 
the completers. Lee and Lee’s (2003) empirical findings suggest that the treatment is bad, 
mainly because the dropouts consist of job-founders. This approach implicitly assumes that 
selection into training is based on observables. Consequently, rich datasets are needed to 
deal with the threat of selectivity bias. 
 
In this study a combination of non-experimental methods is used to deal with the potential 
low-completion bias. First, propensity score matching techniques are used to ensure that 
treated and non-treated youths are comparable (Chapter 3). Second, a pairwise comparison 
as suggested in Lee and Lee (2003) is used, but with fixed-effects methods. In addition, the 
completion is allowed to be endogenously determined as suggested by Heckman et al. 
(2000). In the next section this will be explained in detail. 
 
 
4.5 Empirical Framework 
 
A methodology to estimate Projoven’s treatment effect on trainees’ overall and formal 
employment, as well as monthly wages, is developed in this section. This study does not 
evaluate the effect of Projoven on trainees’ hourly wages since this variable is not directly 
observed in the data. Whereas information regarding monthly wages is requested directly in 
Projoven’s questionnaire, hourly wages should be manually constructed. To build the 
variable hourly wages, it is necessary to divide wages by hours worked. Unfortunately, there 
is a mismatch in the time base of hours worked and wages. The variable hours worked is 
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collected based on the week prior to the interview, which does not coincide with the period 
in which wages are collected (the month immediately before the interview). This is 
problematic because most disadvantaged youths work in the informal labour market where 
they could work long hours some weeks and few hours other weeks. 
 
To mitigate the effects of different sources of bias (training completion and self-selection into 
treatment) four groups are compared pairwise: i) the control group with no treatment [G1]3, 
ii) the dropout group with only classroom instruction and no internship placement [G2], iii) 
the dropout group with classroom instruction and internship placement [G3], and iv) the 
treatment group with the full treatment (classroom instruction and internship) [G4]. Group 
composition is based on individual completion levels, as represented in Figure 4.2.4 
 
The distribution of individuals over different completion levels allows classifying Projoven’s 
effects on trainees’ labour market outcomes (overall and formal employment, and monthly 
wages) in three categories: (1) the effect of participation in the programme, (2) the effect of 
internship placement, and (3) the effect of internship completion. These estimations account 
also for the potential endogeneity of phase completion, sample selection and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Additionally the treatment effect is allowed to vary over time and with 
respect to particular individual characteristics (e.g., gender, working experience prior to 
training and per-capita household income). 
 
Figure 4. 2.  
Evaluation sample. Projoven sixth public call. 
 
Source: Projoven. Further elaboration by the author. 
 
4.5.1 The effect of participation in the programme 
 
To identify the effect of Projoven participation, we compare [G2] vs. [G1], [G3] vs. [G1], and 
[G4] vs. [G1]. A general specification of individual labour market outcomes is given by: 
                                                   
3 This control group has been created based on a matching with replacement procedure. See Chapter 3 
for details. 
4 In this figure the 22 trainees who dropped out within the first three months of the programme have 
been excluded from the evaluation sample as explained in Chapter 3. 
G4: Completers  
578 individuals
Internship 
placement
G3: Dropouts  
231 individuals
Trainees
G0: Economically 
disadvantaged 
youths
G2: No Internship 
placement 183 
individuals
1984 individuals
G1: Control Group 
992 individuals
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[Eq. 4.4]  
ittiitit
XY εδηβα ++++= 1itProjoven , 
 
where 
=
it
Y  labour market outcome (overall or formal employment or wages) of individual i  in 
period t ; 
=
it
X  a row vector of measured individual characteristics affecting labour market outcomes; 
=itProjoven  a dummy variable measuring programme participation (1: only for trainees in 
the post-training periods; 0: for control groups in all the periods and for trainees in the 
period prior to the programme); 
=
i
η an error term specific to individual i  and constant over time; 
=
t
δ  an error term specific to period t , and constant across individuals; 
=
it
ε  an idiosyncratic error term specific to individual i  at period t ; and with α  being a 
column vector of unknown parameters and 
1β  being the unknown programme effect. 
 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after the end of Projoven, 12 
months after the end of Projoven and 18 months after the end of Projoven, respectively.  
 
To identify Projoven’s effects, one of the underlying assumptions is that the error term 
it
ε  is 
serially uncorrelated, implying that treatment outcomes on period  are not affected by 
previous outcomes (in period  − 1, for instance). This assumption is usually not satisfied in 
panel applications. It is likely that if employment condition (or wages) is overpredicted in 
one period for a given youth, then it is likely to be overpredicted in other periods. Failure to 
control for this error correlation leads to underestimation of standard errors. However, it is 
still possible to obtain cluster-robust standard errors under the weaker assumption that 
errors are independent across individuals and that  → ∞. Specifically, 	
, 	 = 0 for 
 ≠ , 	
, 	
 is unrestricted, and 	
 may be heteroskedastic. In this study, robust standard 
errors have been clustered by members of the control group in order to allow for correlation 
of the errors. 
 
The presence of unobservables constant over time, 
i
η , can be circumvented by using fixed-
effects (FE) estimators. These also allow for correlation between the unobservables and the 
explanatory variables, such as Projoven. In the case of labour market outcomes prediction, it 
is very likely that there are potential time-invariant unobservables which are correlated with 
the regressors and with the errors.  
 
If individual effects are not fixed, then the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and random 
effects (RE) estimators would be more appropriate to estimate Projoven’s effects. Whether 
fixed effects are present can be tested by using a Robust Hausman test which allows the error 
term to be heteroskedastic. This test uses the artificial regression approach described by 
Wooldridge (2002, pp. 290-91), in which a random effects equation is reestimated, 
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augmented with additional variables consisting of the original regressors transformed into 
deviations-from-mean form. The test statistic is a Wald test of the significance of these 
additional regressors. A large-sample chi-squared test statistic is reported with no degrees-
of-freedom corrections in Annexes Tables. In all the cases, the test rejects the null hypothesis 
concluding that RE or pooled models are not appropriate.5  
 
A threefold strategy for estimating the effects of Projoven participation is used. First, to 
estimate the effect on overall employment, a linear probability model (LPM) with fixed-
effects estimators is utilised, as in: 
 
[Eq. 4.5]  
 = 
 + Projoven
"# + $12 ∗ Projoven
"' + $18 ∗ Projoven
") + $12*# +
                                     $18*' + ,
 + 	
 , 
 
where D12 and D18 are time dummies corresponding to the periods twelve and eighteen 
months after the end of the training, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are 
Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value 
zero for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). The 
interaction of D12 and D18 dummies and the Projoven variable allows the treatment to vary 
over time. Thus, the effect of Projoven sixth public call participation after six months, after 
twelve months and after eighteen months are represented by 
1β ; 21 ββ + ; and 31 ββ + , 
respectively.  
 
Next, to estimate Projoven’s effects on formal employment, an LPM with fixed-effects 
estimator that corrects for sample selection (Wooldridge, 1995) is used. The objective of using 
sample selection is because formal employment status is only observed for individuals who 
are actually working. Individuals in the labour force could be systematically different from 
those who are inactive, particularly in the case of economically disadvantaged youths. 
Through counselling and encouragement of individuals to enter the labour force, Projoven 
could select certain youths, for example more motivated ones, into employment. This could 
potentially introduce some sample selection bias in the estimation of Projoven treatment 
effects. 
 
Wooldridge’s (1995) estimations follow a two-step approach. First, a standard Tobit 
regression of hours worked on observable covariates for each time period is estimated. 
Second, the residuals of these estimations are included as additional regressors in [Eq. 4.5], 
which is estimated using fixed-effects estimators. The variables being married, having a child 
and the natural log of household income per capita (without the individual) are excluded 
from the outcome equation [Eq. 4.5] but included in the selection equation. These variables 
have been traditionally used in labour economics in the context of wage equations and are 
valid instruments because they affect the selection into work, but not wages directly. It could 
be argued that these variables, for instance, having a relatively high household income or 
having a child, may increase individuals’ reservation wages. However, in the case of the 
                                                   
5 The test is implemented by the Stata user-written command “xtoverid” (Schaffer and Stillman, 2010). 
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Projoven dataset where all individuals are unskilled youths in poverty status, their urgent 
financial needs may have depressed their reservation wages in such a way that the potential 
influence of any further variation of these variables (household income, marriage and child) 
on treatment outcomes (wages or formal employment condition) through reservation wages 
is minimal (or negligible). These individuals are so poor that having another child may not 
modify anymore their reservation wages, but it would definitely affect the time they have 
available for working. 
 
Finally, to estimate Projoven effects on monthly wages a fixed effect estimator that corrects 
for sample selection is used. This approach follows Wooldridge’s (1995) procedure as in the 
case of Projoven effects on formal employment. The idea of using a sample selection 
correction is to disentangle pure wage effects from employment effects. Wages could 
increase because training increases trainees’ hours worked or their likelihood of being 
employed. In addition, it should be considered that wages are only observed for youths who 
are employed and these individuals could, potentially, be systematically different from those 
who are unemployed. Sample selection correction allows taking into account selectivity 
issues and observing pure wage effects. 
 
4.5.2 The effect of Projoven internship placement 
 
Internship placement is observed only in the case of trainees. Consequently, control group 
individuals are excluded from these estimations. The identification of Projoven’s internship 
placement effect is based on the comparison of [G3] vs. [G2], and [G4] vs. [G2]. To estimate 
the effects of internship placement on employment, an LPM fixed-effects estimator is used. 
In the case of effects on formal employment and monthly wages, the sample selection 
correction approach for fixed effects suggested by Wooldridge (1995) is utilised.  
 
In this specification it is assumed that internship placement is independent of trainee labour 
market outcomes, because internship placement does not depend on a trainee decision. 
Internship placement is a process that depends entirely on the ECAP’s ability to network and 
place students. Internships are regulated paid positions that stipulate that every trainee must 
receive at least the minimum wage and health insurance. The minimum wage is higher than 
the market wage for disadvantaged youths, which implies a high opportunity cost for 
trainees if they decide to drop out. Thus, internship placement could be considered 
exogenous. Additionally, Lee (2005, Chapter 5, Section 2) suggests that if the results are 
coherent with other auxiliary findings, one may claim that the assignment, in this case into 
internship, is not affected by unobservables. For instance, trainees who drop out of the 
internship should not have different outcomes than trainees who were not assigned into 
internships. The estimated coefficient of internship placement in the comparison of [G3] and 
[G2] is not statistically different from zero (See Panel B of Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). This lends 
support the initial assumption of random assignment into internships. Nevertheless, in this 
study internship placement is also allowed to be endogenous. 
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To allow for potential endogeneity of internship placement, a pooled, two-stage least squares 
estimation is used, as suggested by Semykina and Wooldridge (2005). This method accounts 
for both possible endogeneity of internship placement and sample selection. The sample 
selection correction is necessary in the formal employment and monthly wage models. The 
Semykina and Wooldridge approach follows a two-step procedure. First, it estimates probit 
regressions of employment condition in every period, adding Mundlak terms as regressors.6 
From this, standard inverse Mills ratios are estimated. Second, it models the trainees’ labour 
market outcomes using pooled two-stage least squares, adding as regressors the inverse 
Mills ratios and Mundlak terms for those individuals whose labour market outcomes are 
observed. The sample selection correction is excluded in the estimations of the effects of  
internship completion on overall employment. 
 
For internship placement, categorical variables indicating the type of ECAP serve as 
instruments — that is, CEO, NGO, VTCESA, firms, IST and universities. Firms and IST are 
aggregated in one category and used as the base category, because those are the types of 
vocational training providers which present higher returns in terms of their graduates’ 
labour market outcomes (Saavedra and Chacaltana, 2001). 
 
The validity of ECAP type dummies as instrumental variables depends on two conditions. 
First, ECAP types should not influence changes on the trainees’ labour market outcomes, 
except indirectly via internship placement (exogeneity). It is observed that trainees do not 
know beforehand in which type of ECAP they will end up. Trainees do not have a direct 
influence on the type of ECAP as less than 20% of trainees are granted their first choice 
(Projoven, 2002). Therefore, the allocation of trainees to ECAP types will be considered 
random (independent of the labour market outcomes). 
 
Second, ECAP types are supposed to influence the trainees’ likelihood to be placed in an 
internship (relevance). In principle, all trainees are entitled to pursue the internship phase 
after the classroom phase. However, placement depends on the ECAP’s capacity and it is 
observed that some ECAP types are better able to do so. Firms, IST and CEOs are the most 
successful at placing trainees in internships (100%, 95% and 92%, respectively). They are 
followed by NGO, universities and VTCESA with 78%, 71% and 60% internship placements, 
respectively. Thus, ECAP types are considered good predictors of internship placement. 
 
                                                   
6 Mundlak terms consist of within-group means of several independent variables. In our case, these 
include: potential experience, household income per capita, being married, and having a child. With 
this strategy, unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to consist of two parts. The first part is 
uncorrelated with the observed variables. The second part is assumed to vary linearly with the group 
means, whereby a possible correlation between the independent variables and the unobserved 
heterogeneity is accounted for (Mundlak, 1978). The correlation between Mundlak terms and the 
exogenous variables does not affect our Projoven coefficients. We include in the Appendix (Table 
A4.18–Table A4.23) the results of the estimations using differently defined Mundlak terms (initial 
values instead of time averages), and without the use of Mundlak terms. We observe that Projoven 
internship placement effect and Projoven internship completion effect vary very little with respect to 
the results with Mundlak terms. 
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The pooled two-stage least squares model with sample selection correction is set up as 
follows: 
 
[Eq. 4.6]    
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where Internship is a dummy variable measuring internship placement (1: for trainees in the 
post-training periods placed in internships; 0: otherwise and for all individuals in the 
baseline period), iZ  represents a row vector containing the Mundlak terms, and itλˆ  
represents the estimated inverse Mills ratios. Thus, the effect of the Projoven internship after 
six months, after twelve months and after eighteen months is represented as 
1β ; 21 ββ + ; 
and 31 ββ + , respectively. 
 
4.5.3 The effect of Projoven internship completion 
 
Internship completion is observed only for trainees who are placed in internships. Therefore 
the evaluation sample in this case consists of trainees placed in internships ([G4] and [G3]). 
To evaluate the effects of internship completion on overall employment, the same techniques 
applied to evaluate the effects of internship placement are used. Additionally, the estimate 
also allows for endogeneity of internship completion. As in the previous case, ECAP type 
dummies are used as instrumental variables.  
 
The logic behind the choice of ECAP type as instrumental variables is similar to the 
internship placement case regarding the instrument exogeneity but slightly different 
regarding the instrument’s relevance. As previously mentioned, in the absence of the 
programme, trainees are most likely unemployed or working in the informal labour market. 
In theory, the internship conditions, in terms of wages, are more favourable than the 
alternatives trainees have. However, in practice this may not be the case, and trainees drop 
out as internship conditions do not indicate chances to improve their labour market 
prospects (Chapter 2). Therefore, under the assumption that better ECAP types place trainees 
in better (or proper) internships, ECAP type could also explain the likelihood to complete the 
internship. In fact, it is observed that the proportion of trainees who complete the internship 
is higher for those from IST, firms, CEOs and NGOs (100%, 92%, 90% and 87% respectively). 
They are followed by universities and VTCESA with 78% and 50% completers, respectively. 
Thus, ECAP types are considered good predictors of internship completion. 
 
4.5.4 Projoven heterogeneous treatment effects 
 
This study tests whether Projoven participation, Projoven internship placement and Projoven 
internship completion effects vary across particular individual characteristics. For that 
purpose, multiplicative dummies of Projoven participation (or, Projoven internship 
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placement or Projoven internship completion) with some individual characteristics are 
added. Among such characteristics, the following are considered: gender, work experience 
condition prior to training, and whether the trainee is in the lowest quartile of household 
income per capita prior to training.7 The selection of these variables is based on the 
discussion in Chapter 2 on individual heterogeneity. The model is set up as follows: 
 
[Eq. 4.7]    
 = 
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where Fem is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is female, Noexp indicates 
whether an individual has no experience prior to training, and Quart signals whether the 
individual is in the lowest quartile of household income per capita prior to training. Thus, 
the additional effects of the programme for women after six months, after twelve months 
and after eighteen months are represented by 
4β ; 54 ββ + ; and 64 ββ + , respectively. In the 
case of trainees with no work experience prior to training, the estimated additional effects of 
the programme after six months, after twelve months and after eighteen months are 
represented by 7β ; 87 ββ + ; and 97 ββ + , respectively. Finally, in the case of trainees in the 
lowest household income per capita quartile prior to training, the estimated additional 
effects of the programme after six months, after twelve months and after eighteen months 
are represented by 10β ; 1110 ββ + ; and 1210 ββ + , respectively. 
 
In order to allow for the inclusion of variables that do not change over time, random effects 
estimators are used. For consistency, these estimations are conditioned on the previous fixed-
effects results, using as a dependent variable the residuals (with individual effects) of the 
estimations of Projoven’s effects in terms of both overall and formal employment and in 
terms of monthly wages. As explanatory variables, Projoven interactions with time and with 
corresponding individual characteristics are considered. The reason to use interactions of the 
treatment with gender, work experience and household income quartile instead of separate 
regressions for each category has to do with the methods employed in the estimations and 
the sample size. In this study a pair-wise comparison of four groups is considered in order to 
circumvent potential biases of training completion. If separate regressions were considered, 
it will not be possible to identify some of the effects because not enough variation is observed 
for some categories in some groups. 
 
                                                   
7 The inclusion of additional dummies for other income quartiles do not modify the results obtained 
when only considering the lowest quartile. 
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4.6 Results 
 
Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 display the estimated effects of Projoven’s sixth public call on overall 
employment, formal employment, and monthly wages, respectively. All three tables show 
the effects of the training over time and include three panels: A) Effects of Projoven 
participation, B) Effects of internship placement, and C) Effects of internship completion. 
These tables are complemented by Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8, which present the effects of 
Projoven’s sixth public call on overall employment, formal employment, and monthly 
wages, respectively, allowing for endogeneity of internship placement and internship 
completion. Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 allow for the treatment to vary across particular 
individual characteristics but using a more restrictive specification: random effects 
estimators. Consequently, the estimates in Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 are presented as 
indicative of Projoven’s treatment effects across individual characteristics. In all the cases, 
robust standard errors have been clustered by members of the control group in order to 
allow for correlation of the errors. 
 
4.6.1 Projoven effects on overall employment 
 
Table 4.3 sets forth the effects of Projoven’s sixth public call on overall employment.8 It is 
observed that relative to the no-programme situation, Projoven participation fails to yield 
permanent returns on employment at any level of completion (Panel A). However in the 
short term (six months post-training), the programme increases by 9% the likelihood of 
individual employment, but only for trainees who complete the internship (Panel A, [G4] vs. 
[G1] first column). This effect diminishes over time to the extent of becoming negative in the 
long-run (eighteen months post-training). 
 
The internship placement effects estimates are found to be not significant over time (Panel B). 
The fact that the comparison of [G3] and [G2] generates no significant effects shows that 
internship placement could be regarded as if randomly assigned. The only difference 
between individuals in [G3] with respect to [G2] is that the [G2] individuals are not placed in 
internships. Since [G3] individuals did not complete the training, one would not expect a 
positive reward. These results also hold when allowing for internship placement to be 
endogenous as shown in Table 4.6. Only for completers [G4] positive effects are found, 
around 21%. In addition, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test cannot reject the hypothesis of the 
exogeneity of internship placement; and according to the Stock and Yogo’s (2005) the null 
hypothesis of weak instrument is rejected (See tables A4.8, and A4.9 for details on the tests). 
The same performance regarding the exogeneity of internship placement and the relevance 
of the instruments is observed in the estimations of formal employment and monthly wages. 
 
                                                   
8 Table 4.3 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.1, 
A4.2, and A4.3. 
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In the case of internship completion, it is observed that Projoven increases employment 
likelihood by 10% (Table 4.3, Panel C, [G4] vs. [G3], first column). The effects of internship 
completion hold in the medium-term, twelve months post-training, and disappear in the 
long-term, eighteen months post-training (Panel C, [G4] vs. [G3], second and third columns). 
The returns are similar when allowing the treatment to be endogenous (Table 4.6, Panel B, 
[G4] vs. [G3]).9 However, the returns are of a different magnitude (17%), just slightly 
insignificant, and do not vary significantly in the medium- or long-term. It must be taken 
into account that the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test cannot reject the hypothesis of the 
exogeneity of internship completion; and according to Stock and Yogo (2005) the null 
hypothesis of weak instrument is rejected (See Tables A4.10 for details on the tests). The 
same performance regarding the exogeneity of internship placement and the relevance of the 
instruments is observed in the estimations of formal employment and monthly wages. 
 
Table 4.9 reports the effects of Projoven’s sixth public call while allowing for heterogeneous 
treatment across certain individual characteristics.10 It is observed that the training yields no 
additional returns to women nor to individuals in the lowest household income per capita 
quartile prior to training (Panels A, B and C). However, Projoven increases the employment 
likelihood of individuals with no working experience prior to training at any level of 
completion. These effects seem to be persistent and are greater in the long-term (eighteen 
months post-programme), conditioned on completion of both training phases. 
 
In summary, with respect to employment condition, Projoven yields limited returns. Only 
individuals who complete the treatment [G4] experience positive and significant returns 
compared to non-participants [G1] and compared to dropouts [G3], but these returns 
diminish over time. The effects of the programme are greater and persistent over time for 
those individuals with no work experience prior to training, regardless of their level of 
completion. 
 
4.6.2 Projoven effects on formal employment, controlling for sample selection 
 
Table 4.4 sets forth the estimated effects of Projoven’s sixth public call on formal 
employment, corrected for sample selection.11 The programme fails to yield any returns on 
trainees’ formal employment condition when compared to non-participants [G1]. The 
coefficients estimated in Panel A are not significant. 
 
Internship placement with respect to no internship placement increases the likelihood of 
employment in the formal labour market. However, these effects are not statistically 
                                                   
9 Table 4.6 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.8, 
A4.9, and A4.10. 
10 Table 4.9 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.11, 
A4.12, and A4.17. 
11 Table 4.4 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.3, 
A4.4, and A4.5.  
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significant (Panel B). Allowing internship placement to be endogenous shows similar results, 
but of different magnitude. Table 4.7 shows estimated effects larger than those in Table 4.4, 
but these are not significant.12 
 
Comparison of [G4] and [G3] confirms that internship completion is rewarded more than 
dropping out. The returns obtained remain constant over time. No evidence of additional 
significant effects is found in the medium- and long-term (Table 4.4, Panel C, [G4] vs. [G3], 
second and third columns). The same results hold when allowing internship completion to 
be endogenous; however, the effects almost double in magnitude (Table 4.7, Panel C). 
 
In the case of heterogeneous treatment, significant and positive effects are only found for 
those individuals with no work experience prior to training and for those in the lowest 
household income per capita quartile (Table 4.10).13 In the case of trainees with no work 
experience, these effects are conditioned on training completion compared to trainees not 
placed in internships (Table 4.10, Panel B, [G4] vs. [G2]). In the case of trainees in the lowest 
quartile, the effects are greater for the dropouts with internship placement [G3] compared to 
the non-participants [G1] (Table 4.10, Panel A, [G3] vs. [G1]). 
 
In summary, the programme fails to yield returns with respect to formal employment. 
However, internship completion is rewarded more than dropping out in this respect. The 
effects of internship completion are persistent over time. As in the case of overall 
employment, Projoven produces additional returns to those individuals with no work 
experience and, in addition, to those in the lowest household income per capita quartile. 
 
4.6.3 Projoven effects on monthly wages, controlling for sample selection 
 
Table 4.5 sets forth the estimated effects Projoven’s sixth public call on monthly wages 
corrected for sample selection.14 Panel A shows that compared to non-participants [G1], 
Projoven increases trainee wages by more than 30% despite of the level of completion. These 
effects diminish significantly over time for programme completers [G4]. As discussed 
previously, these results must be taken only as suggestive because of the systematic 
differences between trainees and the control group prior to training, in terms of wages (See 
Chapter 3). 
 
Panel B shows that internship placement yields no significant returns on monthly wages 
compared to the no-internship placement situation; the effects are even negative in the 
medium- and long-term (Panel B, [G4] vs. [G2], second and third columns). The results 
                                                   
12 Table 4.7 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.8, 
A4.9, and A4.10. 
13 Table 4.10 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.13, 
A4.15, and A4.17. 
14 Table 4.5 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.3, 
A4.6, and A4.7. 
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change only in terms of magnitude when allowing internship placement to be endogenous 
(Table 4.8).15 Only in the case of [G3] positive returns are observed 12 months after the 
programme. However, it must be recalled that the endogenous specification is not more 
efficient even though the power of the instruments (See Tables A4.8 and A4.9). 
 
Completing the Projoven internship relative to dropping out is definitively worthwhile, 
although the effects are not persistent and diminish over time. Controlling for internship 
completion endogeneity (Table 4.8, Panel B) does not change this assessment; only its 
magnitude and level of significance differ. 
 
Table 4.11 reports estimates of the effects of Projoven’s sixth public call on monthly wages, 
allowing for heterogeneous treatment across particular individual characteristics.16 It is 
observed that in comparison to non-participants and dropouts, Projoven yields additional 
returns for those trainees with no work experience prior to the training and for those in the 
lowest household income per capita quartile. These effects are persistent over time. For 
women, the programme is effective only in the long-run (eighteen months post-training), 
conditioned on completion ([G4]), compared to dropouts ([G2] and [G3]). 
 
To summarize, with respect to monthly wages, Projoven can be regarded as an effective 
programme. The programme generates positive and significant returns for all trainees in 
comparison to non-participation [G1], but these effects diminish over time. Additionally, 
completing the training [G4] is rewarded more than dropping out [G3]. Finally, the effects of 
the programme are greater for those individuals with no work experience prior to training 
and for those in the lowest household income per capita quartile. For women, positive effects 
are observed only in the long-term conditioned on completion. 
  
                                                   
15 Table 4.8 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.8, 
A4.9, and A4.10. 
16 Table 4.11 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.14, 
A4.16, and A4.17. 
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Table 4.3. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on overall employment by level of completion. Linear probability 
model - fixed effect estimations.  
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3βˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven participation  
[G2] vs. [G1] 0.033 -0.036 -0.069 
 (0.059) (0.051) (0.056) 
[G3] vs. [G1] -0.006 -0.068 -0.018 
 (0.054) (0.045) (0.054) 
[G4] vs. [G1] 0.091** -0.105*** -0.125*** 
 (0.044) (0.036) (0.043) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.041 -0.033 0.051 
 (0.062) (0.056) (0.057) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.055 -0.063 -0.049 
 (0.054) (0.048) (0.048) 
C. Effects of Projoven  internship completion  
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.103* -0,014 -0.109* 
 (0.061) (0.051) (0.059) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
[ 1βˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2βˆ ], [ 3βˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all models, 
the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4.3 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.1, A4.2 and A4.3. 
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Table 4.4. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on formal employment by level of completion. Linear probability 
model fixed-effects estimates with sample selection correction (Wooldridge, 1995).  
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 12 
months 
[ 2βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 18 
months 
[ 3βˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven participation  
[G2] vs. [G1] -0.046 -0.020 -0.123* 
 (0.085) (0.070) (0.069) 
[G3] vs. [G1] 0.012 -0.011 -0.078 
 (0.075) (0.055) (0.058) 
[G4] vs. [G1] 0.081 -0.010 -0.071 
 (0.065) (0.047) (0.049) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.032 0.031 0.036 
 (0.094) (0.077) (0.074) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.092 0.048 0.067 
 (0.076) (0.067) (0.063) 
C. Effects of Projoven  internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.187* -0.014 -0.029 
 (0.097) (0.077) (0.071) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
[ 1βˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2βˆ ], [ 3βˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all models, 
the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4.4 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.3, A4.4, and A4.5. 
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Table 4.5. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on monthly wages by level of completion. Fixed-effects estimates 
with sample selection correction (Wooldridge, 1995).  
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 12 
months 
[ 2βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 18 
months 
[ 3βˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven participation 
[G2] vs. [G1] 0.332*** -0.025 0.105 
 (0.135) (0.096) (0.098) 
[G3] vs. [G1] 0.341*** 0.106 0.126 
 (0.124) (0.084) (0.095) 
[G4] vs. [G1] 0.382*** -0.140** -0.089 
 (0.095) (0.063) (0.066) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.087 0.073 -0.017 
 (0.143) (0.109) (0.109) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.109 -0.163* -0.268*** 
 (0.124) (0.088) (0.090) 
C. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.351** -0.263** -0.354*** 
 (0.139) (0.110) (0.112) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals) 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
[ 1βˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2βˆ ], [ 3βˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all models, 
the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4.5 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.3, A4.6, and A4.7. 
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Table 4.6. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on overall employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. Pooled linear probability model – two-stage least 
squares estimates.  
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 12 
months 
[ 2βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 18 
months 
[ 3βˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.185 0.076 -0.22 
 (0.415) (0.275) (0.341) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.215* -0.112 -0.105 
 (0.115) (0.093) (0.172) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion  
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.172 -0.111 0.036 
 (0.136) (0.157) (0.137) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
[ 1βˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2βˆ ], [ 3βˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4.6 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.8, A4.9 and A4.10. 
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Table 4.7. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on formal employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. Pooled linear probability model – two-stage least 
squares estimates with sample selection correction (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006).  
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3βˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.198 -0.034 -0.072 
 (0.350) (0.357) (0.361) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.485 -0.129 -0.151 
 (0.300) (0.237) (0.301) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.327** 0.070 -0.142 
 (0.153) (0.150) (0.223) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
[ 1βˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2βˆ ], [ 3βˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01 and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all models 
the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4.7 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.8, A4.9 and A4.10. 
Chapter 4. Evaluation of Projoven Effectiveness 
66 
 
Table 4.8. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on monthly wages by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. Pooled two-stage least squares estimates with 
sample selection correction (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006). 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 12 
months 
[ 2βˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3βˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement  
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.165 0.591** 0.23 
 (0.255) (0.261) (0.259) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.632 0.034 -0.115 
 (1.076) (0.904) (0.931) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.695 -0.497 -0.286 
 (0.543) (0.442) (0.496) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
[ 1βˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2βˆ ], [ 3βˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4.8 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.8, A4.9, and A4.10. 
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Table 4.9. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on overall employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and across individual characteristics. Linear probability model – random 
effects estimates.  
 
Effects 
females 
after 6 
months 
 
 
 
[ 4βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 12 
months 
 
 
[ 5βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 18 
months 
 
 
[ 6βˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 6 
months 
 
[ 7βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 12 
months 
[ 8βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 18 
months 
[ 9βˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 6 
months 
 
[ 10βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 12 
months 
[ 11βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 18 
months 
[ 12βˆ ] 
          
A. Effects of Projoven participation  
[G2] vs. [G1] -0.079 0.084 0.011 0.167** -0.01 0.003 -0.013 -0.052 -0.01 
 (0.067) (0.073) (0.077) (0.068) (0.079) (0.082) (0.077) (0.083) (0.084) 
[G3] vs. [G1] -0.114* 0.100 0.084 0.148** -0.074 0.085 0.012 -0.026 -0.055 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.076) (0.071) (0.068) (0.080) 
[G4] vs. [G1] -0.069* -0.013 0.000 0.243*** -0.043 0.093* 0.029 0.023 0.007 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement       
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.095 0.102 0.106 0.108 -0.067 0.105 0.009 -0.020 -0.032 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.070) (0.068) (0.069) (0.076) (0.069) (0.068) (0.079) 
[G4] vs. [G2] -0.049 0.000 0.041 0.241*** -0.038 0.106** 0.014 0.027 0.018 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053) 
C. Effects of Projoven internship completion      
[G4] vs. [G3] -0.051 0.01 0.056 0.282*** -0.034 0.118** 0.017 0.031 0.030 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.046) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.055) (0.052) (0.053) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
[ 4βˆ ] represents the interactions with the “female” dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 5βˆ ],  
[ 6βˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 7βˆ ] represents the interactions with the “no work experience” dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 8βˆ ], [ 9βˆ ] 
additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 10βˆ ] represents the interactions with the “lowest quartile” dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 11βˆ ], [ 12βˆ ] additional 
effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4.9 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.11, A4.12 and A4.17. 
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Table 4.10. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on formal employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and across individual characteristics. Linear probability model – random 
effects estimates with sample selection correction.  
 
Effects 
females 
after 6 
months 
 
 
 
[ 4βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 12 
months 
 
 
[ 5βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 18 
months 
 
 
[ 6βˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 6 
months 
 
[ 7βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 12 
months 
[ 8βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 18 
months 
[ 9βˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 6 
months 
 
[ 10βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 12 
months 
[ 11βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 18 
months 
[ 12βˆ ] 
          
A. Effects of Projoven participation  
[G2] vs. [G1] -0.105 0.008 0.046 0.021 -0.090 0.089 0.031 0.003 0.003 
 (0.086) (0.102) (0.098) (0.097) (0.107) (0.102) (0.103) (0.108) (0.106) 
[G3] vs. [G1] -0.099 0.111 0.068 -0.062 -0.190* 0.034 0.159* -0.022 -0.08 
 (0.087) (0.097) (0.086) (0.098) (0.099) (0.095) (0.088) (0.102) (0.078) 
[G4] vs. [G1] -0.059 0.024 -0.011 0.094 -0.091 -0.064 -0.042 0.059 0.020 
 (0.047) (0.052) (0.052) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.066) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement       
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.084 0.104 0.049 -0.059 -0.153 0.025 0.128 -0.064 -0.126 
 (0.091) (0.095) (0.088) (0.102) (0.101) (0.097) (0.097) (0.103) (0.080) 
[G4] vs. [G2] -0.058 0.009 -0.026 0.118* -0.099 -0.071 -0.058 0.053 -0.007 
 (0.049) (0.053) (0.052) (0.067) (0.063) (0.062) (0.071) (0.065) (0.067) 
C. Effects of Projoven internship completion      
[G4] vs. [G3] -0.092* 0.025 -0.033 0.085 -0.103 -0.078 0.009 0.046 0.002 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.074) (0.063) (0.061) (0.076) (0.063) (0.066) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
[ 4βˆ ] represents the interactions with the “female” dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 5βˆ ],  
[ 6βˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 7βˆ ] represents the interactions with the “no work experience” dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 8βˆ ], [ 9βˆ ] 
additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 10βˆ ] represents the interactions with the “lowest quartile” dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 11βˆ ], [ 12βˆ ] additional 
effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models 
the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4.10 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.13, A4.15 and A4.17. 
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Table 4.11. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on monthly wages by level of completion, conditional on being 
employed. Heterogeneous treatment over time and across individual characteristics. Random 
effects estimates with sample selection correction.  
 
Effects 
females 
after 6 
months 
 
 
 
[ 4βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 12 
months 
 
 
[ 5βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 18 
months 
 
 
[ 6βˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 6 
months 
 
[ 7βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 12 
months 
[ 8βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 18 
months 
[ 9βˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 6 
months 
 
[ 10βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 12 
months 
[ 11βˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 18 
months 
[ 12βˆ ] 
          
A. Effects of Projoven participation  
[G2] vs. [G1] -0.151 -0.115 -0.146 -0.241 -0.03 0.312** 0.363* 0.142 -0.054 
 (0.182) (0.147) (0.155) (0.166) (0.134) (0.138) (0.208) (0.161) (0.155) 
[G3] vs. [G1] 0.000 -0.221* -0.168 -0.209 0.228* 0.211 0.040 0.089 0.061 
 (0.152) (0.122) (0.123) (0.177) (0.137) (0.168) (0.187) (0.126) (0.172) 
[G4] vs. [G1] -0.108 -0.061 0.085 0.193 -0.023 -0.001 0.215* 0.074 -0.047 
 (0.092) (0.066) (0.067) (0.126) (0.080) (0.080) (0.117) (0.085) (0.084) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement      
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.010 -0.189 -0.175 -0.110 0.268* 0.222 0.193 0.033 0.020 
 (0.158) (0.124) (0.127) (0.198) (0.141) (0.180) (0.203) (0.124) (0.169) 
[G4] vs. [G2] -0.124 -0.006 0.140** 0.353*** -0.002 0.042 0.482*** 0.078 -0.041 
 (0.100) (0.067) (0.068) (0.133) (0.082) (0.081) (0.126) (0.089) (0.089) 
C. Effects of Projoven internship completion      
[G4] vs. [G3] -0.140 -0.042 0.137** 0.370*** -0.015 0.023 0.422*** 0.098 -0.025 
 (0.094) (0.068) (0.068) (0.119) (0.084) (0.081) (0.119) (0.090) (0.089) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
[ 4βˆ ] represents the interactions with the “female” dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 5βˆ ], [ 6βˆ ] additional effects in 
the following periods. 
[ 7βˆ ] represents the interactions with the “no work experience” dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 8βˆ ], [ 9βˆ ] 
additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 10βˆ ] represents the interactions with the “lowest quartile” dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 11βˆ ], [ 12βˆ ] additional 
effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for 
all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4.11 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.14, A4.16 and A4.17. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
 
YJTPs seem to be more effective in Latin America than in Europe and the U.S. In terms of 
employment prospects and earnings these programmes yield higher returns for youths in 
Latin America, particularly for women. Although these differences may be explained by 
certain circumstances such as the existence of an informal labour market, lack of qualified 
human resources or the lack of social welfare programmes, still some issues have not been 
accounted for. Unobservables have not been dealt with directly. Most of the studies rely on 
purging time-invariant unobservables via difference-in-difference estimators with 
propensity score matching techniques. However, the presence of pre-programme earnings 
dips is evidence of some systematic differences between trainees and control group, which 
cast doubt on their comparability. In addition, the review of the studies accounting for 
trainees with partial instruction demonstrated that ignoring dropouts could yield misleading 
conclusions about the effectiveness of training programmes. Programmes seemed to be more 
effective conditioned on completion.  
 
The analysis of Projoven’s sixth public call, a typical YJTP in Latin America, sheds light on 
the importance of controlling for low completion rates, individual heterogeneity and the 
presence of unobservables in treatment effect estimations. This study addresses these issues 
and four general conclusions are reached. 
 
First, Projoven is not as effective as originally thought, in terms of employment, compared to 
non-participation [G1]. Only in the short-term (six months post-training) and conditionally 
on internship completion [G4], is it possible to observe a positive effect (of 9%) on overall 
employment. This effect is not permanent and decreases over time. The diminishing returns 
of the training over time could be due to economic circumstances. In 2001, real economic 
growth was only 0.2%, which is low in comparison with the 3% growth in 2000 or the 5% 
average in the period 2002-2005. That is why these conclusions may not be generalized for 
other public calls. In addition, the programme produces no significant returns in terms of 
formal employment; however, internship completion is rewarded more than dropping out in 
this respect. 
 
Second, Projoven seems to be an effective policy intervention in terms of monthly wages. The 
programme increases monthly wages of trainees by more than 30% at all levels of 
completion. However, the effects on wages, which are in line with estimations from the 
literature, cannot be fully attributed to training. Although the construction of a new control 
group reduced significantly the differences in wages between the control group and trainees 
prior to the programme, some systematic differences are still observed. The fact that the 
programme yields no returns on formal employment excludes the possibility of explaining 
wage increases via productivity enhancement or trainees having better jobs. Actually, it 
seems that trainees work more hours in the same type of precarious jobs they would be 
working in the absence of the programme. The auxiliary Tobit regressions of hours worked 
proved this to be the case. Ñopo and Robles (2002) obtained a similar conclusion for the sixth 
public call. Nevertheless, these results may not be generalized to other public calls. Using 
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polynomial matching methods in a pool of four public calls and without accounting for 
sample selection, Chong et al. (2008) found that, in the short- and medium-term, Projoven 
has significant effects on trainees’ employment quality indicators such as labour contracts, 
health coverage, social security coverage and firm size.  
 
 
Third, ignoring dropouts could lead to misleading conclusions about the effects of YJTPs. In 
the case of Projoven’s sixth public call, it is observed that classroom instruction alone yields 
no returns to trainees, neither in terms of overall, nor in terms of formal employment or 
monthly wages. Nevertheless, once enrolled, the enrolee is definitively better off from 
completion of training. Under no circumstances are dropouts ([G2] and [G3]) better off with 
respect to employment prospects or wages. These results hold even when allowing for 
internship placement and completion to be endogenously determined. 
 
Finally, the results suggest that the programme yields greater returns on overall and formal 
employment conditions for trainees with no work experience prior to training. In terms of 
monthly wages, the programme produces additional returns for individuals with no work 
experience and for those in the lowest household income per capita quartile prior to training, 
but conditioned on completion [G4]. In addition, these effects seemed to be constant over 
time. Contrary to previous findings, no additional effects for women are found. Perhaps the 
literature confounds the additional effects across individual characteristics with gender. 
Economically disadvantaged women are more likely to not have much work experience 
when they are young. However, these results must be taken as indicative, since the 
specification used in this study (random effects estimators) is more restricted. 
 
To conclude, confounding the effects of unobservables, individual heterogeneity and low 
completion rates yields a different picture of Projoven’s effects on trainee labour market 
outcomes. Decomposing programme effects by level of completion suggests that the 
programme is more effective, particularly with respect to wages and overall employment, 
conditioned on completion. Additionally, the results might imply a need to revise the 
targeting strategy and the official goals of the programme. In order to enhance training 
effects, the programme must encourage the participation of individuals with no work 
experience. In the low-skill job market, experience is regarded as more relevant than 
educational credentials. For youth with no work experience, attaining first-time employment 
is almost impossible in Peru. Thus, programmes that provide an internship (work 
experience) definitely impact their chances in the labour market. Given this, Projoven should 
consider strategies to make training more attractive and implement the right incentives for 
trainees to complete training. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A4.1. 
Projoven sixth public call participation effects on overall employment. Heterogeneous effects over 
time. LPM-FE estimates. 
 
[G2] vs. [G1] 
 
[G3] vs. [G1] 
 
[G4] vs. [G1] 
 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Projoven 0.033 (0.059) -0.006 (0.054) 0.091** (0.044) 
Projoven [12 months] -0.036 (0.051) -0.068 (0.045) -0.105*** (0.036) 
Projoven [18 months] -0.069 (0.056) -0.018 (0.054) -0.125*** (0.043) 
Years schooling -0.014 (0.044) -0.028 (0.044) -0.027 (0.041) 
Potential experience -0.028 (0.035) -0.027 (0.035) -0.027 (0.035) 
Child 0.013 (0.088) -0.042 (0.088) -0.059 (0.075) 
Child*Female -0.042 (0.115) -0.032 (0.116) -0.011 (0.097) 
Married -0.061 (0.045) -0.047 (0.044) -0.049 (0.039) 
Ln hh income per capita -0.013** (0.005) -0.014*** (0.005) -0.014*** (0.004) 
Previous job-training course -0.055* (0.031) -0.067** (0.030) -0.037 (0.025) 
Constant 0.914 (0.575) 1.078* (0.574) 1.068** (0.537) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
Number of observations 4724 4827 6257 
Number of individuals 1186 1212 1570 
F-test F(12,681) = 8.71 F(12,707) = 10.65 F(12,1065) = 12.33 
R-squared 0.071 0.0766 0.0632 
( )αη
iti
Xcorr ,  -0.218 -0.2292 -0.2435 
Robust Hausman test for FE ( )
2
12χ  = 22.932 ( )
2
12χ  = 41.259 ( )
2
12χ  = 39.652 
    p-value 0.0283 0.0000 0.0001 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for 
all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
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Table A4.2. 
Projoven sixth public call internship placement effects on overall employment. Heterogeneous 
effects over time [only trainees sample]. LPM-FE estimates. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
     
Internship -0.041 (0.062) 0.055 (0.054) 
Internship [12 months] -0.033 (0.056) -0.063 (0.048) 
Internship [18 months] 0.051 (0.057) -0.049 (0.048) 
Years schooling 0.060 (0.051) 0.033 (0.049) 
Potential experience 0.002 (0.047) 0.009 (0.047) 
Child 0.150 (0.100) 0.042 (0.065) 
Child*Female -0.277* (0.155) -0.123 (0.092) 
Married -0.211*** (0.066) -0.141*** (0.051) 
Ln hh income per capita -0.016** (0.008) -0.015*** (0.004) 
Previous job-training course -0.129*** (0.037) -0.040 (0.026) 
Constant 0.086 (0.683) 0.332 (0.665) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
Number of observations 1653 3083 
Number of individuals 414 772 
F-test F(12,413) = 9.60 F(12,771) = 9.91 
R-squared 0.077 0.0451 
( )αη
iti
Xcorr ,  -0.1813 -0.019 
Robust Hausman test for FE ( )
2
11χ  = 49.632 ( )
2
11χ  = 42.749 
    p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A4.3. 
Projoven sixth public call internship completion effects. Heterogeneous treatment over time [only 
trainees placed in internships sample] [G4] vs. [G3]. FE estimates [with sample selection correction 
– Wooldridge, 1995] 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment [LPM] 
 
Dep. var. formal 
employment [LPM 
with SSC] 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages [with SSC] 
 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Internship Completion 0.103* (0.061) 0.187* (0.097) 0.351** (0.139) 
Internship Completion * [12 months] -0.014 (0.051) -0.014 (0.077) -0.263** (0.110) 
Internship Completion * [18 months] -0.109* (0.059) -0.029 (0.071) -0.354*** (0.112) 
Years schooling -0.031 (0.058) -0.068 (0.102) 0.22 (0.150) 
Potential experience -0.035 (0.055) -0.053 (0.096) 0.217 (0.143) 
Child -0.1 (0.066)     
Child*Female -0.067 (0.088)     
Married -0.093* (0.053)     
Ln hh income per capita -0.017*** (0.004)     
Previous job-training course -0.050* (0.027) 0.002 (0.035) -0.145*** (0.054) 
Commerce sector   -0.025 (0.043) -0.079 (0.071) 
Manufacturing sector   0.081** (0.041) 0.01 (0.062) 
Micro enterprise   -0.140*** (0.031) -0.443*** (0.051) 
Constant 1.163 (0.776) 1.506 (1.382) 2.067 (2.054) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
SSC terms no yes yes 
Number of observations 2827 1908 1772 
Number of individuals 708 679 646 
Overall F-test F(12, 2815) = 10.27 F(15, 1888) = 3.56 F(15, 1757) = 27.70 
F-Test SSC terms  F(4, 678) = 1.50 F(4, 645) = 15.06 
p-value  0.2004 0.000 
R-squared 0.0512 0.0573 0.3755 
( )αη
iti
Xcorr ,  -0.389 -0.3779 -0.4174 
Robust Hausman test for FE ( )
2
11χ  = 84.248 ( )
2
15χ  = 49.343  ( )
2
15χ  = 45.340 
    p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01 and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A4.4. 
Projoven sixth public call participation effects on formal employment. Heterogeneous effects over 
time. LPM-FE estimates [corrected for sample selection – Wooldridge, 1995]. 
 
[G2] vs. [G1] 
 
[G3] vs. [G1] 
 
[G4] vs. [G1] 
 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
       
Projoven -0.046 (0.085) 0.012 (0.075) 0.081 (0.065) 
Projoven [12 months] -0.020 (0.070) -0.011 (0.055) -0.010 (0.047) 
Projoven [18 months] -0.123* (0.069) -0.078 (0.058) -0.071 (0.049) 
Years schooling 0.084 (0.079) 0.078 (0.050) 0.076 (0.070) 
Potential experience 0.068 (0.066) 0.046* (0.028) 0.076 (0.061) 
Previous job-training course -0.069 (0.050) -0.051 (0.050) -0.064* (0.038) 
Commerce sector 0.079* (0.046) 0.041 (0.045) 0.043 (0.038) 
Manufacturing sector -0.024 (0.057) -0.063 (0.056) 0.011 (0.043) 
Micro enterprise 0.013 (0.043) 0.001 (0.043) -0.033 (0.032) 
Constant -0.561 (1.056) -0.409 (0.609) -0.484 (0.949) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
SSC terms yes yes yes 
Number of observations 3118 3183 4232 
Number of individuals 1141 1172 1521 
Overall F-test F(15,647) = 2.89 F(15,678) = 1.92 F(15, 1027) = 2.54 
F-test SSC terms F(4, 647) = 2.13 F(4, 678) = 2.66 F(4, 1027) = 1.34 
p-value 0.0761 0.032 0.2532 
R-squared 0.0437 0.0402 0.0375 
( )αη
iti
Xcorr ,  -0.3393 -0.244 -0.3868 
Robust Hausman test for FE ( )
2
15χ = 57.34 ( )
2
15χ  = 64.779 ( )
2
15χ  = 60.205 
    p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A4.5. 
Projoven sixth public call internship effects on formal employment. Heterogeneous effects over 
time [only trainees sample]. LPM-FE estimates [corrected for sample selection – Wooldridge, 1995]. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
     
Internship 0.032 (0.094) 0.092 (0.076) 
Internship [12 months] 0.031 (0.077) 0.048 (0.067) 
Internship [18 months] 0.036 (0.074) 0.067 (0.063) 
Years schooling 0.083 (0.087) 0.062 (0.079) 
Potential experience 0.032 (0.082) 0.072 (0.075) 
Previous job-training course 0.048 (0.050) -0.029 (0.034) 
Commerce sector 0.046 (0.058) 0.025 (0.042) 
Manufacturing sector 0.059 (0.057) 0.100*** (0.039) 
Micro enterprise -0.115*** (0.044) -0.121*** (0.030) 
Constant -0.409 (1.201) -0.289 (1.078) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
SSC terms yes yes 
Number of observations 1047 2096 
Number of individuals 387 736 
Overall F-test F(15,386) = 1.58 F(15,735) = 3.49 
F-test SSC terms F(4, 386) = 2.90 F(4, 735) = 2.09 
p-value 0.022 0.0799 
R-squared 0.0438 0.0524 
( )αη
iti
Xcorr ,  -0.132 -0.3913 
Robust Hausman test for FE ( )
2
15χ
 
= 27.007 ( )
2
15χ
 
= 49.701 
    p-value 0.0287 0.0000 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for Sample selection correction. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A4.6. 
Projoven sixth public call participation effects on monthly wages. Heterogeneous effects over time. 
FE estimates [with sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995]  
 
[G2] vs. [G1] 
 
[G3] vs. [G1] 
 
[G4] vs. [G1] 
 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
       
Projoven 0.332*** (0.135) 0.341*** (0.124) 0.382*** (0.095) 
Projoven [12 months] -0.025 (0.096) 0.106 (0.084) -0.140** (0.063) 
Projoven [18 months] 0.105 (0.098) 0.126 (0.095) -0.089 (0.066) 
Years schooling 0.162 (0.109) 0.200* (0.109) 0.177* (0.104) 
Potential experience 0.176 (0.091) 0.190** (0.091) 0.193** (0.094) 
Previous job-training course -0.061 (0.075) -0.074 (0.075) -0.091 (0.058) 
Commerce sector -0.035 (0.085) 0.015 (0.085) -0.016 (0.071) 
Manufacturing sector 0.113 (0.078) 0.105 (0.076) 0.113* (0.059) 
Micro enterprise -0.206 (0.068) -0.198*** (0.069) -0.300*** (0.054) 
Constant 2.710 (1.461) 2.229 (1.459) 2.504* (1.442) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
SSC terms yes yes yes 
Number of observations 2808 2845 3847 
Number of individuals 1023 1042 1389 
Overall F-test F(15,590) = 14.39 F(15,609) = 15.65 F(15,956) = 25.87 
F-test SSC terms F(4, 590) = 13.57 F(4, 609) = 14.67 F(4, 956) = 18.29 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.2274 0.2307 0.272 
( )αη
iti
Xcorr ,  -0.33 -0.3783 -0.3627 
Robust Hausman test for FE ( )
2
15χ  = 28.607 ( )
2
15χ  = 37.453 ( )
2
15χ  = 28.754 
    p-value 0.0181 0.0000 0.0173 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A4.7. 
Projoven sixth public call internship placement effects on monthly wages. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time [only trainees sample]. FE estimates [with sample selection correction – 
Wooldridge, 1995]  
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
     
Internship 0.087 (0.143) 0.109 (0.124) 
Internship [12 months] 0.073 (0.109) -0.163* (0.088) 
Internship [18 months] -0.017 (0.109) -0.268*** (0.090) 
Years schooling 0.515*** (0.141) 0.453*** (0.131) 
Potential experience 0.474*** (0.132) 0.471*** (0.125) 
Previous job-training course -0.112 (0.073) -0.128** (0.052) 
Commerce sector -0.163** (0.078) -0.134** (0.066) 
Manufacturing sector -0.108 (0.082) 0.007 (0.059) 
Micro enterprise -0.272*** (0.065) -0.401*** (0.049) 
Constant -2.043 (1.907) -1.288 (1.803) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
SSC terms Yes Yes 
Number of observations 955 1957 
Number of individuals 359 706 
Overall F- test F(15,358) = 20.19 F(15,705) = 30.09 
F-test SSC terms F(4, 358) = 9.95 F(4, 705) = 17.11 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.3838 0.370 
( )αη
iti
Xcorr ,  -0.808 -0.7976 
Robust Hausman test for FE ( )
2
15χ  = 36.029 ( )
2
15χ  = 29.892 
    p-value 0.0018 0.0070 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A4.8. 
Projoven sixth public call internship placement effects. Endogenous and heterogeneous treatment over time 
[only trainees sample] [G3] vs. [G2]. Pooled two-stage least squares with sample selection correction 
estimation. 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment [LPM] [1] 
Dep. var. formal 
employment [LPM] [2] 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages [3] 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Internship Placement 0.185 (0.415) 0.198 (0.350) -0.165 (0.255) 
Internship Placement * [12 months] 0.076 (0.275) -0.034 (0.357) 0.591** (0.261) 
Internship Placement * [18 months] -0.22 (0.341) -0.072 (0.361) 0.23 (0.259) 
Years schooling -0.079 (0.208) -0.133 (0.179) 0.794*** (0.153) 
Potential experience -0.113 (0.222) -0.106 (0.174) 0.747*** (0.156) 
Female -0.087*** (0.028) 0.012 (0.023) -0.219* (0.114) 
Child 0.119 (0.074)     
Child*Female -0.243*** (0.059)     
Married -0.204*** (0.065)     
Ln hh income per capita -0.020** (0.010)     
Previous job-training course -0.114** (0.050) -0.004 (0.039) -0.031 (0.064) 
Arequipa 0.137*** (0.038) 0.441*** (0.053) -0.584*** (0.065) 
Chiclayo -0.031 (0.065) 0.365*** (0.038) -0.136*** (0.048) 
Cusco 0.171 (0.112) 0.158* (0.088) 0.071 (0.052) 
Trujillo -0.091 (0.080) 0.160*** (0.055) -0.280*** (0.057) 
Commerce sector   0.051 (0.033) -0.078 (0.065) 
Manufacturing sector   0.031 (0.042) 0.012 (0.047) 
Micro enterprise   -0.149*** (0.023) -0.428*** (0.041) 
Constant 0.565 (0.388) 0.016 (0.252) 6.080*** (0.283) 
Mundlak terms yes yes Yes 
Time Dummies yes yes Yes 
SSC terms no yes Yes 
Number of observations 1653 1048 985 
Overall Wald test ( )
2
23χ  = 2369.79 ( )
2
26χ  = 5632.39 ( )
2
26χ = 10486.34 
Wald Test SSC terms  ( )
2
4χ  = 4.84 ( )
2
4χ  = 12.55 
p-value  0.3036 0.0137 
Robust DWH test F(3,37)  = 2.2394 F(3,37)  = 0.2974 F(3,36) = 1.59792 
p-value 0.0999 0.8271 0.2069 
Test of OIR ( )
2
9χ   =  9.16048 ( )
2
9χ  = 17.3027 ( )
2
9χ  = 10.5907 
p-value 0.4226 0.0442 0.3048 
Stock and Yogo (2005) test    
   Internship Placement F(12,37) = 62.85796 F(12,37) = 67.8838 F(12,36) = 69.7422 
   Internship Placement * [12 months] F(12,37) = 53.62573 F(12,37) = 56.264 F(12,36) =  55.1524 
   Internship Placement * [18 months] F(12,37) = 57.63763 F(12,37) = 59.85239 F(12,36) = 58.9503 
   Minimum eigenvalue statistic 22.89771 28.64454 28.17038 
   Critical value 2SLS est. (5% Wald test) 17.8 17.8 17.8 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
SSC stands for sample selection correction; DWH for Durbin-Wu-Hausman test; and OIR for overidentifying restrictions test. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A4.9. 
Projoven sixth public call internship placement effects. Endogenous and heterogeneous treatment over time 
[only trainees sample] [G4] vs. [G2]. Pooled two-stage least squares with sample selection correction 
estimation. 
 
Dep. var. ov. employment 
[LPM] [1] 
Dep. var. formal 
employment [LPM] [2] 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages [3] 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Internship Placement 0.215* (0.115) 0.485 (0.300) 0.632 (1.076) 
Internship Placement * [12 months] -0.112 (0.093) -0.129 (0.237) 0.034 (0.904) 
Internship Placement * [18 months] -0.105 (0.172) -0.151 (0.301) -0.115 (0.931) 
Years schooling -0.094 (0.101) -0.138 (0.124) 0.387 (0.393) 
Potential experience -0.109 (0.099) -0.135 (0.119) 0.372 (0.408) 
Female -0.095*** (0.020) 0.003 (0.026) -0.150*** (0.054) 
Child 0.09 (0.065)     
Child*Female -0.234*** (0.045)     
Married -0.133** (0.057)     
Ln hh income per capita -0.014*** (0.005)     
Previous job-training course -0.038 (0.024) -0.023 (0.037) 0.000 (0.068) 
Arequipa 0.110*** (0.023) 0.363*** (0.039) -0.627*** (0.135) 
Chiclayo -0.050 (0.040) 0.317*** (0.039) -0.054 (0.084) 
Cusco 0.058** (0.023) 0.057** (0.027) -0.035 (0.073) 
Trujillo -0.097*** (0.035) 0.097*** (0.025) -0.162*** (0.061) 
Commerce sector   0.029 (0.033) -0.045 (0.053) 
Manufacturing sector   0.041 (0.030) 0.041 (0.051) 
Micro enterprise   -0.135*** (0.028) -0.523*** (0.053) 
Constant 0.595*** (0.166) -0.085 (0.198) 5.806*** (0.603) 
Mundlak terms yes yes yes 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
SSC terms no yes yes 
Number of observations 3083 2097 2041 
Overall Wald test ( )
2
23χ  = 1521.12 ( )
2
26χ  = 2421.91 ( )
2
26χ  = 3336.43 
Wald Test SSC terms  ( )
2
4χ  =  3.62 ( )
2
4χ  = 8.93 
p-value  0.4606 0.0629 
Robust DWH test F(3,39)  = 0.977693 F(3,39) = 0.846231 F(3,39) = 1.39239 
p-value 0.4131 0.477 0.2595 
Test of OIR ( )
2
9χ   =  9.81067 ( )
2
9χ  = 6.26235 ( )
2
9χ  = 8.63422 
p-value 0.366 0.7134 0.4717 
Stock and Yogo (2005) test    
   Internship Placement F(12,39) = 59.2555 F(12,39)  = 59.59 F(12,39) =  59.0079 
   Internship Placement * [12 months] F(12,39) = 51.535 F(12,39)  = 51.6703 F(12,39) = 53.7783 
   Internship Placement * [18 months] F(12,39) = 54.7269 F(12,39)  = 57.7693 F(12,39) = 61.8624 
   Minimum eigenvalue statistic 23.2954 23.73943 23.53904 
   Critical value 2SLS est. (5% wald test) 17.8 17.8 17.8 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
SSC stands for sample selection correction; DWH for Durbin-Wu-Hausman test; and OIR for overidentifying restrictions test. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A4.10. 
Projoven sixth public call internship completion effects. Heterogeneous treatment over time [only trainees placed in 
internships sample] [G4] vs. [G3]. Pooled two-stage least squares with sample selection correction estimation. 
 
Dep. var. ov. employment 
[LPM] [1] 
Dep. var. formal 
employment [LPM] [2] 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages [3] 
 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
       
Internship Completion 0.172 (0.136) 0.327** (0.153) 0.695 (0.543) 
Internship Completion * [12 months] -0.111 (0.157) 0.070 (0.150) -0.497 (0.442) 
Internship Completion * [18 months] 0.036 (0.137) -0.142 (0.223) -0.286 (0.496) 
Years schooling -0.098 (0.129) -0.087 (0.175) -0.036 (0.543) 
Potential experience -0.091 (0.122) -0.091 (0.159) -0.052 (0.514) 
Female -0.095*** (0.021) -0.024 (0.022) -0.174*** (0.064) 
Child -0.016 (0.051)     
Child*Female -0.234*** (0.045)     
Married -0.087 (0.056)     
Ln hh income per capita -0.017*** (0.004)     
Previous job-training course -0.050 (0.033) -0.031 (0.032) -0.048 (0.056) 
Arequipa 0.105*** (0.027) 0.377*** (0.037) -0.599*** (0.125) 
Chiclayo -0.054 (0.038) 0.358*** (0.043) -0.096 (0.068) 
Cusco 0.033 (0.030) 0.045 (0.056) -0.092 (0.098) 
Trujillo -0.101*** (0.039) 0.059 (0.041) -0.199* (0.104) 
Commerce sector   0.012 (0.032) -0.002 (0.065) 
Manufacturing sector   0.013 (0.037) 0.065 (0.054) 
Micro enterprise   -0.153*** (0.028) -0.554*** (0.052) 
Constant 0.672*** (0.166) 0.166 (0.265) 5.756*** (0.553) 
Mundlak terms yes yes yes 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
SSC terms no yes yes 
Number of observations 2827 1909 1849 
Overall Wald test ( )
2
23χ  = 1993.82 ( )
2
26χ  = 2411.81 ( )
2
26χ = 2254.67 
Wald Test SSC terms  ( )
2
4χ  = 7.90 ( )
2
4χ  = 15.44 
p-value  0.0952 0.0039 
Robust DWH test F(3,38) = 6.20241 F(3,38) = 1.91838 F(3,38)  = 1.12364 
p-value 0.0016 0.143 0.3516 
Test of OIR ( )
2
9χ  = 4.23207 ( )
2
9χ  = 8.35149 ( )
2
9χ  = 9.10303 
p-value 0.8955 0.4991 0.4278 
Stock and Yogo (2005) test    
   Internship Completion F(12,38) = 48.5661 F(12,38) = 59.7998 F(12,38)  = 59.0554 
   Internship Completion * [12 months] F(12,38) =52.7263 F(12,38) = 48.858 F(12,38)  = 46.8677 
   Internship Completion * [18 months] F(12,38) = 59.6821 F(12,38) = 41.5849 F(12,38)  = 42.0137 
   Minimum eigenvalue statistic 22.4612 28.99945 28.83809 
   Critical value 2SLS est. (5% Wald test) 17.8 17.8 17.8 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
SSC stands for sample selection correction; DWH for Durbin-Wu-Hausman test; and OIR for overidentifying restrictions test. 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses.The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
Chapter 4. Evaluation of Projoven Effectiveness 
82 
 
Table A4.11. 
Projoven sixth public call participation effects on overall employment. Heterogeneous effects over 
time and across individual characteristics. LPM-RE estimates 
 
[G2] vs. [G1] [G3] vs. [G1] [G4] vs. [G1] 
Coef. 
Std. 
err. Coef. 
Std. 
err. Coef. 
Std. 
err. 
       
Projoven*Female -0.079 (0.067) -0.114* (0.065) -0.069* (0.039) 
Projoven*No work experience 0.167** (0.068) 0.148** (0.068) 0.243*** (0.048) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile -0.013 (0.077) 0.012 (0.071) 0.029 (0.052) 
Projoven*Female*[12 months] 0.084 (0.073) 0.100 (0.067) -0.013 (0.041) 
Projoven*No work experience*[12 months] -0.01 (0.079) -0.074 (0.068) -0.043 (0.047) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[12 months] -0.052 (0.083) -0.026 (0.068) 0.023 (0.052) 
Projoven*Female*[18 months] 0.011 (0.077) 0.084 (0.070) 0.000 (0.046) 
Projoven*No work experience*[18 months] 0.003 (0.082) 0.085 (0.076) 0.093* (0.050) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[18 months] -0.01 (0.084) -0.055 (0.080) 0.007 (0.053) 
Female -0.050* (0.029) -0.048* (0.028) -0.046* (0.026) 
No work experience -0.373*** (0.030) -0.374*** (0.030) -0.391*** (0.027) 
Lowest quartile -0.064* (0.033) -0.055* (0.033) -0.055* (0.031) 
Constant 0.181*** (0.021) 0.177*** (0.021) 0.165*** (0.017) 
Time Dummies Yes yes yes 
Number of observations 2571 2626 3434 
Number of individuals 645 659 861 
Wald test ( )
2
14χ  = 263.51 ( )
2
14χ  = 268.74 ( )
2
14χ = 345.39 
R-squared 0.3307 0.323 0.2901 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for 
all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Table A4.12. 
Projoven sixth public call internship placement effects on overall employment. Heterogeneous 
effects over time and across individual characteristics [only trainees sample]. LPM-RE estimates. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
     
Internship*Female -0.095 (0.065) -0.049 (0.039) 
Internship*No work experience 0.108 (0.068) 0.241*** (0.048) 
Internship*Lowest quartile 0.009 (0.069) 0.014 (0.051) 
Internship*Female*[12 months] 0.102 (0.067) 0.000 (0.042) 
Internship*No work experience*[12 months] -0.067 (0.069) -0.038 (0.048) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[12 months] -0.020 (0.068) 0.027 (0.052) 
Internship*Female*[18 months] 0.106 (0.070) 0.041 (0.045) 
Internship*No work experience*[18 months] 0.105 (0.076) 0.106** (0.050) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[18 months] -0.032 (0.079) 0.018 (0.053) 
Female -0.036 (0.032) -0.045* (0.025) 
No work experience -0.315*** (0.034) -0.360*** (0.028) 
Lowest quartile -0.029 (0.035) -0.047 (0.029) 
Constant 0.164*** (0.024) 0.145*** (0.017) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
Number of observations 821 1629 
Number of individuals 206 408 
Wald test ( )
2
14χ  = 118.23 ( )
2
14χ  = 221.66 
R-squared 0.2024 0.1729 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Table A4.13. 
Projoven sixth public call participation effects on formal employment. Heterogeneous effects over 
time and across individual characteristics. LPM-RE estimates [with sample selection correction – 
Wooldridge, 1995]. 
 
[G2] vs. [G1] [G3] vs. [G1] [G4] vs. [G1] 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
       
Projoven*Female -0.105 (0.086) -0.099 (0.087) -0.059 (0.047) 
Projoven*No work experience 0.021 (0.097) -0.062 (0.098) 0.094 (0.065) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile 0.031 (0.103) 0.159* (0.088) -0.042 (0.065) 
Projoven*Female*[12 months] 0.008 (0.102) 0.111 (0.097) 0.024 (0.052) 
Projoven*No work experience*[12 months] -0.090 (0.107) -0.190* (0.099) -0.091 (0.063) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[12 months] 0.003 (0.108) -0.022 (0.102) 0.059 (0.063) 
Projoven*Female*[18 months] 0.046 (0.098) 0.068 (0.086) -0.011 (0.052) 
Projoven*No work experience*[18 months] 0.089 (0.102) 0.034 (0.095) -0.064 (0.063) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[18 months] 0.003 (0.106) -0.08 (0.078) 0.02 (0.066) 
Female 0.108*** (0.040) 0.091** (0.040) 0.114*** (0.035) 
No work experience 0.069 (0.046) 0.047 (0.044) 0.048 (0.042) 
Lowest quartile 0.105** (0.042) 0.072* (0.041) 0.085** (0.038) 
Constant -0.094*** (0.033) -0.064** (0.032) -0.086*** (0.025) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1538 1559 2110 
Number of individuals 614 633 828 
Overall Wald test ( )
2
14χ  = 37.86 ( )
2
14χ   = 34.22 ( )
2
14χ  = 40.54 
R-squared 0.0644 0.0479 0.0495 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for 
all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Table A4.14. 
Projoven sixth public call participation effects on monthly wages. Heterogeneous effects over time 
and across individual characteristics. RE estimates [with sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 
1995]. 
 
[G2] vs. [G1] [G3] vs. [G1] [G4] vs. [G1] 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
       
Projoven*Female -0.151 (0.182) 0.000 (0.152) -0.108 (0.092) 
Projoven*No work experience -0.241 (0.166) -0.209 (0.177) 0.193 (0.126) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile 0.363* (0.208) 0.040 (0.187) 0.215* (0.117) 
Projoven*Female*[12 months] -0.115 (0.147) -0.221* (0.122) -0.061 (0.066) 
Projoven*No work experience*[12 months] -0.03 (0.134) 0.228* (0.137) -0.023 (0.080) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[12 months] 0.142 (0.161) 0.089 (0.126) 0.074 (0.085) 
Projoven*Female*[18 months] -0.146 (0.155) -0.168 (0.123) 0.085 (0.067) 
Projoven*No work experience*[18 months] 0.312** (0.138) 0.211 (0.168) -0.001 (0.080) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[18 months] -0.054 (0.155) 0.061 (0.172) -0.047 (0.084) 
Female -0.262** (0.125) -0.261** (0.125) -0.190* (0.106) 
No work experience 0.352*** (0.131) 0.303** (0.131) 0.245** (0.118) 
Lowest quartile 0.095 (0.131) 0.132 (0.130) -0.041 (0.116) 
Constant 0.050 (0.078) 0.061 (0.077) 0.057 (0.061) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1303 1298 1814 
Number of individuals 528 536 732 
Overall Wald test ( )
2
14χ  = 40.78 ( )
2
14χ  = 20.25 ( )
2
14χ  = 35.99 
R-squared 0.0366 0.0336 0.0141 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Table A4.15. 
Projoven sixth public call internship effects on formal employment. Heterogeneous effects over 
time and across individual characteristics [only trainees sample]. LPM-RE estimates [with sample 
selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995]. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
     
Internship*Female -0.084 (0.091) -0.058 (0.049) 
Internship*No work experience -0.059 (0.102) 0.118* (0.067) 
Internship*Lowest quartile 0.128 (0.097) -0.058 (0.071) 
Internship*Female*[12 months] 0.104 (0.095) 0.009 (0.053) 
Internship*No work experience*[12 months] -0.153 (0.101) -0.099 (0.063) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[12 months] -0.064 (0.103) 0.053 (0.065) 
Internship*Female*[18 months] 0.049 (0.088) -0.026 (0.052) 
Internship*No work experience*[18 months] 0.025 (0.097) -0.071 (0.062) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[18 months] -0.126 (0.080) -0.007 (0.067) 
Female -0.006 (0.045) 0.084** (0.037) 
No work experience 0.032 (0.049) 0.032 (0.046) 
Lowest quartile 0.101** (0.049) 0.099** (0.045) 
Constant -0.021 (0.034) -0.068*** (0.024) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
Number of observations 465 1016 
Number of individuals 187 382 
Overall Wald test ( )
2
14χ  = 21.76 ( )
2
14χ  = 29.58 
R-squared 0.0317 0.0286 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Table A4.16. 
Projoven sixth public call internship placement effects on monthly wages. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and across individual characteristics [only trainees sample]. RE estimates [with 
sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995]. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
     
Internship*Female 0.010 (0.158) -0.124 (0.100) 
Internship*No work experience -0.110 (0.198) 0.353*** (0.133) 
Internship*Lowest quartile 0.193 (0.203) 0.482*** (0.126) 
Internship*Female*[12 months] -0.189 (0.124) -0.006 (0.067) 
Internship*No work experience*[12 months] 0.268* (0.141) -0.002 (0.082) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[12 months] 0.033 (0.124) 0.078 (0.089) 
Internship*Female*[18 months] -0.175 (0.127) 0.140** (0.068) 
Internship*No work experience*[18 months] 0.222 (0.180) 0.042 (0.081) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[18 months] 0.020 (0.169) -0.041 (0.089) 
Female -0.477*** (0.140) -0.239** (0.107) 
No work experience 0.365** (0.146) 0.18 (0.130) 
Lowest quartile -0.110 (0.158) -0.482*** (0.128) 
Constant 0.150 (0.101) 0.121* (0.069) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
Number of observations 405 921 
Number of individuals 166 362 
Overall Wald test ( )
2
14χ  = 37.33 ( )
2
14χ  = 72.25 
R-squared 0.0548 0.0300 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Table A4.17. 
Projoven sixth public call internship completion effects. Heterogeneous treatment over time [only 
trainees placed in internships sample] [G4] vs. [G3]. RE estimates [with sample selection 
correction]. 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment 
Dep. var. formal 
employment 
Dep. var. monthly 
wages 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std.   
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std.  
Err. 
       
Internship Completion*Female -0.051 (0.041) -0.092* (0.052) -0.140 (0.094) 
Internship Completion*No work experience 0.282*** (0.050) 0.085 (0.074) 0.370*** (0.119) 
Internship Completion*Lowest quartile 0.017 (0.055) 0.009 (0.076) 0.422*** (0.119) 
Internship Completion*Female*[12 months] 0.01 (0.042) 0.025 (0.053) -0.042 (0.068) 
Internship Completion*No work experience*[12 months] -0.034 (0.048) -0.103 (0.063) -0.015 (0.084) 
Internship Completion*Lowest quartile*[12 months] 0.031 (0.052) 0.046 (0.063) 0.098 (0.090) 
Internship Completion*Female*[18 months] 0.056 (0.046) -0.033 (0.053) 0.137** (0.068) 
Internship Completion*No work experience*[18 months] 0.118** (0.050) -0.078 (0.061) 0.023 (0.081) 
Internship Completion*Lowest quartile*[18 months] 0.03 (0.053) 0.002 (0.066) -0.025 (0.089) 
Female -0.061** (0.030) 0.103** (0.043) -0.181** (0.086) 
No work experience -0.443*** (0.032) -0.055 (0.057) -0.167 (0.102) 
Lowest quartile -0.047 (0.037) 0.071 (0.054) -0.489*** (0.104) 
Constant 0.175*** (0.020) -0.037 (0.026) 0.162*** (0.044) 
Time Dummies yes yes Yes 
Number of observations 2827 1908 1772 
Number of individuals 708 679 646 
Overall Wald test ( )
2
14χ  = 263.49 ( )
2
14χ  = 20.38 ( )
2
14χ  =  77.01 
R-squared 0.1862 0.0219 0.041 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This represents baseline 
before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the 
models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero 
for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Table A4.18. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on overall employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. Linear probability model – pooled two-stage least 
squares estimates [without Mundlak terms]. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3
βˆ
] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.227 0.048 -0.257 
 (0.439) (0.287) (0.358) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.261** -0.152 -0.142 
 (0.118) (0.101) (0.177) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.225* -0.155 -0.008 
 (0.136) (0.157) (0.139) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
 
 
Table A4.19. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on overall employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. Linear probability model – pooled two-stage least 
squares estimates [using initial values of the time-varying regressors as Mundlak terms]. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3
βˆ
] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.237 0.046 -0.257 
 (0.420) (0.271) (0.339) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.233** -0.134 -0.123 
 (0.117) (0.097) (0.175) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.209 -0.144 0.013 
 (0.133) (0.147) (0.134) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Table A4.20. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on formal employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. Linear probability model – pooled two-stage least 
squares estimates with sample selection correction (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006) [without 
Mundlak terms]. 
 
Effects after 
6 months 
 
[ 1
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3
βˆ
] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.185 -0.018 -0.050 
 (0.349) (0.353) (0.350) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.368 -0.078 -0.050 
 (0.292) (0.278) (0.313) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.277* 0.126 -0.101 
 (0.164) (0.174) (0.220) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
 
 
Table A4.21. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on formal employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. Linear probability model – Two-stage least squares 
estimates with sample selection correction (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006) [using initial values 
of the time-varying regressors as Mundlak terms]. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3
βˆ
] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.195 -0.037 -0.069 
 (0.344) (0.357) (0.358) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.273 -0.002 0.022 
 (0.281) (0.263) (0.296) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.308* 0.095 -0.133 
 (0.159) (0.143) (0.217) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Table A4.22. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on monthly wages by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. Two-stage least squares estimates with sample 
selection correction (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006) [without Mundlak terms]. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3
βˆ
] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.011 0.473* 0.108 
 (0.229) (0.242) (0.249) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.952 -0.177 -0.364 
 (0.916) (0.813) (0.815) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.744 -0.546 -0.301 
 (0.517) (0.427) (0.496) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
 
 
Table A4.23. 
Projoven sixth public call effects on monthly wages by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. Two-stage least squares estimates with sample 
selection correction (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006) [using initial values of the time-varying 
regressors as Mundlak terms]. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2
βˆ
] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3
βˆ
] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.045 0.543** 0.184 
 (0.241) (0.248) (0.251) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.917 -0.132 -0.323 
 (0.925) (0.803) (0.823) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.815 -0.592 -0.357 
 (0.532) (0.427) (0.499) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. 
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Chapter 5 
Determinants of dropout behaviour in Projoven 
 
 
5.1 Introduction1 
 
A general conclusion of the evaluation literature, and confirmed also for Projoven case 
in Chapter 4, is that youth job training programmes (YJTP) are more effective when 
completed. Yet, YJTPs suffer from substantial dropout problems. Low completion rates 
can be seen as evidence of YJTPs not targeting the right individuals, YJTPs not 
considering particular regional/context features, and/or limitations of the programme’s 
characteristics. First, some individual characteristics can enhance training returns. 
Consequently, some youths, who may find that they do not benefit sufficiently from the 
training to compensate for their opportunity costs, will not make the necessary effort to 
complete the programme. Second, economic circumstances or regional context modify 
trainees’ opportunity costs of undertaking training and the availability of internship 
opportunities. Third, training characteristics (students per course, workload, teacher 
experience, presence of a written contract in the internship, etc.) can modify individual 
expectations about the returns of the training. Youths can drop out during the training if 
they realise that the programme is not going to yield the returns they hoped. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to find out the factors affecting trainees’ dropout behaviour in 
Projoven. This chapter tests whether individual characteristics, regional features or 
training characteristics influence trainees’ dropout decisions in Projoven by using a 
probit model with sample selection. This model takes into account the fact that the 
dropout decision is only observed for those trainees who are placed in internships. In 
addition, a multinomial probit model is estimated in order to allow the effects of the 
explanatory variables to vary across two different exit routes (in comparison with 
training completion): i) dropping out of training to take on another job and ii) dropping 
out of training into unemployment or inactivity. 
 
This chapter’s estimations show no evidence of selection into an internship. It seems that 
training providers’ (ECAP) characteristics influence the likelihood of placing trainees in 
internships. In addition, the results suggest that trainees’ dropout decisions follow a 
                                                        
1 This chapter is based on de Crombrugghe, D., H. Espinoza and H. Heijke (2010) “Determinants 
of dropout behaviour in a job training programme for disadvantaged youths”. Working Paper 
ROA-RM-2010/8, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA), Maastricht. 
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rational pattern. Trainees stay in the programme as long as they perceive evidence that it 
is worthwhile to do so. First, individuals with certain characteristics (such as males with 
work experience) that indicate higher training returns are less likely to drop out into 
unemployment, but more likely to drop out for another job. This is only distinguishable 
in the multinomial probit model. Second, in both models (probit with sample selection 
and multinomial probit), it is found that in cities where fewer job opportunities are 
available (in comparison with Lima), trainees are also less likely to drop out. Finally, 
when the training conditions indicate chances of being hired on a permanent basis or the 
training firm is committed to the training activities (presence of a written contract), 
trainees are also less likely to drop out, regardless of the exit route. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 presents a discussion of the dropout 
behaviour in YJTPs. Section 5.3 presents the empirical framework to evaluate dropout 
determinants at Projoven. Section 5.4 describes Projoven’s dataset. Section 5.5 displays 
the results of the estimations. Finally, Section 5.6 draws some conclusions. 
 
5.2 YJTP Dropout Behaviour  
 
To understand the nature of the dropout phenomenon, it is necessary to assess its extent, 
to comprehend how the dropout decision is made, and to find out its determinants. This 
section discusses these considerations. 
 
5.2.1 Dropout extent 
 
The dropout phenomenon is widespread in YJTPs. In Table 5.1 it is observed that, with 
the exception of the Argentinean Proyecto Joven, which has a completion rate of 90%, 
YJTPs in Latin America (Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Panama and the Dominican Republic) 
experience completion rates below 77%. Low completion rates are not just a Latin 
American phenomenon. Table 5.1 also displays some figures about YJTP performance in 
Germany and the United States, where the completion rates are lower than in some 
Latin American programmes.  
 
All Latin American YJTPs share the two-step sequence design of classroom instruction 
and on-the-job internship. In most cases, the policy planner finances job training centres 
to provide the training and to ensure that a quota of trainees is placed in firms for on-
the-job training experience. Interestingly, the YJTPs listed in Table 5.1 present high 
completion rates (higher than 90%) for the first phase of the training in comparison with 
the second phase of the training. This phenomenon can be explained by the twofold 
institutional arrangements. First, job training centres are bound by contract to ensure 
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that a certain share of trainees participate in the on-the-job training experience after the 
classroom training phase. In Latin American countries, this percentage is 70%, on 
average. However, in such cases as in Uruguay, training centres must only comply with 
a 45% quota. This can explain why Projoven-Uruguay has the lowest completion rate 
among the examples compiled. 
 
Second, another institutionally related explanation of the dropout phenomenon is the 
time gap between the two instructive phases. Santiago Consultores Asociados (1999) 
points out for the Chilean case that the transition from classroom instruction to the on-
the-job training internship is not immediate. In many cases, weeks of delay discourage 
trainees from showing up. Such situations are also observed in Projoven-Peru. 
 
Table 5.1. 
Youth job training programmes and completion rates. 
Programme Country Year Completion 
rate 
Source 
     
Projovena Peru 1996–2005 60% de Crombrugghe et al. (2010) 
Projovenb Uruguay 2004–2005 51% Projoven survey (2006)  
Chile Jovenc Chile 1996–1999 74% Santiago Consultores 
Asociados (1999) 
Proyecto Joven Argentina 1996–1997 90% Aedo and Nuñez (2004) 
Procajoven Panama 2005 77% Ibarrarán and Rosas (2007) 
Juventud y empleo Dominican 
Republic 
2004 60% Card et al. (2007) 
Training programmesd Germany 2000–2002 69% Kluve et al. (2007) 
National Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA)e 
USA 1987–1989 58% Heckman et al. (2000) 
a The figure corresponds to the average completion rate of the first 13 public calls. 
b Only the 10th public call. 
c Phase 2. The figures belong to the ‘training and job experience’ component. 
d Sample of only men. Includes ‘occupation-specific training programmes’ and ‘general training programmes’. 
e Only classroom instruction. In this case dropouts are individuals who enrolled in the programme but did not show up. 
 
5.2.2 Dropout decision and its determinants 
 
In publicly funded YJTPs for economically disadvantaged individuals, all trainees are 
assumed to be able to graduate. In Projoven, for instance, training completion is not 
conditional on further tests or examinations. Trainees obtain a certificate of participation 
if they attend the courses and if they are present for the internship. This makes it 
difficult to extrapolate the results of the substantial literature on individuals’ dropout 
decisions in post-secondary education.2 In the case of post-secondary education, 
                                                        
2
 See Stratton et al. (2006) for a review of the conceptual and empirical work of this literature. 
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completion (obtaining a degree/certificate) depends not only on attendance but on the 
capacity of the individuals to complete knowledge and skills assessments. This study 
borrows two elements from this literature which may apply to the analysis of dropout 
behaviour in YJTPs: i) the presence of uncertainty about training returns and ii) the 
existence of job opportunities. 
 
First, uncertainty about the returns of YJTPs can lead individuals to modify their 
optimal length of training, even after enrolment. To be able to complete the programme, 
the trainee must believe that it is worth doing so. As such the expectancy about the 
returns of the training should be larger than the returns of the alternative activity. It is 
unlikely that trainees know beforehand the returns of the training. The only way the 
youth can definitively determine whether the training is appropriate for him or her is by 
enrolling. It should be noted that well-known vocational training schools, which 
increase expectancy of high returns, rarely participate in Projoven. According to 
Projoven records, less than 5% of the trainees receive instruction in well-known 
vocational training schools. In Peru, as in other developing countries, no ranking of 
vocational training institutions exists. In addition, even if it existed, it is very unlikely 
that individuals at the bottom of the income distribution would be aware of it. Second, 
urgent job offers or individual shocks can also lead to a dropout decision. Youths can 
embark in training activities while waiting for a job offer. 
 
A consequence of the trainees’ uncertainty about training returns and future job offers is 
that before undertaking training, potential trainees ignore whether they are capable of 
completing the training or if it is worth doing so. It is assumed that an individual’s 
decision to drop out is a consequence of a cost–benefit assessment made under 
uncertainty. In general, individuals remain in the programme as long as they feel it 
increases their chances to succeed in the labour market (Schochet, 1998; Heckman and 
Smith, 1999). In this fashion, the likelihood of completing the training (or of dropping 
out) depends on individual opportunity costs and the expected outcomes of the training. 
The factors that affect trainees’ opportunity costs and expected training outcomes can be 
classified into three categories: i) changes in labour market conditions, ii) the 
demographic characteristics of the individuals and iii) programme content. 
 
First, regarding changes in labour market conditions, Di Pietro (2004) and Peraita and 
Pastor (2000) argue that a shock that diminishes the unemployment rate of the region of 
residence encourages individuals to drop out of high school. When unemployment is 
low, more job offers may be available. In the case of YJTPs, job offers can increase 
trainees’ opportunity costs of staying in training. Studies such as that of the Santiago 
Consultores Asociados (1999) for the Chilean case, Aedo and Nuñez (2004) for the 
Argentinean case, and Waller (2008) for the German case, find that getting a job is the 
most common reason for dropping out of training. Market conditions also affect firms’ 
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training efforts (internship availability). On the one hand, recessions can increase firms’ 
training efforts. The increased competition for sales in slack markets can induce business 
strategies that require more training. On the other hand, in a prolonged recession, 
expectations change and uncertainty increases. In these circumstances, the benefits of 
training are much more doubtful and the costs of training can only be reduced (Felstead 
and Green, 1996). 
 
Second, individual characteristics, such as having children, having participated in 
training programmes before and/or having experienced unemployment influence 
dropout decisions by increasing the likelihood of leaving the programme (Waller, 2008). 
Impact evaluation literature offers plenty of examples that certain individual 
characteristics enhance training returns. For instance, women and individuals with no 
work experience benefit the most from YJTPs in Latin America (Betcherman et al., 2004; 
Chapter 4). These characteristics can make it worthwhile for some trainees to complete 
the training, but not for others. 
 
Finally, programme characteristics, mainly the courses and the quality of internships, 
can also affect dropout decisions. Hanushek et al. (2006) find this to be the case for 
primary school students in developing country settings. High-quality training modifies 
trainees’ expectations about training returns. The training quality information is fully 
gathered by the trainee only once enrolled. Consequently, individuals modify their 
expected training outcomes during the training, which can lead them to drop out. 
 
These factors, which affect the opportunity costs and expected returns of undertaking 
training in the context of Projoven, are taken into account in the estimation of the 
dropout decision determinants. 
 
 
5.3 Empirical Framework 
 
This section presents two models to estimate the likelihood of dropping out of a 
Projoven internship. The choice of the models is based on the distribution of trainees by 
participation level. In Figure 5.1, it is observed that almost all the trainees in the sample 
completed the Projoven classroom phase. However, not all trainees were placed in 
internships. Of the trainees who started the programme, 2.2% dropped out during the 
first month of classroom instruction, 20% were not placed in internships by their ECAPs, 
21.7% dropped out of the training during the first two months of the internship, and 
57% completed the programme. This phenomenon of few dropouts in the classroom 
phase occurs in virtually all the Latin American programmes as previously mentioned. 
Perhaps, in addition to the time gap between phases and the quota of internships, in the 
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case of Projoven it may also have to do with the way training providers are financially 
compensated by the programme. ECAPs are financially compensated by Projoven when 
trainees complete at least the classroom phase. This can encourage ECAPs to monitor 
closely that trainees attend the classroom training. 
 
The first model, a probit model with sample selection correction (van de Ven and van 
Praag, 1981), tests and corrects for the possibility of selection into internship. If trainees 
placed in internships are not a random sample of all trainees, the parameters estimating 
the propensity to drop out can be biased. It could be the case that trainees with certain 
characteristics are more likely to be placed in internships. 
 
The second model, a multinomial probit, distinguishes between different exit routes. 
Trainees can quit the programme because of a job offer or because of another reason that 
leads them to unemployment or inactivity. The second model tests whether the trainees 
who leave the programme for a job are different from those who leave the programme 
and end up unemployed or inactive. 
 
Figure 5.1.  
Distribution of trainees by participation level. Projoven sixth public call. 
 
Source: Projoven. Further elaboration by the author. 
 
 
5.3.1 Model 1: Probability of dropping out of a Projoven internship (probit model 
with sample selection) 
 
One can only observe the decision to drop out from a Projoven internship for those 
trainees placed in internships. To account for selection into internship, this study 
2.2 0.0
8.9
12.8
19.1
57.0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2 3 4 5 6
Months completed in training
P
a
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
 (
%
)
Classroom training On-the-job training
Completers
Dropouts
5.3 Empirical Framework 
 
99 
proposes a probit model with sample selection. The dependent variable follows a 
process such as the one of Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2.  
Dropping out of a Projoven internship process. 
 
 
 
This empirical strategy assumes that an individual ( i ) decides to drop out based on the 
expected utility for doing so ( *
i
U ). When a trainee drops out, the individual’s expected 
utility is specified as follows: 
 
[Eq. 5.1]  
11
'*
iii
vXU += β , 
 
with 
1β  a vector of unknown parameters and 1iv  an unobservable stochastic error 
distributed standard normally. Here, 
i
X  includes covariates such as individual 
characteristics (age, household size, sex, marital status, parental status, household 
income, years of schooling, previous training courses and work experience), city of 
residence, and characteristics of the internship (written contract in the internship). 
Implicitly, this specification assumes away a potential endogeneity of the contract 
variable. All trainees are supposed to be given a written contract during the internship, 
but this contract is not offered to all. Unobservables can affect both the likelihood of 
dropping out and the likelihood of being given a written contract. Unfortunately, the 
dataset lacks additional explanatory variables (to serve as instruments) to test for 
potential endogeneity. The limitation of the study in this respect is acknowledged by the 
author. 
 
Utilities are obviously unobservable in contrast to the decision to drop out or stay in the 
programme which is observed. Formally, consider a variable 
i
D , where 1=
i
D  when 
the trainee drops out, and 0=
i
D  otherwise. Then, 0=
i
D  if 0* ≤
i
U  and 1=
i
D  if 
0
* >
i
U . The probability of dropping out of the internship is modelled as 
 
[Eq. 5.2]  [ ] [ ] [ ]0Pr0Pr1Pr 11'* >+=>== iiii vXUD β . 
 
Internship
Completers (0)
Placed in internship (1)
Trainees Dropouts (1)
Not placed in internship (0)
Internship placement
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It should be recalled that the likelihood of dropping out of a Projoven internship is only 
observed for those trainees who were placed in internships. Let 
i
H , a dichotomous 
variable, denote the indicator of selection into an internship when 1=
i
H . Thus, the 
probability that 
i
D  is observed is given by 
 
[Eq. 5.3]  [ ] [ ]0Pr1Pr 22' >+== iii vZH β , 
 
where 
2
β  is a vector of unknown parameters, 
2i
v  is an unobservable stochastic error 
distributed standard normally, and 
i
Z  is a vector containing almost all the variables 
included in 
i
X  except for the variable ‘contract’, which is only observed during the 
internship. Note that 
i
Z  also contains ECAP characteristics such as number of students 
per course, course workload, share of teachers with more than five years of experience, 
whether or not the trainee followed a production-oriented course, and dummy variables 
about the type of ECAP. These variables are excluded from the response equation 
because they are intrinsically related to the first phase of the training (classroom 
instruction). The second phase of the training (internship) is carried out in a training 
firm different from the ECAP. Therefore, the factors that affect the trainees’ decision to 
drop out of the internship must be related to individual characteristics and internship-
related variables rather than ECAP course-related variables. In addition, ECAP course 
features may reflect the ability to find internships.3  
 
To estimate the likelihood of dropping out of a Projoven internship conditional on being 
placed in a training firm (internship), it is assumed that ( )21  , ii vv  are bivariate normal for 
all i , with 
 
[Eq. 5.4]  
1i
v ~ ( )1,0 , 
[Eq. 5.5]  2iv ~ ( )1,0 , 
[Eq. 5.6]  ( ) ρ=21, ii vvcorr . 
 
If 0≠ρ , estimates of [Eq. 5.2] will be biased unless we account for the selection. 
Eventually, the usual tests for independence of the structural equations will be 
performed to assess the robustness of the estimations. 
 
                                                        
3
 The (in) exclusion of type of ECAP in the response equation does not modify the estimates of 
the other coefficients in the regression. 
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5.3.2 Model 2: Probability of dropping out of a Projoven internship, given 
different exit routes (multinomial probit model) 
 
In the data of Projoven’s sixth public call, it is possible to identify three exit routes from 
a Projoven internship: i) completion, ii) dropping out of training for a job and iii) 
dropping out of training into unemployment or inactivity. The exit routes are 
represented by the categorical scalar 
i
d , which values representing completers (1), 
dropouts to a job (2) and dropouts to unemployment (3) (See Figure 5.3).  
 
Figure 5. 3.  
Projoven internship exit routes. 
 
 
 
The previous section implicitly assumes that the effects of the explanatory variables are 
homogeneous across exit routes. This study aims to estimate whether the effect of the 
explanatory variables included in the dropout model differ, given that md
i
= , where 
1=m , 2 , or 3 . The multinomial probit approach is used, since it is assumed that all 
trainees face the same choice set once they are placed in internships. Hence, the utility of 
choosing the exit route m = 1, 2, 3 is specified as 
 
[Eq. 5.7]  
immiim
XU ξα += '* , 
 
where 
i
X  is defined as in the previous model. Associated with 
i
X  are the three vectors 
of regression coefficients 
1
α , 
2
α  and 3α . The error terms 1iξ , 2iξ  and 3iξ  are assumed 
independent and standard normal. Trainee i  will choose the alternative k  in which the 
trainee’s level of utility **
ilik
UU >  for all kl ≠ . For kl ≠ , let 
 
[Eq. 5.8]  **
ikilim
UUv −=  
                     ( )
ikilkli
X ξξαα −+−= '  
                     
immi
X εγ += ' , 
 
Completers (d i=1)
Trainees placed in internships Dropout to a job (d i=2)
Dropout to unemployment (d i=3)
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where lm =  if kl <  and 1−= lm  if kl > , so that m = 1, 2. Notice that ( )21, iii εεε =  ~ 
( )Σ,0MV , where 





=Σ
21
12
. The probability that the alternative k  is chosen is 
 
[Eq. 5.9]  ( ) ( )0,0PrPr
21
≤≤===
iiiiik
vvXkdP  
                     ( )2'21'1 ,Pr γεγε iiii XX −≤−≤= . 
 
This probability (on which the likelihood function is based) involves a two-dimensional 
integral that is difficult to compute. Because of the exchangeable correlation structure of 
Σ , Dunnett’s (1989) reduction of the multidimensional integral to a single dimension is 
utilised. Gaussian quadrature is used to approximate this integral.4 For purposes of 
identification, 1=
i
d  (training completion) is the base category ( 0
1
=α ). Therefore, the 
remaining set of coefficients 
2
α , 
3
α  will measure the differences relative to the 
completer’s group. 
 
 
5.4 Data 
 
For the purposes of this chapter only the baseline survey of Projoven’s sixth public call is 
used as a source of information about trainees’ individual characteristics. Additionally, 
Projoven administrative records provide information about ECAP’s characteristics. The 
dataset of Projoven’s sixth public call consists of 1,014 individuals. From the sample, 
trainees who dropped out during the first month of classroom training have been 
excluded. As a consequence, the sample comprises 992 trainees. 
 
Since Projoven has a fixed length of participation, this study distinguishes two types of 
individuals: those who complete the training and those who do not. Among those who 
do not complete the training, three categories are identified: involuntary ending (not 
placed in internships), dropping out of on-the-job training for a job, and dropping out of 
on-the-job training into unemployment or inactivity. Projoven administrative records do 
not include the reason for dropping out (job offer or unemployment). 
 
The reason for dropping out was inferred from matching labour market conditions and 
dropout timing. Thus, individuals who were working during the month in which they 
dropped out or a month later are considered to have dropped out for a job; otherwise 
they are regarded as having dropped out into unemployment or inactivity. 
                                                        
4 The Stata canned command mprobit is used to estimate the multinomial probit model. 
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The reason for dropping out was inferred from matching labour market conditions and 
dropout timing. Thus, individuals who were working during the month in which they 
dropped out or a month later are considered to have dropped out for a job; otherwise they 
are regarded as having dropped out into unemployment or inactivity. 
 
Table 5.2 displays the summary statistics. It is observed that trainees, both completers and 
dropouts, are similar in eligibility-related variables such as age, household income per capita 
and years of schooling. Table 5.2 also shows that the differences between completers and 
dropouts regarding household size, gender, marital status, number of children and 
participation in another training course are not statistically significant. In addition, a higher 
share of individuals without working experience is observed among dropouts in comparison 
with the completers. 
 
Regarding the city of residence, the proportion of dropouts, in comparison with completers, 
is higher in Lima than in the rest of the cities; however, one must note that Lima has a higher 
share of trainees. A more detailed picture of dropout rates per city is given in Table 5.3. Table 
5.3 shows that Arequipa, Cusco and Trujillo have better performance in terms of completion 
relative to Lima and Chiclayo. In terms of dropout exit routes, involuntary dropouts are, in 
statistical terms, as important as those who drop out for a job. Only 8% of the trainees drop 
out into unemployment or inactivity. Nevertheless, this proportion increases up to 17% in 
Chiclayo, where the involuntary dropout rate is also the highest (41%), double the total’s 
average (18.5%). 
 
With respect to ECAP characteristics, significant differences regarding students per course, 
course workload and cost per student per hour are observed. ECAP effectiveness is lower for 
trainees who drop out involuntarily. The ECAPs of completers have lower numbers of 
courses than the ECAPs of dropouts. The share of teachers with more than five years of 
experience is higher in the ECAPs of dropouts. Completers represent a higher share than 
dropouts in alternative indicators of training quality such as the share of trainees with a 
written contract in the internship. This indicator is also evidence of the low enforcement 
power of the programme. Firms must hire trainees under training contracts and pay them 
the minimum wage. Only the Projoven branch offices of Lima and Chiclayo collected this 
information directly from the trainees.5 
 
 
  
                                                          
5 The inclusion of the written contract variable does not affect the coefficient estimation of the rest of 
the variables. As contract information is not available in Arequipa, Cusco, and Trujillo, this variable is 
coded as zero for trainees in those cities. Alternative models were run excluding this variable, and the 
coefficients’ signs and significance were not altered. When running the model only for Chiclayo and 
Lima, the same conclusions apply. 
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Table 5.3. 
Trainee completion level by city. Projoven sixth public call. 
 Arequipa Chiclayo Cusco Lima Trujillo Total 
       
Completers 64.4 22.7 73.5 49.9 77.9 58.3 
Dropouts       
To a job 22.0 19.1 0.0 22.4 2.5 15.3 
To unemployment or 
inactivity 
7.8 17.3 0.9 10.0 3.5 8.0 
Involuntary  5.9 40.9 25.6 17.7 16.1 18.5 
       
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Projoven dataset. 
 
 
With respect to the types of courses, it is observed that dropouts (for a job or into 
unemployment or inactivity) represent a higher share in industry-oriented courses, whereas 
completers and involuntary dropouts represent a higher share in service-oriented courses. 
Regarding the type of training centres, Table 5.3 shows that completers represent a higher 
share than dropouts in centres for vocational training (CEOs), firms and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), whereas dropouts have a greater presence in institutes for tertiary 
technical education (ISTs), universities and vocational training centres sponsored by 
economic-sector associations of firms (VTCESA) and others. 
 
 
5.5 Results 
 
This section shows the results of the estimation of the probability of dropping out of a 
Projoven internship. Two models are presented: a probit model with sample selection 
(Model 1) and a multinomial probit model (Model 2). For Model 1, the results of the two 
parts of the model are presented: the probability of a Projoven internship placement 
(selection equation) and the probability of dropping out of a Projoven internship (response 
equation). For Model 2, the probability of dropping out of a Projoven internship given 
different exit routes is estimated. 
 
5.5.1 Model 1 – selection equation: Probability of a Projoven internship placement 
 
Table 5.4 displays the selection model indicating the likelihood of a trainee being placed in 
an internship. The results suggest that there are no discrimination practices in trainee 
placement in internships, at least based on observables. Variables such as age, household 
size, gender, having children, income, schooling, previous work experience and previous 
participation in a training course are not significant in the model. 
 
The insignificant coefficient of individual-related variables may indicate that it is the capacity 
of the ECAP that determines internship placements. In fact, in the selection model, ECAP-
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related variables explain the trainees’ likelihood of being placed in an internship. Higher 
costs per student increase the likelihood that a trainee is placed in an internship. Finding 
internships involves more costs than only providing classroom training. ECAPs that invest 
more per trainee are apparently more successful at finding internships. In addition, ECAPs 
that teach more courses face more difficulties finding internships for their trainees. In our 
estimates, a larger number of students per course increases the likelihood of being placed in 
an internship. Usually, it is thought that the lower the number of students in a class, the 
better the instruction. The course selection criteria, which mix low-quality courses and 
efficient ones, may be more important in this case. Since the programme rewards low-cost 
proposals, ECAPs try to offer as many courses as possible. Nevertheless, more efficient 
ECAPs can compensate for these costs by placing more students in each course. The 
marginal cost of placing an additional student may be reduced, given economies of scale. 
 
The model also indicates that studying industry-oriented courses, relative to service-oriented 
ones, increases the probability of a trainee being placed in an internship. Perhaps these 
courses are relatively more in demand in the labour market. Other variables, although not 
statistically significant, provide an interesting explanation of internship placement. A higher 
share of instructors with more than five years of experience increases the likelihood of being 
placed in an internship. Perhaps old instructors have more contacts in the labour market. 
Additionally, an ECAP’s effectiveness (share of trainees per ECAP working six months after 
the training) seems to work as a credential or indicator of reputation for the ECAP, given the 
positive sign of the coefficient. 
 
It is not possible to draw any particular conclusions about the type of training centre. The 
NGO, CEO, VTCESA and University dummy coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant. This could imply that these types of training centres are most likely to place 
trainees in internships (relative to firms and IST). However, low-quality ECAPs outnumber 
high-quality ECAPs in Projoven, even within the seven categories considered in Table 5.2 
(Chacaltana et al., 2003; Chong and Galdo, 2006). 
 
Regarding the city dummies, only Arequipa is significant. It seems that ECAPs in Arequipa 
are more successful in placing trainees in internships (relative to Lima). It may be easier for 
ECAPs to place trainees in a booming environment. For instance, in 2000, the year of 
reference, the growth rate of the gross domestic product of Arequipa was relatively higher 
than Lima’s (3.5% versus 2.4%, respectively). More internship vacancies may be available 
under those circumstances. 
 
Summing up, there is no evidence of discrimination in trainees’ placement into an 
internship. It seems that the ECAPs’ features rather than trainee characteristics influence the 
likelihood of placement in internships.6 In addition, regional characteristics (represented by 
city dummies) also play a role. The environment where the training is carried out affects the 
ECAPs’ capacity to place trainees in internships. 
 
                                                          
6 This model estimates robust clustered standard errors to account for intra-ECAP correlation. 
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Table 5.4. 
Probability of a Projoven internship placement. Model 1, probit estimates of the selection equation 
(dependent variable: internship placement = 1). 
 Coef. Std. err. 
   
Age 0.005 (0.023) 
Household size -0.017 (0.023) 
Female 0.140 (0.117) 
Married -0.386 (0.240) 
Child 0.083 (0.095) 
Child * Female -0.039 (0.092) 
Household income 0.054 (0.065) 
Schooling 0.021 (0.038) 
Course 0.067 (0.118) 
No work experience -0.035 (0.109) 
Arequipa 0.654*** (0.235) 
Chiclayo -0.350 (0.233) 
Cusco -0.309 (0.230) 
Trujillo 0.299 (0.220) 
ECAP effectiveness 0.777 (0.556) 
Number of courses per ECAP  -0.015** (0.006) 
Students per course 0.034*** (0.013) 
Workload (hours) 0.002 (0.001) 
Cost per course per trainee 0.098** (0.048) 
Teachers with <5 years of 
experience 0.357 (0.294) 
Industry course 0.319** (0.139) 
CEO 0.928*** (0.183) 
NGO 0.448*** (0.144) 
VTCESA 0.578** (0.293) 
University 0.075 (0.168) 
Constant -2.445** (1.031) 
Number of observations 992 
Log-likelihood ratio  ( )
2
25χ  = 135.59 
Log pseudo-likelihood -406.49156 
Pseudo-R2 0.1429 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for 40 clusters, by ECAP. 
Base category for city dummies: Lima. 
Base category for type of ECAP dummies: firm and IST. 
 
 
5.5.2 Model 1 – response equation: Probability of dropping out of a Projoven 
internship 
 
Table 5.5 displays the maximum likelihood estimations of the probit model with probit 
sample selection correction [A], an independent probit model [B], a linear probability model 
(LPM) with probit sample selection correction [C], and a linear probability model with logit 
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sample selection correction [D].7 The last three models were included as a matter of 
comparison. In almost all the cases, the parameters coincide in sign; nonetheless, small 
differences are presented in some of the coefficients’ magnitude. The coefficients of models 
[B], [C] and [D] resemble those of model [A]. In interpreting and discussing the estimated 
marginal effects, this section will further concentrate on model [A]. 
 
A positive correlation ( ρˆ ) indicates the overrepresentation of trainees, with unobserved 
characteristics making them more likely to be placed in an internship. This study finds that 
there is indeed a positive correlation ( ρˆ = 0.300) between the selection equation (likelihood 
of internship placement) and the response equation (dropout likelihood); however, it is not 
significant. From this, it is concluded that there is no clear evidence of sample selection. 
Similarly, models [C] and [D] provide little evidence of systematic sample selection. 
 
In the response equation, it is noted that demographic variables such as age, female, years of 
schooling, children, marital status and household income are not statistically significant. 
Dropouts and completers are similar in these variables, since they determine whether 
individuals are eligible or self-selected into the programme. Similar results in this respect are 
found in Waller (2008). Interestingly, although not statistically significant, prior experience 
with training courses diminishes the likelihood of dropping out of a Projoven internship. 
Trainees who have followed vocational training courses in the past may be more trainable 
for training firms. In addition, trainees with prior vocational experience may have relatively 
higher marginal returns, making the option to quit less attractive. 
 
It seems that trainees in larger households are more likely to drop out. Trainees in larger 
households may be more constrained by financial resources. It is argued that the poor have a 
higher discount rate and are, therefore, short-run focused in their decision making. Although 
completing training can provide higher returns in the long term, economically 
disadvantaged trainees feel tempted to drop out if a job opportunity presents itself, even if it 
is not a good one. Salaries are paid at the end of the month during the internship. Alternative 
jobs in the informal sector are usually paid daily, but not necessarily with higher 
compensations. 
 
The model suggests that regional differences, relative to Lima, negatively affect trainees’ 
dropout decisions. Poverty rates in urban areas are higher for Arequipa, Chiclayo, Cusco, 
and Trujillo than for Lima (39%, 50%, 54%, 38%, and 34%, respectively, for the reference year 
2000). The opportunity costs of trainees outside Lima seem to be lower, diminishing the 
likelihood of trainees dropping out. 
                                                          
7 Lee (1983) suggests a technique to use a logit regression in the two-step Heckman procedure for 
sample selection correction. This method estimates the selection equation using a logit model. Then, it 
uses the individual probabilities predicted by the model. Using the inverse cumulative distribution 
function of the normal distribution, these individual probabilities are translated into the form they 
would have had had they been computed on the basis of a probit model. Finally, these quasi-probit 
scores are used to compute the inverse Mills ratio the same way as when using a probit selection 
model. 
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Table 5.5. 
Probability of dropping out of a Projoven internship. Model 1, estimates of the response equation 
(dependent variable dropping out of internship = 1). 
 
Probit with 
probit SSC 
[A] 
Probit without 
SSC 
[B] 
LPM with probit 
SSC 
[C] 
LPM with logit 
SSC 
[D] 
 
Marg. 
effect 
Std. 
err. 
Marg. 
effect 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
err. 
         
Age 0.007 (0.006) 0.006 (0.006) 0.006 (0.006) 0.006 (0.007) 
Household size 0.013* (0.007) 0.012** (0.006) 0.011** (0.006) 0.011** (0.005) 
Female -0.043 (0.047) -0.042 (0.041) -0.057** (0.031) -0.060 (0.047) 
Married -0.126 (0.102) -0.109 (0.077) -0.095 (0.067) -0.092 (0.092) 
Child 0.046 (0.078) 0.028 (0.064) 0.050 (0.093) 0.042 (0.067) 
Child * Female -0.026 (0.096) -0.006 (0.075) -0.020 (0.089) -0.011 (0.072) 
Household income 0.029 (0.024) 0.026 (0.022) 0.026 (0.018) 0.025 (0.019) 
Schooling -0.008 (0.012) -0.007 (0.011) -0.010 (0.010) -0.010 (0.012) 
Course -0.022 (0.032) -0.020 (0.030) -0.019 (0.030) -0.019 (0.031) 
No work experience 0.034 (0.025) 0.032 (0.022) 0.037 (0.029) 0.038 (0.027) 
Arequipa -0.542*** (0.115) -0.561*** (0.103) -0.513*** (0.053) -0.518*** (0.119) 
Chiclayo -0.024 (0.171) 0.004 (0.159) 0.006 (0.065) 0.013 (0.176) 
Cusco -0.832*** (0.107) -0.855*** (0.066) -0.867*** (0.058) -0.866*** (0.059) 
Trujillo -0.797*** (0.103) -0.818*** (0.066) -0.807*** (0.052) -0.811*** (0.078) 
ECAP effectiveness -0.120 (0.242) -0.121 (0.227) -0.053 (0.145) -0.061 (0.257) 
Written contract [Lima or Chiclayo]a -0.656*** (0.087) -0.668*** (0.071) -0.623*** (0.045) -0.626*** (0.088) 
Correlation coefficient ( )ρˆ  0.300 (0.531)   0.314 (0.482)   
Mill’s ratio     0.117 (0.106) 0.092 (0.154) 
Number of observations 992 809 992 992 
Censored observations 183  183 183 
Uncensored observations 809  809 809 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -743.8158 -337.62912     
Wald test of independent eqs.  ( )
2
1χ  = 0.28       
p-Value 0.596       
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for 40 clusters, by ECAP. Marginal effects in [A] and [B] estimated at the sample median of all 
the variables. 
Base category for city dummies: Lima. 
a The variable written contract is only available for Lima and Chiclayo. It is coded as zero for the other cities. Its (ex)inclusion 
does not modify the sign and significance of the other coefficients. 
 
 
A crucial variable affecting the likelihood of dropping out is the presence of a written 
contract in the internship. Trainees with written contracts are less likely to drop out. Since it 
is possible that firms hire trainees after the three-month internship, the presence of a contract 
may encourages trainees to stay and complete the training. The absence of a written contract 
could be evidence of precarious working conditions. In the Peruvian labour market (formal 
or informal), working with no contract implies no social security coverage, long hours and 
an unsafe work environment (Chacaltana, 2006). Santiago Consultores Asociados (1999) for 
the Chilean case and Aedo and Nuñez (2004) for the Argentinean case surveyed dropouts on 
their reasons for quitting. Most of the dropouts argued that they worked under precarious 
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conditions and in some cases the internship content was not related to the classroom 
instruction. 
 
Finally, in Table 5.5 it is also noted that, although not statistically significant, the 
effectiveness of the training reduces the likelihood of dropping out. The fact that ECAPs are 
successful, in terms of their graduates finding work, encourages trainees to continue and 
complete the training. 
 
5.5.3 Model 2: Probability of dropping out of a Projoven internship through different 
exit routes 
 
The estimates of the multinomial probit model are displayed in Table 5.6. Contrary to the 
previous specification, this model allows the explanatory variable effects to differ by exit 
route. This specification accounts for two different exit routes: i) dropping out of a Projoven 
internship for a job and ii) dropping out of a Projoven internship into unemployment or 
inactivity. These are compared relative to programme completion (base category). This 
model disregards the selection process, since the hypothesis of sample selection was rejected 
in the previous section under different specifications. 
 
In the component of the model concerning dropping out for a job, we observe that trainees 
with no work experience are less likely to drop out. Perhaps for these trainees the internship, 
as a working experience, is more valuable. In the market for low-skilled jobs, experience is 
valued the most. In this case, training can serve as a screening device to identify the 
productivity of unskilled youths. This result may also be related to the returns of the 
programme. In Chapter 4 it is observed that trainees with no work experience have higher 
returns from their training. Thus, trainees would not drop out for a job when the returns 
from doing so are lower. In addition, trainees with no work experience may not receive 
many job offers. Females are also less likely to drop out for a job. This could be related to the 
expected effects of the programme. Authors such as Betcherman et al. (2004) and Ibarrarán 
and Rosas (2007) find that YJTPs in Latin America yield higher returns, in terms of wages 
and employment, for women. Interestingly, although not statistically significant, female 
parents are less likely to drop out for a job. This seems to be an effect of the extra stipends for 
individuals in that category. As in the probit model, trainees in larger household are more 
likely to drop out for a job. 
 
In the component of the model concerning dropping out into unemployment, it seems that 
trainees lacking work experience are more likely to drop out. Individuals with no work 
experience are less employable. Consequently, when they drop out, they usually find 
themselves unemployed. Waller (2008) finds a similar effect. This may also be the case for 
women, particularly those with children (although the latter is not a significant factor). The 
group of individuals who drop out of YJTPs into unemployment includes trainees who 
exclude themselves from the training due to random shocks, such as disease or a relative’s 
death (Santiago Consultores Asociados, 1999; Aedo and Nuñez, 2004). Unfortunately, those 
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variables are not reflected in the observable characteristics included in the regression 
analysis. 
 
There are some variables that similarly affect both exit routes in the model. The marginal 
effects of the city dummies are statistically significant and negative. As in the previous 
specification, it seems that regional differences with Lima decrease the dropout likelihood. It 
is less likely that trainees receive jobs offers in unfavourable economic conditions. In both 
exit routes, working an internship under the regulation of a written contract discourages 
trainees from dropping out. This may indicate the firm’s commitment to training activities. 
Hiring trainees informally, with no written contract, suggests that the training firm is using 
trainees as cheap labour. Consequently, trainees with no contract do not find it worthwhile 
to complete the internship. 
 
Table 5.6. 
Probability of dropping out of a Projoven internship through different exit routes. Model 2, 
multinomial probit estimates (base category: training completion). 
 
Drop out for a job Drop out into 
unemployment 
 
Marg. 
effect 
Std. 
err. 
Marg. 
effect 
Std. 
err. 
     
Age 0.003 (0.012) 0.003 (0.011) 
Household size 0.020* (0.011) -0.009 (0.011) 
Female -0.141*** (0.053) 0.092* (0.049) 
Married -0.058 (0.140) -0.054 (0.110) 
Child -0.016 (0.191) 0.051 (0.189) 
Child * Female -0.055 (0.182) 0.041 (0.180) 
Household income 0.033 (0.040) -0.004 (0.038) 
Schooling -0.017 (0.019) 0.009 (0.019) 
Course 0.063 (0.056) -0.081 (0.051) 
No work experience -0.162*** (0.056) 0.197*** (0.055) 
Arequipa -0.385*** (0.071) -0.187*** (0.062) 
Chiclayo -0.040 (0.094) 0.045 (0.088) 
Cusco -0.588*** (0.072) -0.261*** (0.064) 
Trujillo 0.119 (0.269) -0.232 (0.251) 
ECAP effectiveness -0.572*** (0.070) -0.244*** (0.063) 
Written contract [Lima or Chiclayo]a -0.452*** (0.066) -0.216*** (0.059) 
Number of observations [N = 809] 152 79 
Overall Wald test  ( )
2
32χ  = 210.17 
Log-likelihood  -466.86115 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Marginal effects estimated at the sample median of all the variables. 
Base category for city dummies: Lima. 
a The variable written contract is only available for Lima and Chiclayo. It is coded as zero for the other cities. Its (ex)inclusion 
does not modify the sign and significance of the other coefficients. 
 
 
In sum, trainees who are males and who have prior work experience are less likely to drop 
out into unemployment, but more likely to drop out for another job. This may be why the 
effects of these variables are found to be not significant in Model 1, which does not 
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distinguish exit routes. Similarly, the effect of household size is found to be positive and 
significant in Model 1 and in the drop out for a job component of Model 2, and negative and 
insignificant in the dropout into unemployment component of Model 2. Perhaps, Model 1 
comprises the average effect of the two components of Model 2. This shows how important it 
is to distinguish between exit routes. It seems that trainees who drop out for a job are 
different from those who drop out into unemployment. Nevertheless, Model 1 is important 
to show that there is no evidence of selection into internship placement. In addition, 
precarious working conditions in the internship (no written contract) discourage trainees 
from continuing with the training, irrespective of the model or exit route. Both Model 1 and 
Model 2 address how crucial regional differences are in modifying trainees’ expectations and 
opportunity costs to continue training. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
Some studies suggest that YJTPs are more effective when completed (Mealli et al., 1996; 
Chacaltana et al., 2003; Chong and Galdo, 2003) or the longer the trainee is exposed to the 
training (Kluve et al., 2007; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2007). If training is effective conditional on 
completion, it is crucial to find out the reasons why trainees drop out. This chapter analyses 
the determinants of trainees’ dropout decisions in the Peruvian YJTP Projoven. In this study, 
it is tested whether dropout is due to i) trainee characteristics, ii) regional context differences, 
or iii) training characteristics. Four general conclusions are reached. 
 
First, the effects of individual characteristics vary across exit routes. When only one exit 
route is considered, only being a member of a larger household seems to be relevant. 
However, when more exit routes are considered, it is found that trainees who drop out for a 
job are different from those who drop out into unemployment. Males and individuals with 
work experience are more likely to drop out for a job, whereas they are significantly less 
likely to drop out into unemployment or inactivity. These results confirm two previous 
findings: i) In many YJTPs in Latin America, female trainees benefit the most from training 
(Betcherman et al., 2004); and ii) In the case of Projoven, trainees who do not have work 
experience benefit the most from training completion (Chapter 4). Thus, females and trainees 
with no work experience are most likely to be unemployed if they are not in the programme. 
The programme’s effects could be enhanced if more women and individuals with no work 
experience were interested; however, some measures (incentives) must be implemented by 
the programme so that these individuals do not drop out. 
 
Second, regional differences play an important role in explaining dropout behaviour. In both 
models, the comparison of small cities with Lima suggests that where fewer opportunities 
are available for youths, the dropout likelihood decreases. It seems that Projoven is seen as 
an alternative when jobs are unavailable. 
 
Third, classroom instruction characteristics and internship conditions are crucial in 
explaining dropout behaviour. In the selection equation of Model 1, it is observed that an 
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ECAP’s capacity determines trainee placement in internships. This could be why the 
hypothesis of selection into internship is rejected. In addition, working with no written 
contract (i.e., under precarious conditions) discourages trainees from completing the 
programme despite the exit routes. Consequently, training content and its quality affect the 
dropout likelihood. This is an important result, since training content and quality affect not 
only the dropout likelihood, but also the labour market outcomes of the trainees. 
 
Finally, the results suggest that trainees’ dropout decisions follow a rational pattern. Trainees 
stay in the programme as long as they perceive evidence that it is worth doing so. First, since 
women and individuals with no work experience are most likely to benefit from the course, 
they are also less likely to drop out. Second, in cities where fewer job opportunities are 
available (in comparison with Lima), trainees are also less likely to drop out. Finally, when 
the training conditions indicate chances of being hired on a permanent basis or the training 
firm is committed to the training activities (having a written contract), trainees are also less 
likely to drop out. 
 
Finding out what drives trainees to complete or drop out of YJTPs is important because it 
helps policy planners enhance the outcomes of their programmes. A more rigorous process 
of selecting training providers and more effective enforcement mechanisms are necessary to 
rule out internships that offer precarious conditions (in terms of the lack of contracts) and to 
ensure high-quality training courses, including internship placements. Hence, YJTPs such as 
Projoven could achieve better results in terms of completion rates and training outcomes. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
 
6.1.1 Projoven’s Institutional Framework 
 
The review of Projoven’s institutional framework revealed that its impact evaluation should 
take into account that i) not all trainees are placed in internships; ii) not all trainees complete 
the internships; and iii) distinguishing different categories of employment and individual 
heterogeneity could shed more light on Projoven’s effectiveness assessment. 
 
First, since a quarter of the trainees are not placed in internships, Projoven’s impact 
evaluation should distinguish between the effects of the different phases of the programme. 
In principle, all trainees are entitled to follow the internship phase after the classroom phase. 
The only condition is attendance. Although more than 95% of the trainees complete the 
classroom phase, training providers fail to place a quarter of trainees in internships. This 
failure could be the result of the programme’s course selection and the low threshold for 
internship placement set by Projoven. Projoven’s course selection is based on an algorithm 
which assigns higher scores to proposals for low cost courses. In addition, training providers 
must comply with the requirement to place at least 60% of the trainees in internships. To 
present low cost course proposals, training providers may supply low quality training or not 
offer internship placements for all the trainees. Considering that not all trainees are placed in 
internships is important since the effects of the programme only materialise conditionally on 
the completion of the two training phases. 
 
Second, since 30% of the trainees placed in internships drop out, Projoven’s treatment effects 
evaluation should account for the presence of trainees with partial treatment. In the case of 
Projoven, the monitoring system fails to prevent training providers from supplying 
internships under precarious conditions, which may discourage trainees from staying in the 
programme. Projoven’s treatment effects evaluation should account for trainees’ dropout 
behaviour since different levels of training completion could bias the estimates of the effects 
of the programme. Not completing the programme could imply that trainees did not acquire 
all the skills they need in order to increase their labour market prospects. 
 
Third, because of the presence of an informal labour market, Projoven’s treatment effect 
evaluation should consider different categories of employment, including formal and 
informal, as well as individual heterogeneity (e.g., work experience). Half of the trainees are 
working before enroling in the programme. Given the lack of proper welfare programmes 
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and driven by their urgent needs, economically disadvantaged youths may drop out of 
school early and search for jobs in the informal labour market (under precarious conditions). 
Thus, by observing only overall employment, the programme might overlook its effects on 
employment quality. Formal employment could be a better indicator of training programme 
effectiveness. In addition, differentiating Projoven’s effects based on work experience could 
be more informative. Amalgamating the effects of trainees with different levels of work 
experience could lead to a misleading assessment of the programme’s effectiveness. For 
instance, trainees with prior work experience could experience lower returns if the training 
merely teaches skills they already possess. 
 
6.1.2 Projoven Evaluation Data 
 
To evaluate Projoven’s effects in terms of both overall and formal employment and also in 
terms of monthly wages, this study used Projoven’s sixth public call dataset. The analysis of 
this data provides evidence of the presence of a pre-programme earnings dip for the trainees 
which may cast some doubts on their comparability with the control group. To avoid 
potential bias in Projoven’s treatment effects estimations, a new control group was created 
using propensity score matching with replacement. After this procedure, systematic 
differences were significantly reduced. In addition, a Rosenbaum’s sensitivity analysis 
suggests that the effects of Projoven in terms of employment are not especially sensitive to 
the presence of unobservables (hidden bias). Nevertheless, in terms of wages, some 
differences still persist. The test of systematic differences rejected the hypothesis of no 
systematic differences in terms of previous wages between the trainees and the control 
group. Therefore, estimations of Projoven’s effects on trainees’ wages must be considered 
cautiously. 
 
6.1.3 Projoven’s Treatment Effect Evaluation 
 
The literature review of YJTP’s treatment effects suggests that these programmes are 
relatively more effective in Latin America than in Europe or the U.S. In terms of employment 
prospects and earnings, these programmes have yielded higher returns for youths in Latin 
America, particularly for women. Regarding methods of estimation, in most of the Latin 
American studies, the presence of unobservables has not been dealt with directly. Most of 
the studies rely on the assumption that time-invariant unobservables are purged from the 
treatment effect estimations via difference-in-difference with propensity score matching 
techniques. However, the presence of pre-programme earnings dips provides evidence of 
some systematic differences between trainees and the control group, which casts doubt on 
their comparability. Additionally, the review of the studies accounting for trainees with 
partial treatment demonstrated that ignoring dropout rates could yield misleading 
conclusions about the effectiveness of training programmes. In general, YJTPs seemed to be 
more effective based on completion level or length of exposure to the training. 
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Based on the discussion of the institutional analysis and the literature review, this thesis has 
developed an empirical strategy to evaluate the effectiveness of Projoven’s sixth public call. 
Four groups are compared pair-wise: the control group, the dropout group with only 
classroom instruction, the dropout group with classroom instruction and internship 
placement, and the group completing the full programme. By doing so, the bias introduced 
by the different levels of training completion has been reduced. In addition, by using fixed 
effects and random effects estimators, it accounted for time-invariant unobservables and 
heterogeneity of trainees’ characteristics (gender, poverty status and work experience), 
respectively. The estimations also accounted for selection effects and the potential 
endogeneity of training completion. To do so, pooled two-stage least squares methods with 
sample selection correction were used. In all the cases the estimations allow the treatment 
effects to vary over time by six, twelve and eighteen months after the programme. 
Controlling for sample selection allows the estimated effects on formal employment and 
wages to not be influenced by the fact that Projoven increases trainees’ likelihood of being 
employed. 
 
Decomposing the programme’s effects by level of completion suggests that the programme is 
more effective conditionally upon completion. It is found that in terms of overall 
employment, the programme yields returns only in the short term (six months after the end 
of the programme) and conditionally on internship completion. In terms of formal 
employment, no significant effects were found. The programme seems to increase trainees’ 
wages, but these effects diminish over time. The programme’s positive effects on monthly 
wages and null effects on formal employment suggest that trainees are working more hours 
in the same type of precarious jobs that they would be working in the absence of the 
programme. In addition, when differentiating the programme’s effects based on individual 
characteristics, it seems that Projoven yields additional returns, which are constant over time, 
for individuals with no work experience prior to enrolment.  
 
6.1.4 Determinants of Trainees’ Decision to Drop Out 
 
The estimates of Projoven’s treatment effects begs the question of why trainees drop out if it 
is apparently worth the effort to complete the training. To investigate the determinants of 
trainees’ dropout behaviour, this study developed two empirical models. While the first one, 
a probit model with a sample selection correction, accounts for selection into internship, the 
second one, a multinomial model, accounts for two different exit-routes (dropping out for 
another job or going into unemployment/inactivity). These models test whether trainees’ 
characteristics, regional differences and/or training characteristics affect their dropout 
behaviour. The results of the models suggest no evidence of selection into internship as 
having influence on the dropout rate, and that trainees stay in the programme as long as they 
perceive that it is worthwhile continuing the training. Three general conclusions are reached 
based on the analysis of trainees’ dropout behaviour. First, since women and individuals 
with no work experience are most likely to benefit from the training, they are also less likely 
to drop out. This is related to the fact that trainees who are male and have prior work 
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experience are less likely to drop out into unemployment, but are more likely to drop out for 
another job. Second, in cities where fewer job opportunities are available (in comparison with 
Lima), trainees are also less likely to drop out. Finally, under the presence of a written 
contract, which indicates more favourable working conditions, trainees are less likely to drop 
out. These results confirm two previous findings: i) in many YJTPs in Latin America, female 
trainees benefit the most from training (Betcherman et al., 2004); and ii) in the case of 
Projoven, trainees who do not have work experience benefit the most from training 
completion (Chapter 4). 
 
 
6.2 Contribution to Training Evaluation Research 
 
This thesis first contributes to the treatment effects research by explicitly examining the 
impact of the presence of trainees with partial instruction in YJTPs. In general, existing 
studies of training programmes for disadvantaged youths have difficulties accounting 
simultaneously for unobservables, potential endogeneity of training completion, trainees’ 
heterogeneity and institutional arrangements. Several studies that do not account for the 
presence of trainees with partial treatment in Latin America found that training programmes 
are effective policy interventions, in terms of employment and wages, particularly for young 
women (Betcherman et al., 2004; Ibarrarán and Rosas, 2008). However, these studies cannot 
identify if both training components, classroom instruction and internship, are necessary to 
yield these returns or whether the presence of unobservables is driving those results. This 
study shows that integrating institutional arrangements, individual heterogeneity of trainees 
and trainees’ dropout behaviour is crucial to understand and estimate the effects of skill 
development policies for disadvantaged youths. Projoven is, indeed, an effective policy 
intervention but conditionally on completion of both training phases and with diminishing 
returns over time. In addition, the programme yields additional returns for those trainees 
without work experience prior to the training and not for women. Perhaps previous 
evaluations, by neglecting trainees’ work experience, confound the effects of work 
experience and gender. 
 
Second, this study contributes to the empirical evaluation research which measures the 
effects of training programmes for disadvantaged youths. The approach here consists of 
comparing pair-wise four groups of youths (the control group, the dropout group with only 
classroom training, the dropout group with classroom training and internship placement, 
and the group completing the full programme) to avoid potential bias generated by 
completion levels. In addition, the use of fixed effects accounts for the presence of 
unobservables; and complemented with random effects allows the effects of the programme 
to vary, not only over time, but across individuals characteristics (gender, poverty status and 
work experience). 
 
Third, this thesis contributes to the existing evaluation research by focusing on the 
determinants of trainees’ dropout behaviour accounting for potential selection into 
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internships and allowing the effects of the determinants to vary depending on the exit route 
(to another job or into unemployment). The few empirical studies that evaluated training 
programmes accounting for partial treatment did not develop further on why trainees drop 
out even though they concluded it is not worth doing so (e.g., Mealli et al., 1996; Heckman et 
al., 1998; Heckman et al., 2000; Lee and Lee, 2003; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2007). Only Waller 
(2008) studies the occurrence of dropouts in training programmes; however she only focuses 
on demographic characteristics of the trainees and does not account for different exit routes. 
Trainees who drop out for another job can have a different profile than those who drop out 
into unemployment. By accounting for potential selection into internship and different exit 
routes, this study suggests that individual characteristics, regional features and 
characteristics of the training affect trainees’ dropout behaviour. Additionally, it argues that 
trainees who are male and have prior work experience are less likely to drop out into 
unemployment, but more likely to drop out for another job. This is crucial as to allow policy 
makers to enhance the benefits of training by taking into account these factors.   
 
Both empirical structures − i) Projoven’s effectiveness evaluation and ii) the analysis of the 
factors affecting trainees’ dropout behaviour − complement each other in order to shed more 
light in studying the dropout phenomenon in training programmes. Whereas the first one 
evaluates the consequences of dropping out, in terms of employment condition and wages 
gains, the second one provides a profile of trainees who are most likely to drop out. The 
analysis of the factors affecting trainees’ dropout behaviour complements Projoven’s 
effectiveness evaluation by going beyond the consequences of dropping out. It gives some 
explanation as to why trainees drop out. 
 
Although trainees’ decision to drop out is obviously affected by the expectation of potential 
employment and income gains, both empirical structures are treated separately. The reason 
is that whereas in the evaluation of Projoven’s effectiveness the internship placement is the 
treatment factor (which is allowed to be endogeneous and/or exogenous), in the analysis of 
dropout determinants internship placement is an element of sample selection. In addition, 
the endogenous treatment of internship (or the exogenous as well) does not allow 
differentiating trainees by exit route (another job or unemployment) because the exit routes 
are also the outcome to evaluate. 
 
 
6.3 Policy Implications 
 
The conclusions of this study imply that training could be an effective policy intervention to 
improve labour market prospects for economically disadvantaged youths. However, to 
enhance training potential it should be taken into account that the programme works 
differently for different people; that not all the trainees receive the same doses of treatment; 
and that precarious treatment conditions could lead them to drop out of the programme. As 
the behaviour of trainees, training providers and training firms are affected by the set of 
rules and incentives under which the programme is carried out, the analysis of the 
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institutional framework must be also be taken into consideration when evaluating Projoven’s 
effectiveness.  
 
The perception that YJTPs are more effective in developing countries than in developed 
countries remains valid. However, a different angle has been added. Projoven indeed 
increases the employment prospects and monthly wages of its trainees, but only for those 
who manage to complete the training. The analysis of the programme’s effects, accounting 
for levels of completion, warns training practitioners about why the trainees drop out 
although it is apparently not worthwhile to do so. This thesis found that trainees stay in 
training as long as they perceive it increases their chances in the labour market. 
Consequently, the quality of the classroom instruction and the conditions in which the 
internships are carried out are crucial. In this respect, the institutional arrangements of the 
programme play an important role. The monitoring system fails to prevent training 
providers from placing trainees in precarious internships. In addition, by preferring low unit 
cost training providers, the programme may compromise the quality of the training. Under 
these circumstances, certain trainees may not be placed in internships or may feel 
encouraged to drop out, diminishing Projoven’s capacity to enhance labour market prospects 
of its participants. 
 
Another important finding of this thesis is related to the individual heterogeneity. The 
estimation of Projoven’s effects suggests that the programme yields additional returns, in 
terms of employment and monthly wages, for those trainees with no work experience. It was 
also found that, in the absence of the programme, trainees with no work experience are more 
likely to be unemployed. It seems that trainees with no prior work experience are the type of 
youths who are most in need of the programme and that they profit most from it as well. 
Consequently, the programme may increase its returns by targeting disadvantaged youths 
without work experience and accompanying this with measures to motivate these youths to 
stay in the programme. YJTPs are important to help disadvantaged youths to find their first 
job, which may be almost impossible otherwise in a developing country setting. 
 
This thesis has shown that policy measures targeting disadvantaged youths need to combine 
an appropriate and integrated mix of occupational skills and internships and that an 
adequate supply of employment opportunities and a more developed market for vocational 
education is needed. Evidence presented in this study suggests that YJTPs in developing 
countries may improve labour market outcomes among disadvantaged youths. Nevertheless, 
if no internship opportunities are available, or the internships are carried out in precarious 
conditions, YJTPs such as Projoven may be ineffective. Consequently, these services need to 
be carried out in such a way that the institutional arrangements generate the right incentives 
to enhance their effectiveness: i) incentives for trainees to take up and complete the training; 
ii) incentives for training providers to offer high-quality courses and to find internship places 
for all participants; and iii) incentives for training firms to include training as an investment 
policy and offer proper conditions (written contracts). Encouraging shorter, more flexible 
training if trainees do not complete the programme is useless as well if graduates from YJTPs 
remain insufficiently prepared for the jobs available in the labour market. Eventually, YJTPs 
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should be complemented with an integral reform of the market for vocational training. If 
training providers are not regulated, it would be expected that trainees continue dropping 
out and internships are not proper. 
 
 
6.4 Future Research 
 
The analysis conducted in this study exposes open questions and identifies the scope for 
further research, particularly in the empirical field. If data regarding other Projoven public 
calls and more detailed information matching trainees with firm characteristics were 
available, other directions for future research could be suggested. For instance, the link 
between business cycles, training providers’ quality indicators and trainees’ outcomes in a 
developing country context should be analyzed in more depth. This is a field of research for 
which empirical evidence is restricted to a few developed countries. Business cycles are 
likely to affect simultaneously trainees’, training providers’ and training firms’ decisions to 
take up or to provide training. In addition, YJTPs could be more (or less) effective depending 
on which phase of the business cycle the programme is carried out. Contrary to other 
findings, Projoven’s effects are found to diminish over time in this study, which coincides 
with the lower economic growth observed during 2001, post-training period of the sixth 
public call of the programme. Consequently, if data from other waves (public calls) of the 
programme were available, accounting for business cycle effects could modify the current 
view about YJTPs’ effectiveness in developing countries. 
 
Another direction for future research, if more detailed data matching trainees with firm 
characteristics were available, would be to control for training firms’ effects in treatment 
effects estimations. Some firms provide better internship conditions and, therefore, are more 
likely to yield higher employment and income gains. In this study, the presence of a written 
contract in an internship is used as an indicator of internship conditions. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to evaluate also the effect of the regulation of internship contracts and whether 
this influences the decision of the training firm to provide proper internships. In a 
developing country context, transaction costs (contract regulation) play an important role in 
training provision as these could make training provisions relatively more expensive. 
 
Lastly, a promising line of further research would be in terms of empirical methods. In this 
thesis, the estimation of the determinants of trainees’ dropout behaviour endogeneity was 
assumed away. The presence of unobservables affecting dropout behaviour simultaneously 
with the explanatory variables (having a contract, for instance) could not be tested in this 
study. Another issue to consider is the sample selection in the multinomial probit model for 
trainees’ dropout behaviour given different exit-routes. Although single-exit route models 
provided no evidence of sample selection, this thesis did not test selectivity in the 
multinomial model setting. Therefore, developing an empirical procedure for multinomial 
models with selectivity which accounts for potential endogeneity would be of interest. 
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Latijns-Amerikaanse landen hebben te maken met grote barrières voor het verbeteren van de 
werkgelegenheidsperspectieven voor jongere werknemers, in het bijzonder die uit minder 
bevoorrechte milieus. Het groeiende aantal jonge mensen in tijdelijke, onzekere en slecht 
betaalde banen vraagt om hervormingen door beleidsmakers. Als beleidsmaatregel gericht 
op economisch achtergestelde jongeren zijn in Latijns-Amerika jeugdtrainingsprogramma’s 
(YTPs – Youth Job-Training Programmes) geïntroduceerd. Het doel van deze programma’s is 
om de arbeidsmarktperspectieven van deze jongeren te verbeteren door ze te voorzien van 
de basisvaardigheden die nodig zijn voor een baan evenals een aantal vak- 
ofberoepsspecifieke vaardigheden. Deze trainingsprogramma’s worden uitgevoerd in Latijns 
Amerika  sinds de beginjaren 90. Onder deze landen bevinden zich Venezuela (1993), 
Argentinië (1994), Paraguay (1994), Peru (1996), de Dominicaanse Republiek (1999), 
Colombia (2000), Panama (2002) en Haïti (2005). YJTPs zijn gebaseerd op een duaal systeem 
van scholing en een beroepsgerichte stage. De jongeren volgen een markt-georiënteerde 
benadering waarbij overheden de trainingsactiviteiten uitbesteden aan private partijen. De 
Latijns-Amerikaanse overheden financieren de trainingsaanbieders om de jongeren te 
trainen op hun eigen locaties en hen vervolgens van een stageplek te voorzien. De overheid 
beperkt haar rol tot het selecteren van de beste offertes van de private organisaties door 
middel van publieke inschrijvingen en het controleren van de kwaliteit van de aangeboden 
trainingen. 
 
De Latijns-Amerikaanse YJTPs zijn uitgebreid geëvalueerd en de algemene conclusie is dat 
de trainingsprogramma’s effectieve beleidsinterventies zijn. Er wordt aangevoerd dat deze 
programma’s de kansen op werk voor jongeren vergroot, evenals hun potentiële inkomsten, 
in het bijzonder voor jonge vrouwen. De aanwezigheid van jongeren die het programma niet 
afronden, omdat zij geen stageplek krijgen toegewezen of omdat zij vrijwillig met het 
programma stoppen, wordt in de meeste evaluaties veronachtzaamd. Dit is cruciaal, want 
het is kenmerkend voor vrijwel alle trainingsprogramma’s dat een belangrijk deel van de 
deelnemers de training niet afmaakt (‘partial treatment’). Als er rekening wordt gehouden 
met het verschijnseldat een laag aantal deelnemers de training afrondt , kunnen de oorzaken 
en implicaties hiervan de huidige kijk op de effectiviteit van de YTPs in twijfel doen trekken. 
. Het zou bovendien informatie kunnen opleveren over het vergroten van de effectiviteit van 
deze programma’s. 
 
Het lage aantal dat het programma voltooit, levert aanwijzingen op  dat i) aanbieders niet 
alle trainees van een stageplek voorzien; ii) stages gelopen worden onder slechte 
voorwaarden;  iii) het programma voor sommige typen personen beter werkt dan voor 
anderen. Om de effectiviteit van het programma te kunnen bepalen en te begrijpen is het 
daarom belangrijk de effecten van de verschillende fases van het programma te 
onderscheiden, rekening te houden met de institutionele regelingen van de training 
(reglementen, stimuleringsmaatregelen en handhavingmechanismen) en de individuele 
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heterogeniteit (individuele kenmerken). Als stages bovendien onder slechte omstandigheden 
worden gelopen, kunnen deelnemers afvallen voor betere mogelijkheden. Deze aspecten zijn 
genegeerd in eerdere evaluaties. Daarom blijft de relatie tussen het voltooien van de training, 
de heterogeniteit van de deelnemers en de institutionele regelingen van de training aan de 
ene kant en de kansen op de arbeidsmarkt aan de andere kant, dubbelzinnig. Dit proefschrift 
beoogt dit gat in de ‘treatment effects’ literatuur op te vullen. 
 
Dit proefschrift evalueert in het bijzonder de effectiviteit van het Peruaanse YJTP Projoven in 
termen van zowel totale werkgelegenheid als formele werkgelegenheid en in termen van 
maandlonen. De casus die is gekozen voor deze studie is representatief voor soortelijke 
trainingsmaatregelen in Latijns-Amerika en heeft een gemiddeld aantal uitvallers. Projoven 
is een doorlopend trainingsprogramma dat is gestart in 1996 en dat minstens een keer per 
jaar wordt uitgevoerd in opeenvolgende golven of ‘public calls’ (publieke aanbestedingen). 
In de dertien jaar dat het operatief is, heeft het zo’n 60.000 personen getraind. Het 
programma wordt gerund door het Peruaanse ministerie van arbeid. Projoven financiert de 
trainingscursussen voor jongeren, maar de service wordt geleverd door trainingsinstituten 
die concurreren om de financiering te bemachtigen voor hun  opleidingsaanbod. Het officiële 
doel van het programma is het faciliteren van de toegang tot de formele arbeidsmarkt voor 
economisch achtergestelde jongeren (16-24 jaar oud) door ze te voorzien van een basis 
training in laagopgeleide beroepen. De Projoven training is gebaseerd op twee 
opeenvolgende fasen: i) drie maanden scholing, die bijna alle deelnemers afronden, gevolgd 
door ii) drie maanden beroepsgerichte stage  die aan de meerderheid, maar niet aan alle 
deelnemers wordt aangeboden. 
 
Dit proefschrift integreert de analyse van het institutionele kader, de individuele 
heterogeniteit en het gedrag van de uitvallers tot een evaluatie van de effectiviteit van 
Projoven.  Hiervoor wordt een driestappen benadering gevolgd. Hoofdstuk 2 geeft als eerste 
stap achtergrondinformatie over het programma en het bediscussieert het institutionele 
kader. Deze discussie levert een aantal elementen op waar rekening mee gehouden zou 
moeten worden in de evaluatie van het trainingsprogramma. Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 zijn als 
tweede stap gewijd aan de evaluatie van de ‘treatment’ effecten van Projoven. Hoofdstuk 3 
beschrijft en bespreekt Projovens dataset en de 6de  ‘public call’, waarvoor gedetailleerde data 
beschikbaar zijn. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een methodologie voorgesteld en toegepast om 
Projoven te evalueren. Deze methodologie houdt rekening met de niet-experimentele aard 
van de data, de heterogeniteit van de individuen, de selectie voor werk en de aanwezigheid 
van deelnemers met een ‘partial treatment’. De evaluatie is uitgevoerd in termen van zowel 
totale als formele werkgelegenheid en in termen van maandlonen. Als derde stap 
identificeert en bediscussieert hoofdstuk 5 de factoren die het gedrag van de deelnemers die 
het programma afbreken, beïnvloeden. Onderzocht wordt of individuele eigenschappen, 
regionale kenmerken of trainingskenmerken de beslissing van de deelnemers om de training 
te stoppen, beïnvloedt. Tot slot wordt in hoofdstuk 6 een aantal algemene conclusies 
getrokken. 
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Hoofdstuk 2 bestudeert tot op welke hoogte er rekening zou moeten worden gehouden met 
de institutionele regelingen in de evaluatie van de effectiviteit van het programma in de 
context waarin het programma wordt uitgevoerd. Naar aanleiding van een uiteenzetting hoe 
Projoven behoort te werken en hoe het daadwerkelijk werkt, stelt dit hoofdstuk drie 
elementen voor waarmee rekening moet worden gehouden wanneer de effectiviteit van een 
training als Projoven wordt geëvalueerd. Als eerste moet worden gerealiseerd dat niet alle 
leerlingen een stageplek toegewezen krijgen wanneer ze de scholing hebben afgerond. 
Daarom moet er bij het meten van Projovens impact een onderscheid worden gemaakt 
tussen de effecten van de twee fases van het programma. Ten tweede moet er bij het meten 
van Projoven’s impact rekening worden gehouden met de aanwezigheid van deelnemers 
met een gedeeltelijke training, omdat 30% van de deelnemers de praktijkstage voortijdig 
afbreekt. Ten derde moet niet uit het oog worden verloren dat zowel de deelnemers als hun 
arbeidsmogelijkheden heterogeen zijn. Het feit dat de helft van de deelnemers voorafgaand 
aan het programma werkzaam is, hoogst waarschijnlijk in de informele sector, heeft 
gevolgen voor de berekening van het trainingseffect in termen van 
werkgelegenheidsindicatoren en individuele heterogeniteit. Het evalueren van de totale 
werkkansen kan de werkelijke potentie van het programma over het hoofd zien, omdat 
minder bevoorrechte jongeren regelmatig te werk gesteld zijn in riskante, slecht betaalde 
banen zonder sociale rechten (de informele arbeidsmarkt). Als er rekening wordt gehouden 
met de aanwezigheid van de informele arbeidsmarkt, zou het bepalen van de formele 
werkgelegenheidscondities van deelnemers additioneleaanwijzingen kunnen opleveren van 
Projoven’s effect in termen van werkgelegenheid. Bovendien zou het programma de 
deelnemers verschillend kunnen beïnvloeden, afhankelijk van hun werkervaring. De 
trainingsopbrengsten zouden bijvoorbeeld relatief lager kunnen uitvallen voor jongeren met 
werkervaring, omdat zij al over een aantal vaardigheden beschikken. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft Projovens dataset van de 6de ‘public call’ . Deze dataset combineert 
niet alleen demografische informatie van de deelnemers en een officiële controlegroep, maar 
ook administratieve gegevens over de mate waarin men de training voltooid heeft. Hij omvat 
een vastlegging van de uitgangssituatie en drie na-interviews: zes, twaalf en achttien 
maanden na afloop van de training. Dit hoofdstuk zet uiteen hoe een nieuwe controlegroep 
werd gecreëerd door middel van ‘propensity score matching with replacement’. Doel is om 
het probleem aan te pakken van de terugval in verdiensten die voorafgaand aan de training 
bij de deelnemers optreedt maar niet wordt waargenomen bij de officiële controle groep en 
die een aanwijzing kan vormen voor   . systematische verschillen tussen beide groepen, wat 
hun vergelijkbaarheid ondermijnt. De nieuwe controlegroep is een deelsteekproef van de 
individuen in de officiële controlegroep. De toetsen die uitgevoerd zijn bij deze nieuwe 
controlegroep geven aan dat de geschatte trainingsseffecten in termen van werkkansen vrij 
zijn van bias, terwijl deze in termen van maandlonen kunnen zijn overschat. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de effectiviteit van Projovens 6de  ‘public call in termen van zowel 
totale als formele werkgelegenheid en in termen van maandlonen. Er wordt rekening 
gehouden met de aanwezigheid van deelnemers die de training slechts gedeeltelijk 
ondergaan door gebruik te maken van ‘fixed effect’ methodes met correctie voor 
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steekproefselectie. De correctie voor steekproefselectie zorgt ervoor dat de geschatte effecten 
opde formele werkgelegenheid en de lonen niet worden beïnvloed door het feit dat Projoven 
de waarschijnlijkheid van het vinden van werk zou kunnen vergroten. Er worden vier 
groepen paarsgewijs vergeleken: de controlegroep, de afvallers die alleen de scholingsfase 
hebben doorlopen, de afvallers met scholing en een onvolledige praktijkstage en de groep 
die het complete programma van scholing en praktijkstage heeft afgerond. De schattingen 
houden ook rekening met de potentiele endogeniteit van de afronding van de training door 
gebruik te maken van gepoolde ‘two stages least squares’ methoden met correctie voor 
steekproefselectie. 
 
Splitsing van de effecten van het trainingsprogramma naar de mate van afronding levert 
aanwijzingen op dat het progamma effectiever is op voorwaarde dat men deze geheel 
afrond. Er wordt gevonden dat in termen van totale werkgelegenheid het programma alleen 
een gunstig effect  heeft op de korte termijn (zes maanden na afloop van het programma) en 
op voorwaarde van voltooïng van de praktijkstage. In termen van formele werkgelegenheid 
werden geen significante resultaten gevonden. Het programma lijkt de lonen van de trainees 
te verhogen, maar dit effect neemt in de loop van de tijd af. De positieve effecten van het 
programma op de maandlonen en het ontbreken van een effect op de formele 
werkgelegenheid duidt er op dat de trainees meer uren zijn gaan werken in hetzelfde type 
onzekere banen als waarin zij werkzaam zouden zijn zonder het trainingsprogramma. Als 
verder de programma-effecten worden gedifferentieerd naar de individuele kenmerken van 
de deelnemers lijkt Projoven voor individuen die voor hun deelname geen werkervaring 
hadden extra opbrengsten te hebben die constant blijven in de loop van de tijd Er moet 
worden opgemerkt dat de algemeen-evenwichtseffecten van Projoven op de Peruaanse 
arbeidsmarkt te verwaarlozen zijn gegeven het beperkte bereik van Projoven. 
 
De schatting van de effecten van de deelname aan Projoven roept de vraag op waarom er 
deelnemers afvallen wanneer het duidelijk de moeite waard is om de training af te ronden. 
Om de determinanten van het gedrag van de afvallers te onderzoeken, worden in hoofdstuk 
5 twee empirisch modellen ontwikkeld. Het eerste model, een probit model met correctie 
voor steekproefselectie, verklaart waarom deelnemers wel of niet voor een stageplek worden 
geselecteerd, terwijl het tweede model, een multinomiaal model, de twee verschillende 
uitvalsroutes (uitval vanwege een andere baan of uitval leidend tot 
werkloosheid/inactiviteit) verklaart. Deze modellen toetsen of de kenmerken van de 
deelnemers, de regionale verschillen en/of de kenmerken van de training het gedrag dat 
leidt tot uitval beïnvloeden. De resultaten van de modellen duiden op de afwezigheid van 
een invloed van de selectie voor de praktijkstage  op het aantal afvallers en  dat de 
deelnemers het programma blijven volgen zolang zij het de moeite waard vinden de training 
te blijven volgen. Er kunnen drie algemene conclusies worden getrokken op basis van de 
analyse van het gedrag van de deelnemers die uitvallen. Allereerst is het minder 
waarschijnlijk dat vrouwen en personen zonder werkervaring het programma afbreken, 
aangezien zij hoogst waarschijnlijk het meest profiteren van de training. Dit is gerelateerd 
aan het feit dat mannelijke deelnemers met werkervaring voorafgaand aan het programma, 
waarschijnlijk minder snel uitvallen en werkloos worden, dan dat zij het programma 
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verlaten vanwege een andere baan. Ten tweede is het ook minder waarschijnlijk dat 
deelnemers afvallen in steden waar minder banen beschikbaar zijn (in vergelijking met 
Lima). Tenslotte is het minder waarschijnlijk dat deelnemers afvallen wanneer zij een 
geschreven contract hebben, wat betere werkomstandigheden veronderstelt. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 beschrijft tot slot de conclusies van de studie. De conclusies van deze studie 
duiden erop dat de training een effectieve beleidsinterventie zou kunnen voor het verbeteren 
van de arbeidsmarkt perspectieven van financieel achtergestelde jongeren. Om het potentieel 
van de training te vergroten moet er echter wel rekening mee worden gehouden dat het 
programma anders werkt voor verschillende typen personen,  dat niet alle deelnemers de 
training in dezelfde mate afronden en dat onzekere trainingsomstandigheden kunnen leiden 
tot het afbreken van deelname aan het programma. Bovendien moet bij een evaluatie van de 
effectiviteit van Projoven een analyse van het institutionele kader in beschouwing worden 
genomen , omdat het gedrag van deelnemers, aanbieders van trainingen en stagebedrijven 
wordt beïnvloed door de regelingen en stimuleringsmaatregelen die voor het programma 
gelden. 
 
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat beleidsmaatregelen gericht op economisch achtergestelde 
jongeren een geschikte en geïntegreerde mix van het leren van beroepsvaardigheden en een 
stage moet zijn en dat een adequaat aanbod van werkgelegenheidsmogelijkheden en een 
beter ontwikkelde markt voor scholing nodig zijn. De in deze studie geleverde aanwijzingen 
laten zien dat YJTPs de mogelijkheden op de arbeidsmarkt voor achtergesteld jongeren in 
ontwikkelingslanden zouden kunnen vergroten. Als er echter geen stages beschikbaar zijn of 
als de stages worden gelopen onder onzekere voorwaarden, kan een programma als 
Projoven ineffectief zijn. Als gevolg hiervan moeten het programma op zo’n manier worden 
uitgevoerd dat de institutionele regelingen de juiste stimulansen opleveren  die de 
effectiviteit vergroten: i) stimulansen voor de deelnemers om de training op te pakken en af 
te ronden; i) stimulansen voor de  trainingorganisaties om scholingsprogramma’s van  hoge 
kwaliteit  aan te bieden en stageplaatsen te vinden voor alle deelnemers; en iii) stimulansen 
voor stagebedrijven om training op te nemen in hun investeringsbeleid en gepaste 
voorwaarden te bieden (schriftelijk contract). Het aanmoedigen van kortere, meer flexibele 
training als deelnemers de training niet afronden is nutteloos, evenals een afgestudeerde van 
YJTP die onvolledig voorbereid is voor banen die beschikbaar zijn op de arbeidsmarkt. 
Tenslotte zouden YJTPs aangevuld moeten worden met een integrale hervorming van de 
markt voor scholing. Als trainingsaanbieders niet worden gereguleerd, kan worden 
verwacht dat deelnemers blijven uitvallen en dat stages niet geschikt zijn. 
Summary in Dutch 
 
134 
 
135 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
Henry Espinoza Peña was born in Callao, Peru, on January 31st, 1979. He graduated from 
high school at Liceo Naval Lizardo Montero in 1995. He studied economics at Universidad 
del Pacífico (Lima, Peru) from 1996 to 2001. 
 
From 2002 to 2005, he worked as a researcher at the Research Centre for Development 
Studies – CEDEP (Lima, Peru) where he carried out research and consultancies in 
employment issues and poverty dynamics in Peru. He also participated in the impact 
evaluation of diverse social programmes.  
 
In August 2005, Henry Espinoza moved to the Netherlands to study a Master in Social 
Protection and Public Policy at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG). For 
his Master Thesis he analyzed the role of the free availability of the tenure bonus CTS 
(Compensación por tiempo de servicio), a non-wage labour cost in Peru, as an in-work benefit 
scheme. Using micro-simulations techniques, he assessed CTS’ impact at reducing poverty 
and suggested some proposals for reform. This thesis was awarded with the Stichting 
Wetenschapsbeoefening for the best Master Thesis at the Faculty of Humanities and Science 
(FHS) of Maastricht University. 
 
After concluding his Master studies, Henry joined the PhD programme of the MGSoG in 
September 2006. As a Research Fellow, Henry worked on his dissertation which evaluates 
the effects of job-training programmes on economically disadvantaged youths in Peru. In 
addition, he participated as a tutor and lecturer in the courses of Public Policy Analysis and 
Econometrics which were taught in the Master Programme of the MGSoG. 
  
136 
 
 
137 
 
MGSoG Dissertation Series 
 
Florian Tomini 
Between Family and Friends 
Understanding the Interdependency of Private Transfers 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr 15 (2010) 
 
Michał Polalowski 
The Institutional Transformation of Social Policy in East Central Europe: 
Poland and Hungary in comparative and historical perspective 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr 14 (2010) 
 
Maha Ahmed 
Defining, Measuring and Adressing Vulnerability: 
The Case of Post Conflict Environments 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr 13 (2010) 
 
Pascal Beckers 
Local Space and Economic Success 
The role of spatial segregation of migrants in the Netherlands 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr 12 (2011) 
 
Victor Cebotari 
Complicting Demands in Ethnically Diverse Societies 
Ethnopolitical Contention and Identity Values in Europe 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr 11 (2010) 
 
Dennis Gyllensporre 
Competing and Complementary Perspectives on the EU as a Crisis Management Actor: 
An Examination of the Common Security and Defence Policy through the Lenses of Idealism and Realism 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr 10 (2010) 
 
Judit Vall Castello 
Business Cycle and Policy Effects on Labour Market Transitions of Older and Disabled Workers in Spain 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr. 9 (2010) 
 
Keetie Roelen 
False Positives or Hidden Dimentions: the definition and measurement of child poverty 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr. 8 (2010) 
 
Denisa Maria Sologon 
Earning Dynamics in Europe 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr. 7 (2010) 
 
Melissa Siegel 
Money and Mobility: Migration and Remittances 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr. 6 (2010) 
 
Jessica S. Hagen-Zanker 
Modest Expectations: Causes and effects of migration on migrant households in 
source countries 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr. 5 (2010) 
 
138 
 
Mirtha R. Muniz Castillo 
Human Development and Autonomy in Project Aid: Experiences from four 
bilateral projects in Nigaragua and El Salvador 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr. 4 (2009) 
 
Christiane Arndt 
Governance Indicators 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr. 3 (2009) 
 
Britta Augsburg 
Microfinance – Greater Good or Lesser Evil? 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr. 2 (2009) 
 
Geranda Notten 
Measuring and Managing Poverty Risks 
MGSoG Dissertation Series, nr. 1 (2008) 
